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UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA 


CONTEMPORARY  AMERICAN 

OPINION  OF  THE  MID-CENTURY 

REVOLUTIONS  IN  CENTRAL  EUROPE 


ARTHUR  JAMES  MAY 


A  THESIS 

IN    HISTORY 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  IN 

PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR 

THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


PHILADELPHIA 
1927 


tf 


CONTEMPORARY  AMERICAN 

OPINION  OF  THE  MID-CENTURY 

REVOLUTIONS  IN  CENTRAL  EUROPE 


A  THESIS 

IN   HISTORY 
PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL  OF  THE 
UNIVERSITY  OF  PENNSYLVANIA  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILLMENT 
OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS  FOR  THE  DEGREE 
OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


ARTHUR  JAMES  MAY 


PHILADELPHIA 
1927 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I 

Opinion  of  Americans  in  Europe  on  the  Revolutions  in  the  Germanies. .  .        7 


Opinion  in  America  on  the  Revolutions  in  Germany 21 


III 

What  Americans  in  Europe  Thought  of  the  Revolutions  in  the  Austrian 

Empire 34 


IV 
Opinion  in  America  on  the  Austro-Hungarian  Revolts 44 


The  Conquered  Hero  Comes 65 


VI 


£ 


Congress  Debates  the  Exile's  Welcome 81 

VII 
Vox  Populi,  Vox  Dei? 86 

VIII 
The  Grand  Tour 107 


786693 


IX 

European  Liberty  and  the  Campaign  of  1852 115 

Conclusion 122 

Bibliography 129 


PREFACE 

Every  study  of  this  character  should  be  prefaced  with  a  brief 
statement  as  to  its  raison  d'etre.  Herein  the  writer  has  under- 
taken to  narrate  and  analyze  the  opinion  of  Americans  abroad 
and  at  home  with  respect  of  the  central  European  upheavals 
at  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  nature 
and  interest  of  Americans  in  European  affairs.  A  strenuous 
effort  has  been  made  to  keep  the  account  of  the  happenings  in 
Europe  at  the  irreducible  minimum,  but  in  various  footnotes, 
references  are  given  to  reliable  histories  of  the  revolutions.  Full 
and  free  expression  of  the  American  thought  and  feeling  on  revolu- 
tionary Europe  synchronizes  with  the  visit  of  the  eminent 
protagonist  of  Hungarian  independence,  Louis  Kossuth,  who  came 
hither  at  the  invitation  of  Congress.  The  influence  of  Kossuth 
upon  national  politics,  hinted  at  from  time  to  time,  has  been 
summarized  in  the  final  chapter.  The  conclusion,  it  is  hoped, 
may  be  of  some  value  to  the  general  student  of  American  history. 

In  the  collection  of  materials  for  this  work,  the  writer  has 
become  the  lasting  debtor  of  numerous  individuals  and  institu- 
tions. The  staffs  of  the  Library  of  the  Pennsylvania  Historical 
Society  in  Philadelphia  and  of  the  newspaper  division  in  the 
Library  of  Congress  have  been  especially  helpful.  Mrs.  Sum- 
mers and  Miss  Barney  in  the  manuscripts  divisions  of  the  Depart- 
ments of  State  and  Navy,  respectively,  have  enabled  him  to 
unearth  hitherto  unused  materials.  Dr.  Worthington  C.  Ford 
of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society  and  Mr.  John  C.  Fitz- 
patrick  of  the  Library  of  Congress  are  two  others  to  whom  the 
writer,  in  common  with  dozens  of  others,  is  deeply  obligated. 
As  the  footnotes  and  bibliography  reveal,  he  has  made  full  use 
of  the  investigations  of  other  workers  upon  topics  that  impinge 
on  his. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  materials,  the  writer  has  had  the 
fruitful  advice  and  constant  guidance  of  Professors  W.  E. 
Lingelbach,  St.  G.  L.  Sioussat,  and  Herman  V.  Ames  of  the 
University  of  Pennsylvania.  He  desires  here  to  express  his 
sincere  appreciation  of  their  inspiration  and  help.  Many  blem- 
ishes have  been  removed  because  of  the  aid  of  these  men ;  those 


which  remain  are  to  be  ascribed  exclusively  to  the  writer.  With- 
out the  aid  of  his  wife,  Hilda  Jones  May,  the  errors  in  this  study 
would  be  numerous. 

Arthur  J.  May. 
Rochester,  New  York. 
12  April,  1927 


I 

Opinion  of  Americans  in  Europe  on  the  Revolutions  in 

the  germanies 

Out  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars  emerged  a  " Germany"  which  was 
merely  a  geographical  expression,  with  kings  and  queens  in 
abundance  and  with  pawns  without  any  voice  in  the  affairs  of 
state.  But  as  the  century  hastened  to  its  mid-point,  unifying, 
liberal  principles  gained  headway  among  the  people  of  central 
Europe.  In  1847,  democratic  programmes  vied  with  nationalistic 
creeds  for  the  attention  of  the  people.  Prussia,  in  that  year, 
had  convoked  a  United  Diet  which  had  quarreled  with  the  King 
and  had  been  dissolved.  Unsatisfied  popular  demands  led 
directly  to  the  mid-century  upheaval  in  the  Germanies,  which 
needed  only  the  revolution  in  Paris  to  start  it  off.* 

American  observers  in  Europe  in  this  "annus  mirabilis" 
represented  the  same  groups  one  might  find  there  in  any  summer. 
Government  agents  prove  to  be  men  endowed  with  no  unusual 
powers  of  judgment,  but  full  of  democratic  feeling.  Foremost 
in  importance  stands  Andrew  Jackson  Donelson,  nephew  and 
disciple  of  him  whose  name  he  bore,  who  remained  as  Minister 
to  Prussia  throughout  the  hectic  period.  His  secretary,  Theodore 
S.  Fay,  an  author  of  some  distinction,  occasionally  informed 
Washington  of  his  views.  The  historian  Bancroft  graced  the 
ministerial  chair  in  London,  while  T.  G.  Clemson,  son-in-law  of 
Calhoun,  held  a  like  position  at  the  Hague. 

Of  particular  value  are  the  opinions  of  A.  Dudley  Mann,  a 
roving  diplomat  of  no  mean  ability,  who  had  been  in  Europe 
obtaining  emigration  data  for  the  government.  Consular  agents 
likewise  wrote  their  comments.  Officers  and  men  of  the  cruiser 
St.  Lawrence  had  an  opportunity  to  observe  conditions  while 


*The  best  account  of  the  revolutionary  movement  in  the  Germanies  is 
Blum,  H.,  Die  Deutsche  Revolution,  (Leipzig,  1898).  Vide,  Curtis,  E.  N.,  Amer- 
ican Opinion  of  French  Nineteenth  Century  Revolutions,  29  Amer.  Hist.  Rev., 
257  ff. 


8  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

they  were  in  German  waters.  Enterprising  American  newspapers 
kept  their  readers  acquainted  with  transpiring  events  through 
first-hand  information  sent  them  by  their  correspondents  abroad. 

Shortly  after  the  Parisian  revolt  had  swept  the  Orleans 
monarchy  into  the  discard,  the  German  states  entered  an  epoch 
overloaded  with  bewildering  and  complicated  events.  As  soon 
as  news  of  the  French  movement  reached  his  ears,  Mann  pre- 
dicted that  monarchy  in  "Germany"  would  be  reduced  to  a  mere 
skeleton.  In  the  south  German  states  the  sovereigns  would 
accede  to  all  the  concessions  demanded  by  the  people.  Perhaps 
the  Zollverein,  the  commercial  bond  between  the  states,  would 
be  dissolved.  Graebe,  consul  at  Hesse- Cassel,  hoped  the  Ger- 
mans would  obtain  freedom  of  the  press,  a  militia  system,  and 
the  convocation  of  a  national  Parliament.  In  Berlin,  Donelson 
confidently  expected  that  the  King  would  take  measures  to  quiet 
the  complaints  of  his  subjects  as  expressed  in  the  United  Diet 
in  the  previous  year,  but  he  had  no  apprehension  that  the 
people  would  overthrow  the  Hohenzollern.  If  necessary, 
Prussian  troops  would  be  employed  to  enforce  legal  authority,  a 
measure  which  would  provoke  a  bloody  revolution.1 

Pleased  with  the  concessions  granted  in  Saxony,  Bavaria, 
Wurttemberg,  and  Baden,  Donelson  believed  that  a  peaceful 
compromise  in  which  the  doctrines  of  the  revolution  were  con- 
firmed, would  bring  permanent  quiet.  Only  when  the  rights 
demanded  by  the  people  were  granted  would  the  panic  be  stilled. 
In  spite  of  the  fierce  riots  that  followed  the  killing  of  several 
citizens  in  front  of  the  Prussian  royal  palace,  Donelson  found 
nothing  in  the  general  state  of  affairs  to  alarm  the  true  friend 
of  gradual  progress.  In  his  judgment  the  world  had  never  seen 
so  remarkable  a  transformation  whose  political  and  social  con- 
sequences would  be  felt  the  world  over.  Eventually  the  Prussian 
monarchy  would  go,  since  it  no  longer  met  the  needs  of  society. 
Above  all,  at  the  moment,  "Germany"  required  a  patriotic  states- 


1  Mann  to  Buchanan,  2,  13  Mch.  1848,  1  Ap.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State, 
Repts.,  Special  Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  4,  7,  8  Mch.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 
Graebe  to  Buchanan,  6  Mch.  1848,  Ibid.,  Consular  Letters,  Hesse-Cassel,  I. 
Graebe  to  Donelson,  4  Mch.  1848.  Donelson  Mss. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  9 

man  and  a  soldier,  not  a  Frederick  the  Great  but  a  Washington.2 
Throughout  the  era  of  revolutionary  disorders,  Donelson, 
though  keenly  interested  in  the  establishment  of  a  united, 
liberal,  German  government,  did  not  permit  his  wishes  to  swerve 
him  from  the  path  of  traditional  policy.  He  issued  an  injunction 
to  Americans  not  to  participate  in  the  revolution  in  any  way. 
America  should  impart  by  her  example  an  effective  moral 
support  which  if  not  then  sufficiently  strong  to  command  victory 
would  ultimately  bring  it  to  pass.  Several  Americans  sustained 
slight  injuries  in  street  scuffles,  but  none  seems  to  have  dis- 
obeyed the  official  warning;  they  were  content  to  sympathize, 
feeling  that  the  distance  between  the  two  countries,  great  as  it 
was,  was  not  so  great  as  the  distance  that  separated  their  insti- 
tutions. Whenever  possible  to  make  a  friendly  suggestion  which 
might  aid  the  cause  of  German  liberty  and  reform,  Donelson 
did  not  refrain  from  doing  so.  After  the  Marztage,  he  felt  that 
no  harm  had  been  done  in  brilliantly  illuminating  the  embassy 
as  a  tribute  alike  to  the  "gallant  conduct  of  people  and  of  King." 
At  the  same  time,  the  Consul  at  Frankfort-am-Main  unfurled 
the  star-spangled  banner  as  a  manifestation  of  his  sympathy 
with  the  liberal  movement.3 

At  the  outset  of  the  revolt,  German  nationalists  had  demanded 
that  action  be  taken  to  unify  the  several  states,  and  Americans 
in  Europe  were  not  ignorant  of  the  possibilities  of  a  federal 
system  comparable  to  their  own.  As  early  as  November,  1846, 
Mann  believed  that  nothing  could  prevent  the  union  of  Ger- 
many on  principles  similar  to  those  followed  in  this  country. 
Donelson  saw  in  the  unionist  movement  a  development  which 
might  lead  in  the  end  to  "the  adoption  of  that  system,  which 
with  one  central  head  for  the  management  of  internal  concerns, 
will  leave  to  the  parties  of  the  union  a  local  sovereignty  for 
municipal  purposes."  Prussia  ought  to  be  the  leader  in  the  new 
combination,  though  he  doubted  whether  it  would  be  willing 


2  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  10,  18,  19,  20,  23,  28  Mch.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of 
State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 

Donelson  to  Donelson,  A.  J.,  Jr.,  28  Mch.  1848,  Donelson  Mss. 

3  Mann  to  Buchanan,  13  Mch.  1848,  1  Ap.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State. 
Repts.,  Special  Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  5,  18,  20,  28,  31  Mch.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 


10  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

to  act  in  a  manner  desired.  Bancroft  recognized  that  the  Amer- 
ican federative  system  guided  the  Germans  in  their  demand  for  a 
general  political  union.  Another  writer  ventured  to  assert 
that  the  doctrines  of  Jefferson  would  quickly  be  extended  over 
all  Germany.  In  the  new  nation  governed  under  a  constitution 
modelled  on  that  of  America,  the  reigning  princes  would  be  the 
counterparts  of  American  governors.4 

If  words  could  change  a  state  from  an  absolute  monarchy 
into  one  "almost  as  free  as  the  United  States,"  wrote  Donelson 
at  the  end  of  March,  "the  fruit  of  the  revolution  would  be 
glorious."  He  suggested  to  Buchanan  that  in  the  new  order  a 
written  constitution  would  define  the  functions  of  the  Federal 
Central  Government.  The  American  policy  in  the  matter  should 
harmonize  with  her  political  sympathies;  besides,  better  com- 
mercial treaties  might  be  arranged  with  a  United  Germany 
than  with  independent  states.  Realizing  that  only  the  wonderful 
prologue  of  the  drama  had  been  played,  Donelson  warned  his 
government  that  the  federation  scheme  at  best  was  embryonic.5 

A  group  of  Badenese  who  hoped  to  introduce  into  Germany 
both  the  socialistic  doctrines  of  Louis  Blanc  then  regnant  in 
France,  and  a  republic,  revolted  in  mid- April.  Americans 
invariably  criticised  this  movement  which  tended  to  arouse 
popular  antagonism  to  any  change  of  government  and  con- 
versely, to  strengthen  the  cause  of  monarchy.  At  length  the 
rebellion  was  driven  underground  and  its  leader,  Hecker,  escaped 
to  America.  Bewildered  by  this  movement  and  the  general 
confusion,  Clemson  at  the  Hague  could  discover  no  unifying 
principles  in  Germany.  Confidence  seemed  gone,  the  necessities 
of  the  moment  alone  governed.6 


4  Wash.  Union,  4  May  1848. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  7,  10  Mch.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia, 
IV. 

Bancroft  to  Buchanan,  10,  24  Mch.  1848,  5,  16  May  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts., 
England,  LVIII. 

Mann  to  Buchanan,  13  Mch.  1848,  17,  24  Ap.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Spec. 
Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

5  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  22,  28,  30  Mch.  1848,  8  Ap.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept. 
of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 

6  Mann  to  Buchanan,  1,  8,  15  May  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
Spec.  Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Graebe  to  Buchanan,  1  May  1848,  Ibid.,  Consular  Letters,  Hesse-Cassel,  I. 
Clemson  to  Buchanan,  29  May  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Belgium,  III. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  11 

Americans  had  earlier  considered  the  utility  of  a  republican 
government  for  Germany.  In  March,  Donelson  noted  that  if 
the  Germans  had  capable  leaders  and  a  little  more  political 
experience  they  might  resort  to  a  republic,  but  such  a  striking 
change  might  endanger  the  rights  already  acquired.  If  the 
Prussian  king  or  his  government  committed  some  great  mis- 
take, he  wrote  later,  then  a  republic  might  follow.  Bancroft 
could  see  no  final  settlement  of  the  form  of  government  unless 
it  should  be  a  republic  based  on  a  confederation  of  the  several 
states.  Only  the  fear  that  a  republican  government  would  not 
produce  immediate  order  and  tranquillity  prevented  its  adoption, 
Clemson  decided.  But  officials  of  lesser  rank  were  convinced 
that  a  republic  would  be  a  colossal  misfortune;  the  Germans 
were  not  yet  ripe  for  a  republican  government.7 

American  opinion  concerning  the  revolutionary  movement 
must  have  been  affected  by  the  influence  that  America  and  its 
institutions  had  upon  the  Germans.  Donelson  learned  that 
Prussians  who  sympathized  with  American  political  doctrines 
were  making  these  ideas  felt  in  the  royal  councils  in  Berlin. 
Copies  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence  and  of  the  Federal 
Constitution  were  found  everywhere.  Later  at  Frankfort, 
Donelson  noticed  that  members  of  the  Assembly  were  diligently 
studying  the  various  American  constitutions.  Members  of  this 
body  frequently  referred  to  the  American  government  as  the 
best  example  for  Germany  to  imitate.  Francis  Lieber,*  in 
attendance  at  the  sessions  of  the  Frankfort  Assembly,  said  that 
men  of  all  parties  had  told  him  that  the  more  they  studied 
the  Constitution,  "the  more  they  were  amazed  at  its  simple 
grandeur  and  deep  wisdom."  A  German  gentleman  obtained 
from  Mann  his  views  on  a  constitution  for  Germany  and 
wrote  them  down  for  the  use  of  the  Assembly.     Mann  could 


7  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  14  Mch.  1848,  10,  21  Ap.  1848,  4  Je.  1848,  Mss., 
Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 

Bancroft  to  Buchanan,  14  Ap.  1848,  16  May  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  England, 
LVIII. 

Clemson  to  Buchanan,  28  Mch.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Belgium,  III. 

Graebe  to  Buchanan,  3  Ap.  1848,  Ibid.,  Consular  Letters,  Hesse-Cassel,  I. 

Flugel  to  Donelson,  22  Mch.  1848.    Donelson  Mss. 

*  Francis  Lieber,  a  German  refugee,  was  professor  of  history  and  political 
science  at  South  Carolina  College  from  1825  to  1856. 


12  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

never  forget  the  political  discussions  of  the  liberal  leaders  in 
Bavaria.  In  debating  what  they  had  the  right  to  demand  from 
their  monarch  "one  would  observe  to  another  'die  demokraten 
von  Nord  Amerika'  have  things  thus  and  so  'und  wir  wollen 
sie  auch  haben.'"  Likewise  the  stability  of  the  American 
economic  order  made  a  wide  appeal.  Noble  families  informed 
Donelson  that  they  would  flee  to  America,  "the  only  conser- 
vative society  in  the  world."  Capitalists  formulated  plans  for 
the  transfer  of  their  wealth  to  America.  Eventually  they  would 
emigrate.  Thousands  called  on  the  consular  agent  at  Darm- 
stadt to  get  information  about  the  United  States  for  investment 
or  emigration  purposes.8 

On  March  31,  1848,  a  hastily  chosen  liberal  German  assembly 
met  in  Frankfort  to  arrange  for  a  gathering  of  representatives 
which  should  determine  the  future  German  government.  Mann, 
on  the  spot  at  the  opening,  marvelled  at  the  huge  crowds  that 
assembled  daily  to  hear  the  debates.  Well  aware  of  the  import- 
ance of  the  gathering,  he  planned  to  remain  and  devote  himself 
exclusively  to  it.  This  preliminary  Parliament  decreed  that  a 
Constitutional  Convention  should  be  convoked  in  Frankfort — 
a  city,  Mann  said,  which  would  be  as  much  the  centre  of  attrac- 
tion until  the  new  government  was  established  as  Vienna  was 
in  1815.  Little  confidence  did  Donelson  have  that  the  Germans 
would  select  the  proper  sort  of  men  for  the  task  of  making  a 
constitution,  and  his  suspicions  were  amply  justified  by  later 
events.9 

On  May  18,  1848,  the  German  Constitutional  Assembly, 
which  Stiles,  the  American  charge  in  Austria,  considered  might 
be  the  most  important  convention  that  ever  assembled  in  Europe, 
since  it  might  effect  a  revolution  in  the  political  institutions  of 


8  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  23,  25  Mch.  1848,  6  Ap.  1848,  5  May  1848,  4  Je- 
1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 

Mann  to  Buchanan,  13  Mch.  1848,  1,  11,  25  Ap.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Spec. 
Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Mann  to  Buchanan,  4  Jl.  1848.    Buchanan  Mss. 
Perry,  T.  S.,  Life  and  Letters  of  Francis  Lieber,  214-223. 
De  Vere  to  Hunter,  23  Je.  1848,  A.H.A.  Rept.,  1916,  II,  93. 

9  Mann  to  Buchanan,  1,  11  Ap.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec, 
Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  1,  5  May  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  13 

the  countries  represented,  met  at  Frankfort.  Americans  freely 
expressed  their  opinions  as  to  the  calibre  of  the  representatives 
in  the  Assembly.  Mann  thought  that  the  body  included  as 
learned  a  group  of  men  as  any  similar  one  ever  assembled,  but 
he  noticed  the  absence  of  any  practical  statesmen.  Donelson, 
who  saw  the  large  number  of  young  and  inexperienced  men 
present  doubted  whether  they  would  formulate  a  workable, 
sound  constitution.  Graebe,  though  he  granted  that  some  good 
men  were  in  evidence,  maintained  that  the  great  number  of 
professors  whose  knowledge  had  been  acquired  exclusively 
from  books,  would  prevent  progress.  Kendall,  European  corre- 
spondent for  the  New  Orleans  Picayune,  placed  a  low  estimate 
on  the  body.  He  doubted  whether  there  were  three  men  who 
could  cope  with  the  problems  at  hand.  In  appearance,  the  men 
seemed  like  so  many  buffalo  bulls,  two-thirds  of  whom,  in  the 
United  States,  would  be  considered  candidates  for  the  first 
barber  shop  in  the  vicinity.  Another  journalist  was  astonished 
at  the  extremely  mean  complexion  presented  by  the  assembled 
learning  of  Germany.10 

One  of  the  best  contemporary  American  opinions  of  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  Frankfort  Assembly  comes  from  William  Wells, 
a  highly  intelligent  friend  of   Donelson: 

"The  Assembly  here  is  the  most  conglomerate  mass  that  can  be  imagined 
and  contains  every  shade  of  political  element  from  republicans  to  princes. 
The  extreme  left  numbers  about  thirty  who  are  open  republicans  without 
expediency  .  .  .  the  left  centre  is  very  strong  and  they  are  all  favorable  to 
the  republic  the  moment  that  it  can  be  introduced  without  the  tremor  of 
civil  war  and  anarchy  .  .  .  the  right  centre  may  be  called  liberal  constitutional 
monarchists  ...  on  the  extreme  right  sit  the  Catholic  bishops  and  priests 
in  clerical  robes  .  .  .  The  most  remarkable  man  in  the  Assembly  is,  unques- 
tionably, Robert  Blum,  of  Leipzig,  leader  of  the  radicals.  His  mind  is  strong 
and  clear;  his  influence  with  the  masses  immense,  and  a  violent  introduction 
of  the  republic  may  make  him  President  .  .  .  Von  Gagern,  President  of  the 
Assembly,  is  called  their  Washington." 


10  Stiles  to  Buchanan,  26  Ap.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 
Mann  to  Buchanan,  22  May  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents  to  German 
States  and  Hungary. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  25  May  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 

New  Orleans  Picayune,  16  Nov.  1848;  Newark  Daily  Advertiser,  1  Mch.  1849. 


14  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Bancroft,  too,  considered  Von  Gagern  "one  of  the  ablest 
statesmen  of  the  time."11 

From  the  outset  the  Frankfort  Assembly  dissipated  its  vitality 
in  interminable  debate,  while,  as  Americans  recognised,  the 
position  of  the  German  monarchs  improved.  As  Mann  wrote, 
the  monarchical  serpent  had  not  been  exterminated  by  the 
revolts,  it  had  only  been  scotched.  After  a  lengthy,  academic 
discussion  over  the  executive  for  the  temporary  central  govern- 
ment, the  Assembly  agreed  upon  an  official  to  be  known  as  the 
"Grand  Vicaire".  For  this  office  Archduke  John,  brother  of  the 
Hapsburg  sovereign,  was  elected.  "A  simple-minded  Prince 
as  relates  to  ambition,"  wrote  Mann,  "  a  republican  in  the  ab- 
stract." The  absurd  program  of  selecting  an  executive  before 
the  rest  of  the  government  had  been  created  aroused  the  ire  of 
Stiles,  who  felt  this  action  characteristic  of  everything  being 
done." 

Since  they  believed  or,  better,  hoped  that  the  Frankfort 
Assembly  would  develop  into  a  permanent  central  government, 
Americans  bestirred  themselves  to  establish  diplomatic  relations 
with  it.  Donelson  requested  that  the  President  "without  taking 
any  part  in  the  great  struggle  of  the  German  States"  grant 
him  the  right  to  follow  his  own  discretion  regarding  recognition. 
After  the  Archduke  had  been  elected,  Mann  held  recognition  to 
be  unavoidable  and  supposed  that  the  duty  had  already  been 
assigned  to  Donelson.  Bancroft,  to  whom  intimation  had  been 
made  that  the  Germans  would  be  pleased  at  some  act  of  recog- 
nition of  the  German  Union,  suggested  that  the  President  should 
direct  a  member  of  the  diplomatic  corps  "to  recognise  the  new 
federative  creation."     A  Congressional  vote  of  congratulation, 


11  Wells  to  Donelson,  11  Je.  1848.    Donelson  Mss. 

Bancroft  to  Buchanan,  30  Je.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  England, 
LVIII. 

12  Mann  to  Buchanan,  15  May  1848,  29  Je.  1848,4,  18  Jl.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept. 
of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  13,  25  May  1848,  24,  30  Je.  1848,  1,  15  Jl.  1848, 
Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 

Stiles  to  Buchanan,  5  Jl.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 
Donelson  to  Buchanan,  1  Ag.  1848.    Buchanan  Mss. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  15 

wrote  another  "American  gentleman  of  great  intelligence",  would 
cement  friendship  and  'ead  to  greater  commercial  privileges.*  I3 

When  Donelson  received  no  reply  to  his  numerous  pleas 
concerning  the  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  with 
Frankfort,  he  wrote  Buchanan  that  he  had  decided  to  go  there 
and  act  as  he  saw  best.  In  passage,  this  letter  crossed  one  from 
the  Secretary  of  State  advising  Donelson  to  proceed  to  Frankfort; 
if  he  found  the  government  in  successful  operation,  he  should 
recognize  it.  Thereupon,  Donelson,  as  the  duly  accredited 
American  agent,  presented  himself  to  the  "Grand  Vicaire",  and 
assured  him  that  American  opinion  strongly  favored  the  move- 
ment to  unite  Germany.  America  expressed  this  conviction 
"not  in  the  spirit  of  propagandism,  but  out  of  sincere  respect  for 
the  German  states."14 

Though  this  action  on  Donelson's  part  exhibits  his  optimism 
for  a  unified  Germany,  other  Americans  despaired.  Fay,  per- 
haps the  most  judicious  of  all  the  officials,  doubted  whether  the 
obstacles  that  blocked  the  path  to  unity  could  be  surmounted. 
"Germany,  never  much  united,  is  at  the  moment  less  so  than 


*  One  American  at  Frankfort  decided  to  take  time  by  the  forelock  and 
recognize  the  temporary  government.  Professor  Scheie  de  Vere,  of  the 
University  of  Virginia,  had  written  his  Senator,  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  of  the  situ- 
ation at  Frankfort.  He  found  conditions  much  better  than  he  had  anticipated 
and  expressed  indignation  that  no  agent  was  present  to  recognize  the  new 
state  and  to  look  after  American  commercial  interests.  At  length  he  informed 
the  consul  at  Frankfort  that  he  had  been  sent  by  the  American  government 
to  assist  in  organizing  the  German  government  and  to  act  as  charge  to  it. 
When  President  Polk  learned  of  De  Vere's  audacious  activity  he  declared  in  a 
special  message  to  the  Senate  that  he  knew  not  the  man  and  that  he  had  no 
power  to  act  for  the  United  States  in  any  capacity  whatsoever. 

Schwendler  to  Buchanan,  10  Jl.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Consular  Let- 
ters, Frankfort,  I. 

Graebe  to  Donelson,  18  Jl.  1848.     Donelson  Mss. 

De  Vere  to  Hunter,  23  Je.  1848,  A.  H.  A.  Rept.,  1916,  II,  91. 

Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  Presidents,  IV,  605. 

13  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  24,  30  Je.  1848,  1  Jl.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State, 
Repts.,  Prussia,  IV. 

Mann  to  Buchanan,  29  Je.  1848,  18  Jl.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents  to 
German  States  and  Hungary. 

Bancroft  to  Buchanan,  28  Jl.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  England,  LVIII. 
Wash.  Union,  27  Jl.  1848. 

14  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  1  Ag.  1848.    Buchanan  Mss. 

Buchanan  to  Donelson,  30  Oct.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Prussia, 
XIV. 

Wash.  Union,  15  Oct.  1848. 


16  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

ever."  His  prediction  that  the  Frankfort  fabric  would  fall  in 
like  a  pack  of  cards  was  fulfilled.*  As  the  summer  wore  on, 
other  "doubting  Thomases"  developed  apace.  Mann  could 
not  see  order  coming  from  the  European  chaos;  indeed,  in 
Germany  matters  seemed  to  be  getting  progressively  worse. 
Graebe,  never  very  enthusiastic  over  the  Frankfort  venture, 
felt  that  the  Assembly  had  lost  its  opportunity  because  of  lack 
of  despatch  in  forming  a  constitution.  A  journalist  found  every- 
thing in  the  Assembly  at  sixes  and  sevens;  only  a  miracle  could 
now  unite  all  the  elements  in  Germany.  "  It  must  be  admitted," 
said  Kendall,  "the  politics  of  Germany  are  as  difficult  to  under- 
stand as  metaphysics."**15 

Early  in  the  revolutionary  period,  Donelson  had  urged  his 
government  to  send  some  of  the  warships  released  from  active 
duty  through  the  cessation  of  the  Mexican  War  to  the  Baltic 
"ready  for  eventualities."  Accordingly,  on  October  8,  1848,  the 
frigate  St.  Lawrence  commanded  by  Captain  Hiram  S.Paulding*** 
arrived  at  Bremerhaven.  The  German  people  considered  the 
ship  as  on  a  mission  of  fraternal  republican  sympathy.  Officers 
walking  in  the  streets  of  Berlin  were  hailed  as  "the  officers  of 
the  new  German  fleet."16    Paulding  made  an  excursion  through 


*When  on  September  9,  1848,  Berlin  witnessed  a  terrible  emeute,  Fay 
momentarily  thought  that  Prussia  might  give  way  to  the  Frankfort  Assembly. 

**  Of  the  riotous  excesses  in  Frankfort  in  September,  1848,  Donelson  is 
strangely  silent.  Mann  had  gone  to  London  to  use  his  influence  to  push 
through  the  repeal  of  the  Navigation  Acts. 

Mann  to  Buchanan,  18  Jl.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agent 
to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

16  Fay  to  Donelson,  26,  31  Jl.  1848,  26  Ag.  1848.     Donelson  Mss. 

Graebe  to  Donelson,  18  Jl.  1848.     Ibid. 

Graebe  to  Buchanan,  1,  28  Ag.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Consular  Letters, 

T-Jpqsp— v  3. SSG1     I 

New  Orleans' Picayune,  14  Sept.  1848,  21  Nov.  1848. 

Mann  to  Buchanan,  4  Jl.  1848.     Buchanan  Mss. 

***  Hiram  Paulding  (1797-1878)  had  seen  service  in  the  war  of  1812  and 
against  the  Barbary  pirates.  Elevated  to  a  captaincy  in  1844,  he  had  spent 
several  years  in  East  Indian  waters  before  his  appearance  in  Germany. 

16  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  10,  11  Ap.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
Prussia,  IV. 

Mann  to  Buchanan,  17  Ap.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents  to  German 
States  and  Hungary. 

Paulding  to  Donelson,  7  Oct.  1848.    Donelson  Mss. 

Phila.  Sunday  Despatch,  26  Nov.  1848. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  17 

the  German  states  and  formulated  his  opinion  on  the  political 
situation. 

To  his  mind,  all  Germany  seemed  to  favor  a  republican  federal 
government.  The  hope  of  peace  and  the  preservation  of  society 
rested  with  the  Frankfort  Assembly,  but  since  it  lacked  trained 
political  leaders,  he  foresaw  that  confusion  and  violence  would 
reign  in  the  immediate  future.  Together  with  Donelson,  he 
called  upon  the  Prussian  king,  and  in  the  course  of  a  special 
interview  the  Minister  reiterated  the  American  attitude  toward 
the  movements  in  Germany.  Said  he:  "The  United  States, 
though  attached  to  the  scheme  of  federal  unity  does  not  obtrude 
its  example  or  experience  on  other  sovereigns."  In  sending  him 
to  Frankfort,  it  was  far  from  the  intention  of  his  government  to 
make  itself  a  party  for  or  against  "any  scheme  of  reform  which 
was  of  doubtful  bearing  on  the  prospects  of  the  German  states 
whether  viewed  as  a  Federal  whole  or  as  sovereignties."17 

Berlin  in  November  experienced  a  revival  of  revolution  when 
the  King,  having  appointed  the  reactionary  Brandenberg  as 
Cabinet  head,  prorogued  the  Prussian  Assembly.  Donelson 
considered  the  King's  action  unjustifiable  and  sensed  some  great 
convulsion  in  the  near  future.  In  adjourning  the  Berlin  assembly 
the  monarch  had  struck  a  savage  blow  at  the  representative 
principle — at  the  Frankfort  Assembly.  Donelson  expected 
that  the  revolution  would  begin  "de  novo",  in  which  case  the 
Central  Power  would  probably  be  at  once  dissolved.18 

Quickly  the  disorders  became  general  so  that  Donelson  could 
write  Buchanan,  "all  Prussia — all  Germany  is  coming  under 
martial  law."  Still  he  had  hopes  that  the  Frankfort  govern- 
ment, which  "was  acquiring  more  and  more  the  public  confi- 
dence," might  formulate  a  satisfactory  form  of  union.  But 
Stiles  saw  only  the  complete  destruction  of  German  hopes  which 
recently  had  been  "so  auspicious  and  so  cheering."     Presently 


17  Paulding  to  Mason,  14  Oct.  1848,  16  Nov.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy, 
Cruise  of  St.  Lawrence,  1848-50. 

Paulding  to  Donelson,  14  Nov.  1848.     Donelson  Mss. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  3  Nov.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  V. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  5  Nov.  1848.     Buchanan  Mss. 

18  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  9,  13,  18  Nov.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
Prussia,  V. 


18  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Donelson  conceded  that  affairs  were  terribly  confused,  and 
hinted  at  a  tremendous  civil  conflict  which  would  bring  on  uni- 
versal bankruptcy.  On  Christmas  Day,  he  informed  Buchanan 
that  he  doubted  whether  the  Frankfort  Assembly  would  suc- 
ceed. A  month  later,  with  Austria  torn  by  civil  discord,  he 
was  certain  that  a  federal  union  of  all  the  German  states  was 
impossible.19 

While  events  were  transforming  Donelson's  opinions  on  the 
central  government,  Kendall  voiced  his  disgust  with  the  pro- 
cedure of  the  Assembly.  Germany  needed  some  governing  mind 
to  lead,  instead  of  the  idle  and  dissolute  boys  or  swaggering 
demagogues  who  controlled  affairs  at  Frankfort.  By  its  antics, 
the  Assembly  would  alienate  the  middle  classes.  Republicans, 
through  the  crimes  they  committed  or  through  their  legislative 
tomfooleries,  had  fallen  short  of  what  lovers  of  liberty  expected 
of  them.  Because  of  its  incompetency,  the  Assembly  had  lost 
its  influence  and  would  soon  crumble.20 

From  February,  1849,  to  the  time  when  the  Frankfort  movement 
hopelessly  collapsed,  Donelson's  shifting  opinions  attest  the 
general  confusion  that  prevailed  throughout  the  Germanies. 
On  February  1,  he  believed  that  a  German  union  would  be  con- 
summated; two  days  later  the  probabilities  were  against  "the 
preservation  of  a  popular  power  at  Frankfort,"  on  February  5,  he 
wrote  to  one  man,  "A  few  days  will  give  us  the  last  act  as  far 
as  the  play  is  with  the  present  Assembly;"  to  another,  "  I  indulge 
the  hope  that  the  German  states  leaving  out  Austria  will  estab- 
lish a  federal  system  calculated  to  pacify  the  people."  As  the 
month  wore  on  he  anticipated  another  revolution  in  which 
the  democratic  party  would  renew  the  struggle  for  German 
unity.21 

Meanwhile  the  Frankfort  Assembly,  having  drawn  up  a  con- 


19  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  6,  14,  19,  25  Dec.  1848,  15,  19  Jan.  1849,  Mss., 
Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  V. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  26  Nov.  1848,  14  Dec.  1848.     Buchanan  Mss. 

20  New  Orleans  Picayune,  15  Oct.  1848,  16,  21  Nov.  1848,  6,  24  Dec.  1848, 
11  Jan.  1849. 

21  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  1,  3,  19  Feb.  1849,  1  Mch.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of 
State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  V. 

Donelson  to  Von  Roenne,  5  Feb.  1849.     Donelson  Mss. 
Donelson  to  Parker,  5  Feb.  1849.     Ibid, 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  19 

stitution  which  excluded  Austria,  offered  the  permanent  execu- 
tive office  to  the  Prussian  king,  who  should  have  the  title  of 
Emperor.  By  that  action  Mann  thought  the  German  legis- 
lators had  proved  themselves  "utterly  unworthy  of  the  sym- 
pathies of  a  people  so  free  as  those  in  America."  Kendall  had 
no  confidence  in  the  selection.  Donelson  anticipated  that  the 
Prussian  king  would  reject  the  crown  unless  the  other  German 
sovereigns  approved  the  proposal  of  the  constitutional  conven- 
tion. When  he  heard  that  the  King  had  actually  refused  the 
new  crown,  Donelson  doubted  whether  the  cause  of  unity  could 
succeed.22 

As  soon  as  the  Frankfort  group  learned  of  the  adverse  decision 
of  the  Prussian  monarch,  it  decided  that  the  central  government 
should  function  without  Prussia.  Donelson  was  fully  convinced 
that  the  King,  having  recalled  the  Prussian  delegates  from  the 
Assembly,  would  employ  all  his  resources  against  the  new 
government.  Nevertheless,  since  twenty-nine  states  had  ac- 
cepted the  constitution,  Donelson  thought  it  might  yet  be  put 
into  operation.  Doubtless  a  civil  war  would  test  the  strength 
of  the  " German"  government.23 

When  the  Prussian  army  advanced  into  the  Rhineland,  the 
"rump"  national  Assembly  transferred  its  activities  to  Stuttgart, 
whither  at  least  one  American  thought  Donelson  should  follow. 
Donelson,  however,  saw  that  the  move  was  fatal,  since  the  mass 
of  the  German  people  would  not  approve.  At  last  the  truth 
seems  to  have  dawned  on  him.  The  revolutionary  movement  had 
failed  dismally.  The  hopes  of  a  federal  union  with  a  popularly 
elected  parliament  had  been  vain.  By  the  end  of  September, 
1849,  the  American  consul  at  Stuttgart  could  write,  "all  the 
political  strife  between  government  and  people  seems  to  be  at  an 


22  Donelson  to  Buchanan,  11  Mch.  1849.     Buchanan  Mss. 

Donelson  to  Clayton,  28  Mch.  1849,  5,  25  Ap.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State, 
Repts.,  Prussia,  V. 

Mann  to  Clayton,  28  Ag.  1849,  27  Sept.  1849,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents  to 
German  States  and  Hungary. 

Graebe  to  Clayton,  9  Ap.  1849,  Ibid.,  Consular  Letters,  Hesse-Cassel,  I. 

23  Donelson  to  Clayton,  7,  24  May  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
Prussia,  V. 


20  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

end.    Confidence  is  reestablished  among  men."    The  revolution 
with  all  its  exalted  hopes  belonged  to  the  ages.24 

What  were  the  results  of  the  German  revolutions  as  seen 
contemporaneously  by  Americans?  To  Kendall,  the  populace, 
politically  and  socially,  seemed  to  be  in  the  same  position  as 
before  the  revolution  started,  but  physically  their  condition 
was  worse.  The  verdict  of  incompetency  had  been  rendered 
against  the  idlers  and  "the  moonstruck  professors  of  the  Univer- 
sities" who  had  become  "drunk  on  liberty."  Though  the  1848 
movement  had  failed,  it  represented  merely  the  prelude  to  a 
drama  which  would  "drench  the  Old  World  in  blood."  The 
sagacious  Fay  believed  that  some  good  had  resulted  from  the 
upheaval  and  prophesied  that  "Germany"  would  soon  be 
visited  by  a  conflict  "of  a  character  such  as  history  had  not  yet 
seen."  Keenly  disappointed  by  the  Frankfort  fiasco,  Donelson 
awaited  another  revolt  greater  in  extent  and  depth  to  the  one 
the  Germanies  had  just  witnessed.  Generally  aggrieved  over 
the  outcome  of  the  1848  movement,  Americans  looked  hopefully 
to  the  future.  Eastward  the  star  of  liberalism  would  take 
its  way.25 


24  Donelson  to  Clayton,  4,  8  Je.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  V. 
Fleischmann,  C.  L.  to  Clayton,  30  Sept.   1849,  Ibid.,  Consular  Letters, 

Stuttgart,  I. 

Corry  to  Donelson,  9  Je.  1849.     Donelson  Mss. 
Aspenwall  to  Clayton,  15  Je.  1849.     Clayton  Mss. 

25  New  Orleans  Picayune,  16  Feb.  1849. 
Donelson  to  Clayton,  6  Ag.  1849.     Clayton  Mss. 

Fay  to  Clayton,  2  Feb.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  VI. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  21 

II 

Opinion  in  America  on  the  Revolutions  in  Germany 

Ever  responsive  to  the  impulses  of  the  crowd,  American  news- 
journals,  especially  through  their  editorials,  expressed  the  views 
of  their  readers  on  the  revolutionary  movements  and  at  the 
same  time  succeeded  in  molding  public  opinion.  From  public 
meetings,  one  learns  the  action  of  the  common  pulse  with  respect 
of  problems  of  the  moment.  That  Americans,  on  the  whole, 
had  comparatively  little  information  on  affairs  in  Central 
Europe  is  probably  well  attested  by  the  dearth  of  opinion  on  the 
revolutions  in  the  correspondence  of  leading  political  figures. 
Finally  the  government  policy  influenced  by  public  opinion 
shows  more  definitely  the  thought  of  Americans  as  to  the  revolu- 
tions and  allied  events. 

Without  exception,  American  editors  wrote  favorably  regarding 
the  German  movement,  though  there  were  varying  degrees  of 
interest  exhibited.  The  Mercury  of  Charleston  looked  upon 
the  upheaval  as  an  indication  of  the  value  of  public  education  in 
opening  up  men's  minds  to  their  inherent  rights.  The  Richmond 
Enquirer  contained  a  vigorous  editorial.  Surprised  somewhat 
at  the  general  moderation  with  which  the  great  events  had  been 
achieved,  the  editor  knew  that  the  German  movement,  if  suc- 
cessful, would  receive  the  applause  of  his  countrymen.  He 
hoped  that  the  new  regime  founded  on  "  truth,  justice,  and  the 
inalienable  rights  of  man"  would  be  obtained  without  bloodshed. 
But  come  what  would,  Americans  had  a  cordial  sympathy  for 
the  splendid  republican  spirit  already  shown.  The  Washington 
Union  lauded  the  erection  in  Germany  of  a  government  in  close 
sympathy  with  the  American  Republic,  and  anticipated  the 
establishment  of  favorable  commercial  relations.  Germany 
would  put  on  the  grandeur  due  her  "as  the  cradle  of  civilization 
for  centuries."1 


1  Charleston  Mercury,  27  Ap.  1848;    Rich.  Enquirer,    24   Ap.  1848;   Wash. 
Union,  27,  30  Jl.  1848,  14  Je.  1849. 


22  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Southern  Whig  papers  held  like  views.  To  the  Savannah 
Republican,  it  seemed  as  if  Germany  and  all  Europe  had  suddenly 
been  roused  from  a  coma  and  now  struggled  for  freedom.  If  a 
general  war  should  break  out  in  Europe,  the  end  would  be  a 
triumph  for  republican  institutions.  In  case  of  war,  the  duty 
of  the  American  government  was  plain — sympathy  with  those 
struggling,  but  no  entanglement  in  foreign  quarrels.  Another 
waxed  eloquent  as  it  observed  the  spread  of  American  political 
doctrines.  Europe  now  looked  to  America  to  lead  the  nations. 
German  emancipation  had  been  achieved  through  the  example 
of  American  freedom.  The  revolutions  were  but  "the  revolution 
of  1776  extending  itself  across  the  seas."  The  cause  of  Germany 
— that  of  right  against  might  and  light  against  darkness — 
became  essentially  the  enterprise  of  mankind.  The  Philadelphia 
Public  Ledger  gloried  in  the  period  "when  liberty  had  gained 
such  a  base  of  operation."  When  rumor  spread  that  Germany 
had  announced  a  republic  it  hailed  the  news  as  "the  most 
important  ever  received  from  Europe."  Others  looked  to  the 
revolutions  to  benefit  America  by  increasing  trade  and  commerce. 
Through  all  vicissitudes,  Americans  seemed  convinced  that  a 
united  Germany  with  a  central  government  would  eventuate. 
Royal  power  would  fall  before  the  advance  of  democracy  which 
most  certainly  would  supplant  the  waning  aristocratic  regime.2 

When  the  tide  began  to  turn  against  the  revolutionist  forces, 
newspaper  enthusiasm  gradually  changed  to  dismay  or  hostile 
criticism.  Despite  the  setbacks  the  popular  cause  sustained, 
the  New  Orleans  Picayune  refused  to  believe  despotism  could 
regain  its  former  power.  America  should  be  sympathetic  when 
considering  the  mountainous  difficulties  with  which  German 
progressives  had  to  contend.  The  Mercury  predicted  that  the 
selection  of  Archduke  John  as  the  Vicar  of  the  general  govern- 
ment would  produce  continuous  turmoil.  Hopes  of  political 
regeneration,  wailed  another,  fjaded  for  the  want  of  counsel 
from  leaders  who  had  German  welfare  at  heart.  After  the  Frank- 


2  Savannah  Republican,  24  Ap.  1848,  1  Jan.  1849;  N.  O.  Picayune,  3  May 
1848,  24  Je.  1849;  Phila.  Ledger,  4,  30  Ap.  1848,  24  Oct.  1848,  28  May  1849; 
N.  Y.  Tribune,  28  May  1849;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  11  Ap.  1848;  19  Merchants' 
Magazine,  85;   33  Graham's  Mag.,  323. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  23 

fort  debacle  and  the  consequent  flight  of  hope  for  German  unity, 
sympathy  and  advice  flowed  from  many  channels.  The  history 
of  this  parliamentary  fiasco  should  serve  as  an  instructive  lesson 
for  the  future.  Time  had  been  wasted  in  idle  talk  and  the 
writing  of  constitutions.  If  Germany  wanted  to  be  united  the 
people  would  need  to  act  in  concert.  The  Richmond  Whig 
declared  its  lack  of  confidence  in  any  scheme  designed  to  unify 
Germany.  An  empire  of  Germany  seemed  nebulous  and  unreal 
even  to  the  optimistic  New  York  Tribune* 

When  word  of  a  fresh  upheaval  in  the  southwestern  German 
states  in  June,  1849,  reached  the  Philadelphia  Ledger,  interest 
reawakened  only  to  be  snuffed  out  a  month  later  when  the 
movement  collapsed  due  to  the  interposition  of  a  Prussian  army. 
Disappointed,  the  editor  penned  his  disgust  with  the  revolu- 
tionists who  had  acted  like  a  group  of  schoolboys.  The  Boston 
Atlas  feared  that  the  social  heresies  which  had  sprung  up  during 
the  revolution  might  retard,  even  though  they  did  not  prevent, 
the  ultimate  success  of  liberty  in  Germany.  Horace  Greeley, 
who  had  long  clung  to  the  hope  that  a  republic  one  and  indivisible 
would  eventually  triumph,  now  conceded  that  the  revolution 
had  ended.  He  called  attention  to  the  fugitives  foregathered 
in  Switzerland  who  needed  financial  aid  so  that  they  might 
migrate  to  America.4 

Public  gatherings  for  Germany,  though  well-nigh  eclipsed  by 
similar  meetings  for  France,  were  held  in  many  American  cities. 
At  Newark  and  New  Orleans,  individuals  presented  schemes  by 
which  Americans  might  contribute  funds  to  aid  Germany. 
Volunteers  to  fight  for  German  unity  marched  forward  in  a 
public  meeting  in  Harrisburg,  Pennsylvania,  and  a  subscription 
list  to  defray  their  expenses  was  passed  around.5 


*N.  0.  Picayune,  28  Jl.  1848,  29  Oct.  1848;  Charleston  Mercury,  20  Jl. 
1848;  Wash.  Intelligencer,  20  Sept.  1848;  Rich.  Whig,  14  May  1849;  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  20  Ap.  1849. 

4  Phila.  Ledger,  21  Jan.  1849,  12  Mch.  1849,  31  May  1849,  11  Jl.  1849;  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  26,  28  May  1849,  2,  5  Je.  1849,  2  Ag.  1849;  Boston  Atlas,  10  Jl.  1849; 
2  Mass.  Quart.  Rev.,  178;   N.  0.  Picayune,  18  Ag.  1849. 

6  N.  Y.  Tribune,  12  Jl.  1849;  Newark  Daily  Advertiser,  28  Je.  1849,  15  Mch. 
1849;  Rich.  Enquirer,  26  Ap.  1848;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  29  Ap.  1848,  2,  10 
May  1848,  10  Oct.  1848;  St.  Louis  Republican,  20  Mch.  1849.  Cp.  Cole,  A. 
C,  Illinois  History,  The  Era  of  the  Civil  War,  23. 


24  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

In  New  York,  a  great  parade  with  the  red  flag  in  evidence 
preceded  a  series  of  speeches  urging  assistance  to  Germany. 
Boston  held  a  similar  meeting.  At  a  monster  assembly  in 
Richmond,  the  people  gloried  in  the  triumph  of  liberty  and 
justice.  At  Charleston,  a  huge  throng  serenaded  the  residence 
of  Professor  Lieber  whose  son  had  shared  in  the  movements  in 
Berlin.  When  Hecker,  the  escaped  leader  of  an  abortive  repub- 
lican movement  in  Baden,  arrived  in  Philadelphia,  he  received 
a  tremendous  ovation.  America  welcomed  such  exiles,  gratified 
as  she  was  to  see  the  struggles  for  liberty  in  other  lands.  In  the 
same  city,  a  "Revolutionary  League"  composed,  doubtless, 
largely  of  foreigners,  offered  sums  of  money  for  the  death  of  the 
chief  crowned  heads  of  central  Europe.  A  body  of  German- 
American  citizenry  in  St.  Louis  immediately  repudiated  this 
rash  gesture.*  s 

The  exiguity  of  recorded  interest  among  the  men  high  in  social 
and  political  station  is  striking.  If  they  revealed  their  opinions 
on  this  revolutionary  turmoil,  almost  all  traces  of  them  have 
vanished.  Of  those  extant,  Francis  Lieber  believed  at  the 
outset  that  a  general  war  would  follow  the  revolt  and  that  the 
end  would  be  the  unity  of  Germany.  Union  would  be  followed 
by  the  flight  of  princes  and  the  adoption  of  constitutional  liberty. 
J.H.Hammond**  expected  that  the  European  sovereigns  would 
provoke  a  war  to  detract  attention  from  internal  affairs.  Anx- 
iously he  awaited  the  results  in  Germany.6 

The  only  extensive  personal  opinion  that  we  have  on  the 
revolution  is  that  of  Calhoun.  From  the  beginning  of  the  move- 
ment his  interest  appears.  The  revolutions  struck  him  as  being 
"without  parallel  in  the  history  of  the  world."  Results  were 
difficult  to  predict  since  the  events  were  so  much  out  of  the 
ordinary.     To  him,  Germany  seemed  considerably  changed  by 


*  After  a  Berlin  paper  had  published  news  of  this  "League",  the  Minister 
of  the  Interior  used  it  as  a  reason  for  continuing  the  state  of  siege  there. 
Donelson  to  Clayton,  27  Ap.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Prussia,  V. 

**  J.  H.  Hammond  was  an  able  and  prominent  South  Carolinia  politician 
and  a  close  friend  of  Calhoun.    He  had  been  Governor,  1842-44. 

6  Lieber  to  Mittermaier,  31  Mch.  1848,  Perry,  T.  S.,  Life  and  Letters  of  F. 
Lieber,  213. 

Hammond  to  Maj.  Hammond,  3,  21  Ap.  1848.     Hammond  Mss. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  25 

the  revolutions,  and  he  hoped  improved  thereby.  The  intelli- 
gence and  progress  of  the  age  had  outgrown  monarchies  which 
would  now  be  cast  into  discard.  The  existing  political  institu- 
tions in  Germany  might  easily  be  transformed  into  a  federalized 
constitutional  government  similar  to  the  American.  He  relied 
on  Germany  to  be  the  saviour,  politically,  of  all  Europe.  Mate- 
rials for  success  availed,  but  would  a  leader  appear  who  could 
weave  the  elements  into  a  satisfactory  whole?  Time  increased 
his  fears.  He  began  to  wonder  whether  the  leaders  were  suffi- 
ciently enlightened  on  political  science  to  devise  a  stable  govern- 
ment. Later  he  felt  that  Europe  had  overthrown  the  old  regime 
without  preparation  for  the  new,  and  he  looked  for  a  long  period 
of  anarchy  and  disorder.7 

Calhoun's  views  are  colored  by  his  academic  interest  in  the 
operation  of  political  science  in  Germany.  His  political  prin- 
ciples "drawn  from  facts  in  the  moral  world  just  as  certain  as 
any  in  the  physical"  might  be  put  to  a  definite  test.*  Calhoun 
had  no  faith  in  majority  rule  of  itself,  and  reflecting  on  the 
German  situation  he  did  not  fail  to  expound  his  familiar  doctrine 
that  "the  mere  numerical  majority  is  the  people  and  has,  as 
such,  the  indefeasible  right  to  govern"  constituted  a  vicious 
error.  As  the  central  German  government  became  palpably 
weaker  he  explained  the  decline  as  due  to  the  misconceptions  and 
the  fundamental  errors  of  the  political  leaders.  High  and  exalted 
aspirations  had  vanished  in  the  pursuit  of  false  political  premises.7 

Tucker**  thought  that  the  Germans  had  gone  wild  having 
drunk  from  the  "jargon  of  Kant."  He  recognized,  however,  the 
intense  devotion  to  the  fatherland  and  hoped  the  efforts  might 
culminate  in  success.     Daniel  Webster  held  the  movement  in 


7  Jameson,  J.  F.,  Correspondence  of  J.  C.  Calhoun,  A.H.A.,  Repts.,  1899,  II, 
748-760. 

Calhoun  to  Donelson,  23  May  1848.    Donelson  Mss. 

*It  was  suspected  by  contemporaries  that  Calhoun  had  sketched  a  plan  of 
government  for  Germany.  That  such  was  actually  the  case  has  been  recently 
discovered. 

Graebe  to  Donelson,  2  JI.  1848.     Donelson  Mss. 

Vide,  Curti,  M.  E.,  Austria  and  the  United  States,  1848-52,  143. 

**  Beverley  Tucker  was  professor  of  law  in  the  College  of  William  and  Mary 
and  an  influential  writer  on  things  political. 


26  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

high  esteem.    At  one  time  he  considered  going  to  Germany  as 
minister  to  aid  in  the  erection  of  a  federal  government.8 

Opinion  in  America  concerning  the  revolutions  in  the  Ger- 
manies  aided  in  shaping  the  policy  of  the  government  with 
respect  of  them.  The  State  Department  desired  all  possible 
information  so  that  its  judgments  might  be  correctly  formed 
and  a  wise  policy  followed.  Actuated  by  reports  from  agents  in 
Europe,  the  government  early  in  the  revolutions  felt  it  advisable 
to  adopt  a  "watchful  waiting"  attitude.  Accordingly  President 
Polk  refused  to  ratify  a  convention  of  extradition  arranged 
with  Prussia  and  some  of  the  other  German  states,  because  of  the 
great  change  which  had  recently  come.  If  a  central  government 
were  erected,  the  United  States  would  treat  with  it.9 

Later,  reassured  by  Donelson,  the  Administration  considered 
the  success  of  the  revolution  a  certainty.  Hence  in  July,  1848,  the 
Minister  at  Berlin  received  orders  to  proceed  to  Frankfort  as  the 
diplomatic  representative  of  the  United  States  and  to  recognize 
the  new  German  government  if  it  were  in  successful  operation. 
The  American  people,  wrote  Buchanan,  sympathized  warmly 
with  any  thing  that  would  work  for  the  best  interests  of  Germany. 
While  at  Frankfort,  Donelson  had  special  instructions  to  do  all 
in  his  power  to  promote  American  commercial  interests  and  to 
secure  a  reduction  of  the  duty  on  the  important  agricultural  and 
manufacturing  productions.  Early  in  the  following  month, 
encouraged  by  the  reports  from  abroad  and  fortified  by  the 
approval  of  his  Cabinet,  President  Polk  decided  to  make  the 
Frankfort  mission  a  permanent  one.  Thus  with  Senate  approval, 
Donelson  received  an  apppointment  as  Minister  Plenipotentiary 
and  Envoy  Extraordinary  to  the  Federal  Government  of  Ger- 
many, with  the  distinct  understanding  that  he  should  remain  as 
envoy  to  Prussia  also  until  word  reached  Washington  that  the 
central  government  had  complete  charge  of  foreign  relations,  at 
which  time  the  Prussian  mission  would  be  dispensed  with.    The 


8  Tucker  to  Hammond,  11  Oct.  1848.    Hammond  Mss. 
Blair,  F.  P.  to  Van  Buren,  5  Mch.  1849.    Van  Buren  Mss. 

9  Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  Presidents,  IV,  600. 
Quaife,  Diary  of  J.  K.  Polk,  IV,  18,  19,  28,  33. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  27 

most  important  object  of  the  mission  consisted  in  getting  the 
German  tariff  reduced  to  a  reciprocal  basis.  Buchanan  im- 
pressed on  Donelson  the  government  policy  and  opinion.  The 
United  States  never  interfered  with  the  domestic  concerns  of 
foreign  states,  but  it  could  not  "view  with  indifference"  the 
unification  movement  in  Germany.10 

As  the  summer  wore  on,  and  no  Minister  from  the  central 
government  presented  his  credentials,  Polk  became  suspicious. 
Donelson's  suggestions  for  a  commercial  pact  fell  on  adder's  ears. 
Only  when  the  Frankfort  government  had  a  well-defined  con- 
stitution would  such  a  treaty  be  made.  When  the  Whigs  came 
into  office  on  March  5, 1849,  Secretary  of  State  Clayton  advocated 
the  same  policy  with  regard  to  a  commercial  treaty  as  that 
pursued  by  Buchanan,  since  Germany  had  not  yet  been  firmly 
established.  In  forceful  language,  he  forbade  Donelson  to  nego- 
tiate a  commercial  treaty  until  so  advised  from  Washington." 

As  the  United  States  had  only  one  envoy  in  Germany,  it  was 
prepared  to  receive  one  man  representing  both  Berlin  and 
Frankfort.  After  a  long  wait  in  New  York  for  his  commission, 
Roenne,*  the  German  minister,  was  received  by  Polk  in  January, 
1849.  Following  a  felicitous  speech  from  Roenne,  Polk  declared 
that  the  American  people  had  taken  a  deep  and  lively  interest 
in  the  events  in  Germany  during  the  previous  year.  While 
they  adhered  to  the  established  doctrine  of  non-interference  in 
the  domestic  affairs  of  nations,  American  sympathy  had  been 
with  Germany  in  her  struggle  for  a  liberal  centralized  govern- 
ment. The  President  expressed  pleasure  at  the  reception 
accorded  Donelson  in  Frankfort  and  added  that  America  desired 


10  Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  Presidents,  IV,  605. 
Quaife,  Diary  of  J.  K.  Polk,  IV,  47,  56-57. 

Buchanan  to  Donelson,  24  Jl.  1848,  3,  7,  15  Ag.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State, 
Inst.,  Prussia,  XIV. 

11  Buchanan  to  Donelson,  6  Nov.  1848,  8  Jan.  1849,  17  Feb.  1849,  Mss., 
Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Prussia,  XIV. 

Buchanan  to  Donelson,  26  Jan.  1849,  Ibid.,  Notes  to  German  States,  VI. 

Clayton  to  Donelson,  19  Mch.  1849,  Ibid.,  Inst.,  Prussia,  XIV. 

Quaife,  Diary  of  J.  K.  Polk,  IV,  170,  172,  310,  337. 

*  Frederick  Ludwig  von  Roenne  had  been  the  Prussian  envoy  at  Washing- 
ton, 1834-43. #  After  sitting  in  the  Frankfort  Parliament  he  had  been  desig- 
nated as  minister  to  Washington  where  he  had  established  numerous  friend- 
ships. 


28  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

"to  cement  the  amicable  relations  which  exist"  and  "to  extend 
commercial  intercourse."  This  reception  breathed  the  same 
spirit  that  Polk  had  exhibited  in  his  recent  message  to  Congress 
in  which  he  had  expressed  pleasure  at  the  unification  movement. 
If  unity  should  be  accomplished  with  a  guarantee  for  the  pro- 
tection of  states-rights,  it  would  mark  "an  important  era  in  the 
history  of  human  events;"  the  whole  world  would  benefit  by 
the  union.12 

The  last  official  act  of  Polk  made  the  Frankfort  mission  a  sepa- 
rate one  through  the  appointment,  under  political  pressure,  of  E.  A. 
Hannegan*  to  Berlin.  Polk's  policy  was  dictated  by  the  belief, 
formed  from  Donelson's  despatches,  that  eventually  the  Berlin 
mission  would  be  swallowed  up  in  that  of  Frankfort.  Donelson, 
come  what  might,  would  be  secure,  thought  Polk.  But  Donelson, 
seeing  the  rope  of  sand  on  which  the  Frankfort  government  hung, 
recognized  the  futility  of  having  two  ministers  in  Germany.13 

The  Whig  Administration,  with  John  M.  Clayton  as  Premier, 
proceeded  more  cautiously  in  its  dealings  with  the  German 
situation.  Donelson  received  orders  to  go  to  Frankfort  and  to 
assure  the  Archduke  John  that  the  new  administration  desired 
to  draw  the  bonds  of  amity  closer  than  they  had  ever  been 
before.  Considering  the  complicated  circumstances,  however, 
it  behooved  the  American  Republic  to  act  with  unusual  caution 
and  prudence.  To  be  sure,  the  sympathies  of  the  government  and 
of  the  American  people  were  with  the  German  group  that  wanted 
a  government  based  on  the  supreme  principle  that  the  people  are 
the  source  of  all  power.  America  was  prepared  to  recognize  new 
governments  and  "to  cheer  them  in  every  progressive  movement 
that  has  for  its  aim  the  countless  and  priceless  blessings  of  free- 
dom." Donelson,  however,  was  to  act  merely  as  a  silent  sentinel 
and  keep  the  government  informed  of  German  opinion  and 


12  Wash.  Union,  31  Jan.  1849. 

Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  Presidents,  IV,  630. 
Quaife,  Diary  of  J.  K.  Polk,  IV,  310. 

*  E.  A.  Hannegan,  an  Indiana  debauchee,  who  had  been  U.  S.  Senator, 
1845-1849. 

13  Buchanan  to  Donelson,  8  Jan.  1849,  18  Feb.  1849,  29  Je.  1849.     Donelson 
Mss. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  21  Jl.  1849.     Buchanan  Mss. 
Quaife,  Diary  of  J.  K.  Polk,  IV,  369,  370. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  29 

progress.  Developments  at  Frankfort  in  the  near  future  would 
determine  whether  or  not  the  mission  should  be  abolished.  If  no 
progress  should  be  made,  Donelson  would  be  recalled  and  then 
"we  should  not  renew  the  experiment  of  sending  a  minister  to 
another  Government  before  it  shall  be  organized  and  capable 
of  treating  with  us" — a  sharp  dig  at  the  Democratic  Buchanan 
policy.14 

When  the  certainty  of  organizing  the  central  German  govern- 
ment had  vanished,  Donelson  was  recalled  (September  18, 1849) 
and  the  mission  "for  the  present"  was  suppressed.*  President 
Taylor  came  to  this  decision  because  no  permanent  German 
government  had  yet  been  formed,  and  fresh  reports  indicated 
that  none  could  be  erected  until  Prussia  agreed  to  cooperate. 
Until  that  time  the  United  States  would  keep  its  representative  in 
Berlin.  Though  the  Frankfort  envoy  was  ordered  home,  Clayton 
considered  it  advisable  to  have  someone  there  to  keep  him  informed 
of  any  developments.  A  new  mission,  assigned  to  Seaton  Gales, 
ex-secretary  of  the  Frankfort  Legation,  was  to  be  strictly  private 
and  confidential.  If  anything  should  develop  Clayton  wanted 
surety  that  he  would  be  accurately  and  readily  informed. IS 

Democratic  party  horses  at  Washington  soon  attacked  the 
administration  policy.  In  the  Senate,  Cass  demanded  the  re- 
establishment  of  the  mission  to  the  Frankfort  government 
because  it  was  the  fountain  of  liberal  principles  upon  which  any 
regeneration  of  Germany  depended.  Earlier  in  the  session  Foote 
introduced  a  bill  looking  to  the  reestablishment  of  diplomatic 
relations.  The  mission  had  been  suppressed  just  when  it  seemed 
likely  to  prove  highly  advantageous  to  the  cause  of  freedom. 
Countering,  King,  chairman  of  the  Foreign  Relations  Committee, 
pointed  out  that  the  central  government  had  failed,  and  no 
confederated  government  existed  to  which  a  mission  could  be  sent. 


14  Clayton  to  Donelson,  19  Mch.  1849,  8  Jl.  1849,   Mss.,   Dept.  of  State, 
Inst.,  Prussia,  XIV. 

Cp.  Phila.  North  American,  24  Ag.  1849. 

*  It  was  considered  possible  that  the  Frankfort  post  might  later  be  reestab- 
lished.   Clay,  H.  to  McNairy,  26  Jan.  1850.     Clay  Mss. 

15  Clayton  to  Donelson,  18  Sept.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Prussia, 
XIV. 

Clayton  to  Gales,  1  Oct.  1849.     Ibid. 
Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  Presidents,  V.  11. 


30  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

On  a  motion  in  the  House,  similar  to  the  one  made  by  Foote, 
McClernand,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
declared  the  mission  had  been  suppressed  through  "the  coalition 
of  the  Executive  with  the  Kings  against  the  people  of  Germany." 
Though  this  avowed  Democratic  hostility  continued  to  evidence 
itself,  the  Whig  government  remained  obdurate.16 

Another  indication  of  the  surpassing  interest  in,  and  of  Ameri- 
can opinion  on  the  revolutionary  movement  with  the  concom- 
itant struggle  for  union,  may  be  observed  in  the  governmental 
activities  with  respect  of  the  navy  projected  for  United  Germany. 
Duckwitz,  Minister  of  Commerce  at  Frankfort,  requested  through 
Donelson  that  the  United  States  allow  a  naval  officer  "of  high 
station  who  has  already  been  in  command  of  a  man-of-war  and 
who  is  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  requisites  of  the  marine." 
to  enter  the  German  service.  Buchanan  had  received  a  request 
in  like  tenor  through  Graebe  who  added  that  Germany  desired 
to  buy  some  American  warships.  At  a  Cabinet  meeting  the 
Secretary  of  State  presented  the  application,  which  he  and  several 
of  his  colleagues  thought  should  be  granted.  But  the  President 
interposed  several  objections.  If  an  American  naval  officer  held 
a  command  in  the  German  navy,  he  would  be  in  an  anomalous 
position.  Again,  he  would  be  drawing  pay  from  two  states. 
Let  an  officer  go  to  Germany  on  a  leave  of  absence,  without  pay, 
and  if  he  chose  he  might  voluntarily  enter  the  German  naval 
service,  one  suggested.  Polk  compromised  by  agreeing  to  grant 
a  leave  to  an  American  officer  for  a  short  period.17 

With  the  distinct  understanding  that  he  would  in  no  wise 
jeopardize  his  position  in  the  American  service,  Foxhall  A. 
Parker,*  was  sent  on  this  strictly  confidential  mission  "to  ascer- 


16  31  Cong.,  1  sess.,Cong.Globe,  583,  745-6;  31  Cong.,  1  sess.,  Sen.  JoL,  114, 458. 

17  Mann  to  Buchanan,  1  May  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Spec.  Agents  to 
German  States  and  Hungary. 

Graebe  to  Buchanan,  9  Oct.  1848,  Ibid.,  Consular  Letters,  Hesse-Cassel,  I. 

Buchanan  to  Donelson,  30  Oct.  1848,  Ibid.,  Inst.,  Prussia,  XIV. 

Quaife,  Diary  of  J.  K.  Polk,  IV,  169-172. 

*  Commodore  Parker  had  a  long  and  varied  career  in  the  naval  service.  As 
a  lieutenant  in  1814,  he  had  participated  in  successful  cruises  against  British 
merchantmen.  In  1843,  he  commanded  the  squadron  that  accompanied 
Caleb  Cushing  on  his  mission  to  negotiate  the  first  commercial  treaty  with 
China. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  31 

tain  precisely  what  is  desired  and  what  will  be  the  conditions  of 
the  temporary  service  in  Germany,"  since  the  President  wanted 
"to  give  every  legitimate  aid"  in  establishing  the  new  German 
navy.     Parker  embarked  for  Bremen,  December  20,  1848.18 

Meanwhile  the  German  Naval  Board  awaited  the  presence  of 
their  American  adviser,  and  hesitated  to  do  anything  before  his 
arrival.  Before  going  to  Frankfort  Parker  dined  with  the 
Prussian  king.  After  several  protracted  ^conferences  with 
Von  Gagern,  President  of  the  Frankfort  Council  of  State,  and 
with  Duckwitz,  Parker  learned  that  virtually  nothing  had  been 
done  to  create  a  national  navy.  Laws  had  not  even  been  devised 
for  the  government  of  the  navy,  nor  had  plans  been  arranged  to 
prevent  a  blockade  in  case  war  should  break  out  with  Denmark, 
which  seemed  imminent  to  Parker.  Consequently  he  con- 
cluded that  no  American  officer  could  do  credit  to  himself  or 
his  country  at  the  time.  American  assistance  should  be  confined 
exclusively  to  advice.  In  a  letter  to  Donelson,  Parker  stated 
that  though  Germany  wanted  thirty-nine  American  officers  to 
organize  the  navy,  he  doubted  whether  one  would  accept; 
personally,  he  had  not  the  slightest  idea  of  entering  the  German 
service.  Until  the  course  of  the  new  government  should  be 
clearly  charted,  the  United  States  should  rest  on  its  oars.19 

On  his  return  to  Washington,  Parker  made  a  report,  which 
unfortunately  has  vanished,  to  his  Department  and  received 
thanks  for  "the  promptitude  and  intelligence"  with  which  the 
mission  was  executed.     Parker's  report  convinced  the  authori- 


18  Mason  to  Buchanan,  12  Dec.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Miscell.  Letters, 
Oct.-Dec.  1848. 

Buchanan  to  Donelson,  18  Dec.  1848,  Ibid.,  Inst.,  Prussia,  XIV. 

Mason  to  Parker,  16  Dec.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Officers,  Ships  of  War, 
XLII. 

19Graebe  to  Buchanan,  28  Nov.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Consular 
Letters,  Hesse-Cassel,  I. 

Graebe  to  Donelson,  26  Dec.  1848.     Donelson  Mss. 

Duckwitz  to  Donelson,  12  Jan.  1849.     Ibid. 

Fay  to  Donelson,  25  Jan.  1849.     Ibid. 

Donelson  to  Fay,  22,  23  Jan.  1849.     Ibid. 

Parker  to  Donelson,  25  Jan.  1849.     Ibid. 

Parker  to  Mason,  24  Jan.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Capts.  Letters, 
Jan.-Je.  1849. 


32  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

ties  that  it  was  inadvisable  for  American  navalmen  to  enter 
foreign  service;  an  opinion  that  was  duly  transmitted  to  Roenne. 
Learning  that  the  naval  invitation  had  been  refused,  Donelson 
assumed  that  the  government  had  finished  with  the  Frankfort 
government.20 

Meanwhile  the  Frankfort  authorities  had  determined  to 
augment  the  diminutive  navy  through  the  acquisition  of  some 
privately  owned  American  vessels,  for  which  purpose  a  special 
agent  was  despatched  to  this  country.  Roenne,  who  already 
had  secured  copies  of  the  naval  laws  and  regulations  together 
with  the  plan  of  naval  organization,  applied  for  a  naval  officer 
to  aid  in  fitting  out  a  vessel  and  to  accompany  it  to  Bremerhaven. 
Compliance  would  attest  afresh  the  friendly  disposition  of  the 
United  States  to  assist  Germany  in  creating  a  navy.  Com- 
mander M.  C.  Perry  consented  to  undertake  the  task  and  on  his 
advice  a  mail  packet,  the  United  States,  was  purchased.  When 
the  German  envoy  applied  for  the  use  of  the  Brooklyn  Navy 
Yard  facilities  in  equipping  the  vessel,  the  request  was  granted.21 

Inherently  more  conservative  in  foreign  affairs  and  fearful 
that  the  ship  might  be  employed  in  the  Dano-German  war  then 
underway,  the  Whig  administration  completely  altered  the 
policy  of  the  Polk  regime.  Perry  was  ordered  to  sever  his  rela- 
tionship with  the  German  authorities;  the  permit  to  use  the 
Navy  Yard  was  revoked.  Only  after  a  bond  to  preserve  neu- 
trality with  all  powers  with  which  America  was  at  peace  had 


"  Roenne  to  Mason,  15  Feb.  1849,  Wash.  Union,  20  Je.  1849. 

Mason  to  Parker,  28  Feb.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Capts.  Letters,  Jan.- 
Je.  1849. 

Mason  to  Roenne,  1  Mch.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Miscell.  Letters, 
Mch.-Ap.   1849. 

Mann  to  Clayton,  28  Ag.  1849,  Ibid.,  Spec.  Agents  to  German  States  and 
Hungary. 

Donelson  to  Clayton,  17  May  1849,  Wash.  Intelligencer,  15  Je.  1849. 

Donelson  to  Buchanan,  21  Jl.  1849.     Buchanan  Mss. 

21  Roenne  to  Mason,  30  Jan.  1849,  15,  19  Feb.  1849.  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State, 
Miscell.  Letters,  Mar.-Ap.  1849. 

Mason  to  Roenne,  6  Feb.  1849,  Ibid. 

Mason  to  McKeever,  23  Feb.  1849,  Ibid. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  33 

been  arranged  did  the  port  authorities  in  New  York  allow  the 
vessel  to  depart.22 

The  correspondence  in  the  affair  was  flaunted  before  the  public 
in  the  columns  of  the  rival  Washington  journals,  the  Union 
and  the  Intelligencer.  Editorially,  the  latter  praised  the  Whig 
Administration  for  preventing  a  violation  of  the  nation's  neu- 
trality. The  Democratic  organ  declared  that  Clayton's  action 
illustrated  his  sympathy  "with  the  tyrants  and  aristocrats  of 
Europe  in  their  struggle  with  the  people."  Buchanan  and 
Clayton  between  themselves  considered  the  episode  a  huge  joke.23 


22  Preston  to  Perry,  19  Mch.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Officers,  Ships  of 
War. 

McKeever  to  Preston,  21  Mch.  1849,  Ibid. 

Clayton  to  Preston,  21  Mch.  1849,  Ibid. 

Clayton  to  Roenne,  19  May  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Notes  to  German 
States,  VI. 

Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  Presidents,  VI,  225.  31  Cong.,  1  sess.,  Cong. 
Globe,  409. 

23  Clayton  to  Buchanan,  14  Ap.  1849.     Clayton  Mss. 
Buchanan  to  Clayton,  17  Ap.  1849.    Buchanan  Mss. 

Wash.  IntelL,  15  Je.  1849;   Wash.  Union,  12,  13,  16,  20  Je.  1849. 
Phila.  Ledger,  21  Je.  1849. 


34  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 


III 

What  Americans  in  Europe  Thought  of  the  Revolutions 
in  the  Austrian  Empire 

Long  before  the  revolutionary  movement  broke  out  in  the 
Austrian  dominions,  American  observers,  recognizing  the  absence 
of  political  harmony,  predicted  the  upheaval.  Mann  wrote  that 
of  all  European  states  the  condition  of  Austria  was  the  most 
deplorable.  Early  in  March,  1848,  William  H.  Stiles,*  who  repre- 
sented the  United  States  at  the  Hapsburg  court,  prophesied 
that  the  revolutionary  spirit  would  spread  from  France  and 
shake  Austria  to  its  very  foundations.  In  his  opinion,  this 
revolution  promised  to  be  in  no  way  inferior  to  the  French 
upheaval  which  began  in  1789.  The  long  awaited  contest  be- 
tween peoples  and  thrones  was  imminent,  and  the  United 
States  would  soon  be  joined  by  a  number  of  sister  republics.1 

On  March  13,  the  Viennese  populace,  spurred  on  by  the  Uni- 
versity students,  demanded  reforms  and  began  rioting.**  At 
the  behest  of  a  mob,  Metternich,  Chancellor  of  the  Empire, 
and  the  incarnation  of  conservatism,  fled  from  the  country. 
Several  reforms  requested  by  the  people  were  speedily  promised 
by  the  Emperor.  To  Stiles  it  seemed  as  if  the  empire  would 
quickly  be  transformed  from  one  of  the  most  absolute  to  one  of 
the  most  liberal  monarchies  in  Europe.  If  the  authorities  ex- 
hibited sufficient  wisdom  nothing  could  prevent  Austria  from 
enjoying  a  splendid  future.  One  American  believed  that  the 
upheaval  in  Austria  produced  a  more  profound  sensation  in 
England  than  did  the  one  in  France.     The  empire  needed  a 


*  Stiles,  a  lawyer  from  Georgia,  had  been  in  Congress,  1843-5,  and  was 
Charge  to  Austria,  1845-9.  His  History  of  Austria,  1848-9,  (2  vols.,  N.  Y., 
1852)  is  an  indispensable  study  of  the  period. 

1  Mann  to  Buchanan,  13  Mch.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec. 
Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Stiles  to  Buchanan,  4  Mch.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 

**  A  thorough  study  of  the  upheaval  in  the  Austrian  Empire  is  to  be  found 
in  Helfert,  G.,  Geschichte  Osterreichs,  (Leipzig,  1869).  Maurice,  C.  E.  The 
Revolution  1848-9  in  Italy,  Austria  -Hungary,  and  Germany,  (London,  1887) 
gives  the  best  account  in  English. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  35 

liberal  constitution  with  jurisdiction  in  local  affairs  vested  in 
the  various  provinces.  Thus  could  the  state  be  knit  together  and 
stability  guaranteed.  To  many  Americans  Emperor  Ferdinand 
appeared  unequal  to  the  gigantic  problems  that  awaited  solution.2 

Concessions  granting  freedom  of  the  press,  the  establishment  of 
a  National  Guard,  and  amnesty  to  political  prisoners  allayed 
somewhat  the  turbulence  of  the  Viennese  mobs.  Still  the  situa- 
tion of  the  empire,  notably  in  Bohemia  and  Hungary,  remained 
critical  and  a  fresh  outbreak  in  the  capital  might  occur  at  any 
moment.  So  difficult  did  Stiles  find  the  task  of  obtaining  accurate 
and  complete  information  that  he  requested  permission  to 
employ  an  aide.  Outrages  in  the  provinces  produced  in  him  a 
feeling  of  nausea.3 

When  a  recrudescence  of  the  revolutionary  spirit  appeared, 
the  Emperor  and  his  family  decided  to  leave  Vienna.  Stiles 
considered  that  the  departure  might  lead  to  the  dethronement 
of  the  monarch  and  the  institution  of  a  republican  government, 
though  the  opposition  to  such  a  change  would  be  tremendous. 
Only  with  a  republic  would  the  masses  be  satisfied,  yet  for  this 
type  of  government  Stiles  believed  the  people  were  totally 
unready.  The  American  consul  in  Vienna  concurred  in  this 
view.  No  such  characters  as  Washington,  Franklin,  and  Jeffer- 
son had  emerged,  and  leaders  such  as  these  would  be  necessary 
to  formulate  a  sound  constitution.  The  withdrawal  of  the 
Emperor  aroused  intense  anxiety  in  the  minds  of  the  Vienna 
bourgeoisie.  A  consequent  revulsion  of  feeling  set  in  against 
his  enemies,  the  students  and  the  proletariat,  and  a  distinct 
recovery  of  royal  prestige  was  soon  noticeable.4 


2  Stiles  to  Buchanan,  16  Mch.  1848,  31  May  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State, 
Repts.,  Austria,  II. 

Bancroft,  E.  D.,  Letters  from  England,  171. 

Clemson  to  Buchanan,  28  Mch.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Belgium, 

Vide,  Reminiscences  James  A.  Hamilton,  376-8.     This  undistinguished  son 
of  a  famous  father  visited  Vienna  during  the  Marztage. 

3  Stiles  to  Buchanan,  29  Mch.  1848,  12  Ap.  1848,  9,  18,  31  May  1848,  Mss., 
Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 

4  Stiles  to  Buchanan,  18,  31  May  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Aus- 
tria, II. 


36  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

The  appearance  on  July  7,  of  a  deputation,  purporting  to  be 
sent  from  the  American  government  bearing  gifts  to  the  Viennese 
revolutionaries,  placed  Stiles  in  an  awkward  position.  The 
traditional  American  policy,  he  well  knew,  precluded  the  pos- 
sibility of  the  mission  being  genuine.  On  the  following  day,  the 
party,  consisting  of  a  Mr.  Kohnstam,  probably  from  New  York, 
his  brother  from  Munich,  and  two  negro  boys,  made  speeches 
about  liberty  declaring  that  the  movement  in  Vienna  met  with 
a  warm  response  in  America.  One  said,  "Not  only  words,  but 
our  money  and  our  arms  are  at  your  disposition.  One  hundred 
thousand  men  will  be  ready  to  help  our  brethren."  Many  people 
in  Vienna  believed  that  the  American  government  had  actually 
sent  the  embassy  to  aid  in  the  formation  of  a  republic.  Enraged 
at  the  whole  episode,  Stiles  roundly  denounced  the  men  as 
impostors  and  in  a  newspaper  article  outlined  the  principles 
which  the  United  States  followed  in  respect  of  the  domestic 
affairs  of  other  states.5 

In  the  middle  of  August,  the  Emperor,  under  the  impression 
that  tranquillity  had  been  restored,  returned  to  Vienna.  Despite 
the  presence  of  the  sovereign  the  city  continued  to  be  dis- 
orderly. The  students  could  not  be  silenced.  In  the  next  emer- 
gency, wrote  one  American,  the  Emperor  will  need  to  call  in 
troops  to  suppress  the  recalcitrant  elements  or  the  latter  will 
overthrow  him  and  institute  a  new  for,m  of  government. 
Financial  affairs  were  in  a  critical  state,  and  no  one  had  sufficient 
confidence  in  the  monarch  to  extend  a  needed  loan.  Should 
Ferdinand  abdicate  in  favor  of  another  member  of  his  family, 
Mann  believed,  the  bankers  would  be  reassured.  In  October, 
the  mutiny  of  soldiers  quartered  in  Vienna,  together  with  the 
rioting  of  some  of  the  citizens,  produced  a  fresh  crisis.  On  October 
7,  the  Hapsburgs  again  quitted  their  capital,  and  the  Diplo- 
matic Corps  were  advised  to  leave.  Then  an  Imperial  Army 
commanded  by  the  veteran  Windischgratz  bombarded  the  city.6 


5  Stiles  to  Buchanan,  15  Jl.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 
Schwarz  to  Plitt,  16  Jl.  1848,  Ibid.,  Consular  Letters,  Vienna,  I. 

6  Mann  to  Buchanan,   17  Ag.   1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec. 
Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Stiles  to  Buchanan,  24  Ag.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 
Annual  Register,  1848,  401-426. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  37 

American  opinion  differs  as  to  the  justification  for  the  bom- 
bardment of  Vienna.  Stiles  held  that  the  radical  faction  deserved 
the  harsh  policy  carried  through  by  the  government.  Besides, 
he  knew  that  the  disorders  had  been  fomented  in  order  to  prevent 
the  Emperor  from  sending  his  entire  military  strength  against 
the  revolting  Hungarians  then  advancing  on  Vienna.  For  this 
reason  the  attack  on  the  city  constituted  in  his  judgment  a  phase 
in  the  contest  between  the  Hapsburgs  and  the  Hungarians. 
Fay,  Legation  Secretary  in  Berlin,  "shocked  by  the  outrageous 
bombardment,"  failed  to  see  how  the  action  would  better  the 
situation  of  the  imperial  party.  Stimulated  by  the  activities 
of  two  emissaries  from  the  Frankfort  Parliament,  Blum  and 
Messenhauser,  the  Viennese  held  out  until  the  end  of  October. 
The  remarkable  fortitude  and  the  determined  resistance  of  the 
citizenry  evoked  much  praise  from  Americans.  When  the  city 
capitulated  several  Americans  expressed  their  regret  over  the 
insurgent  failure.  The  execution  of  Blum,  "who  might  have  been 
a  Samuel  Adams,"  said  one,  would  create  added  difficulties  for 
the  authorities.7 

While  the  people  in  Vienna  agitated  for  political  reform,  the 
liberal  leaders  in  the  subject  kingdom  of  Hungary  utilized  the 
opportunity  to  gain  their  "inherent  rights."  After  obtaining 
several  concessions  from  the  Emperor  the  Hungarians  were 
confronted  with  the  demands  of  their  Croatian  subjects  for 
virtual  autonomy.  A  nationalistic  war  broke  out  between  these 
two  peoples.  When  the  Hungarian  Diet  had  been  refused  sup- 
port by  the  Emperor  against  the  Croats,  it  invested  its  leader, 
Louis  Kossuth,*  with  dictatorial  powers  and  prepared  to  attack 


7  Stiles  to  Buchanan,  2,  14  Nov.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Austria, 

Fay  to  Buchanan,  16  Oct.  1848,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  V. 

New  Orleans  Picayune,  6  Dec.  1848. 

Newark  Daily  Advertiser,  8  Dec.  1848. 

*  Louis  Kossuth,  (1802-94),  born  of  a  noble  family,  had  been  carefully 
trained  for  his  father's  profession  of  law.  As  early  as  1825  he  attained  prom- 
inence through  his  advocacy  of  political  reform  in  the  Hungarian  National 
Diet.  For  inflammatory  articles  that  he  printed  in  his  personal  newspaper, 
Kossuth  was  imprisoned  for  three  years.  Upon  his  release  he  threw  all  his 
talents  into  the  cause  of  Hungarian  political  and  commercial  independence. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  revolutions,  he  played  a  leading  role,  and  may  be 
considered  in  a  real  sense  the  personification  of  the  revolutionary  movement. 


38  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

both  the  Austrians  and  the  Croats.  Hopeful  that  a  reconcilia- 
tion might  be  effected,  the  Emperor  appointed  Count  Lamberg 
as  generalissimo  of  the  Hungarian  army.  An  angry  Hungarian 
mob  illustrated  the  feeling  of  the  people  when  it  barbarously 
murdered  Lamberg.  Whereupon  the  imperial  government 
nominated  Jellachic,  Croat  leader  and  arch-enemy  of  Hungary, 
as  the  chief  military  official  in  Hungary.  The  dissolution  of  the 
Magyar  Diet  was  decreed,  and  the  Austrian  troops  were  ordered 
to  advance  into  Hungary.  For  a  time  the  military  operations 
of  the  government  were  halted  by  the  Viennese  disturbances  in 
October.  With  Vienna  under  control,  Austrian  and  Croat 
turned  their  attention  to  the  Hungarians.  Just  outside  Vienna, 
at  Schwechat,  on  October  30,  the  imperial  forces  defeated  the 
rebels,  drove  them  pell-mell  into  Hungary,  and  prepared  to 
advance  on  nine  fronts.8 

During  the  retreat,  an  appeal  from  the  Hungarians  afforded 
Stiles  an  opportunity  to  show  the  American  position  concerning 
the  revolt.  An  envoy  from  Kossuth  asked  him  whether  he  would 
intervene  to  settle  the  civil  strife.  Stiles  hesitated.  Traditionally 
the  United  States  had  abstained  from  any  interference  in  domes- 
tic disputes.  Moreover,  extensive  preparations  had  been  made 
for  the  campaign,  and  Austria  probably  would  not  listen  to  any 
proposals  save  unconditional  surrender.  When  the  messenger 
declared  that  Hungary  had  been  unable  to  reach  official  ears 
with  a  plea  for  an  armistice,  Stiles  agreed  for  the  sake  of  human- 
ity to  attempt  to  open  up  negotiations  for  a  truce.  Kossuth, 
who  looked  upon  the  United  States  as  "the  natural  supporters 
of  freedom  and  civilization,"  signified  his  eagerness  for  Stiles  to 
act  immediately.  The  latter  attempted  to  get  into  communica- 
tion with  Schwartzenberg,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
Windischgratz,  the  military  chief,  but  found  them  absent  from 
Vienna.  To  Kossuth  he  wrote  that  he  had  little  hope  of  securing 
the  desired  armistice.  On  December  3,  Stiles  did  obtain  an 
interview  with  Windischgratz  who  listened  to  him  attentively, 
but  refused  to  treat  with  the  rebels.    He  said  Stiles'  plea  was  the 


8  Annual  Register,  1848,  401-426. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  39 

first  application  for  an  armistice  that  the  imperial  government 
had  received.  Without  in  any  degree  compromising  his  country, 
the  American  Charge  had  acted  in  the  best  interests  of  humanity 
and  his  policy  was  approved  by  President  Polk.9 

Meanwhile  Ferdinand  resigned  the  throne  to  his  youthful 
nephew,  Francis  Joseph.  Considering  the  unsettled  condition 
in  the  empire,  Stiles  questioned  the  wisdom  of  the  change. 
Another  American  thought  that  the  new  emperor  with  a  liberal 
program  would  be  able  to  control  affairs  until  the  people  became 
more  sophisticated.     Then  a  fresh  revolution  would  ensue.10 

Early  in  1849,  Windischgratz's  plans  seemed  speedily  reaching 
their  conclusion.  The  hasty  retreat  of  the  Hungarians  disap- 
pointed the  general  expectation  and  vitiated  the  confidence 
reposed  in  their  military  ability  by  Americans.  The  campaign 
would  long  since  have  ended,  wrote  one,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
horrible  condition  of  the  highways  coupled  with  the  fact  that 
the  Hungarians  adopted  guerilla  tactics.  Sharp  criticism  was 
directed  at  Kossuth,  who,  though  a  great  orator,  was  " devoid  of 
practical  talent."  Kendall  of  the  Picayune  concluded  that  the 
Hungarians  had  failed  to  exhibit  the  qualities  necessary  to 
establish  a  separate  government.  Considering  the  movement 
at  an  end,  Stiles  thought  the  revolutions  had  been  a  blessing  in 
disguise  since  Austria  had  changed  "from  the  decrepitude  of  old 
age  to  the  vigor  of  youth."  The  people,  however,  could  not  have 
freedom  until  they  had  learned  the  first  lesson  in  self-govern- 
ment— respect  for  authority  and  obedience  to  law." 

The  early  days  of  March  witnessed  a  complete  reversal  of 
the  military  situation.  Changed  from  a  retreating  army  to  one 
of  offense,  the  spirited  Hungarians  pushed  all  before  them. 
Americans  were  overjoyed  at  the  advance  which  they  thought  to 
be  due,  in  part,  to  the  inferior  strategy  of  Windischgratz.  The 
issuance  of  a  Hungarian   "Declaration  of  Independence"   on 


9  The  correspondence  covering  this  incident  may  be  found  in  31  Cong., 
1  sess.,  Sen.  exec,  doc,  43.     Vide,  Stiles,  W.  H.,  Austria,  1848-9,  IT,  155-7. 

10  Stiles  to  Buchanan,  3  Dec.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 
New  Orleans  Picayune,  11  Jan.  1849,  24  Feb.  1849. 

11  New  Orleans  Picayune,  1  Mch.  1849. 

Stiles  to  Buchanan,  8  Jan.  1849,  15  Feb.  1849,  1  Mch.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept. 
of  State,  Repts.,  Austria,  II. 


40  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

April  19,  was  regarded  as  a  most  serious  step,  but  one  that  had 
been  too  long  delayed.  At  this  juncture,  Russia  with  her 
ponderous  military  machine  entered  the  conflict,  on  the  side  of 
legitimacy.  The  Russian  action  proved  somewhat  of  a  surprise 
to  Americans,  who  knew  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  revolutions 
the  Czar  had  caused  a  proclamation  to  be  read  in  all  the  churches 
in  which  he  declared  Russia  would  not  interfere  with  the  internal 
concerns  of  other  states.  The  entrance  of  Russia  presaged  a 
terrible  war  whose  outcome  it  was  impossible  to  foresee.  Either 
the  coalition  would  soon  march  over  Hungary  or  else  the  latter 
would  secure  allies  and  provoke  a  general  European  war.  Donel- 
son  held  the  latter  view.  Only  through  the  preservation  of 
Hungary  intact  could  the  peace  of  Europe  be  obtained,  thought 
another  American.  To  Richard  Rush,  minister  in  Paris,  "formi- 
dable international  strife"  seemed  about  to  follow  in  the  wake 
of  the  internal  collisions.  England  and  France  would  use  their 
good  offices,  he  hoped,  to  prevent  a  general  conflict.  Other  men 
foresaw  in  the  advance  of  Russia  the  ultimate  destruction  of  all 
liberal  hopes.  At  Warsaw,  Silas  E.  Burrows*  marveled  at  the 
efficiency  of  Russia  in  organizing  and  shipping  the  munitions 
of  war.  "The  invaders  go  to  arrange  the  affairs  of  those  who  are 
too  young  in  self-government  to  know  what  their  own  interests 
are."  He  predicted  that  at  the  close  of  the  contest  Austria 
would  become  the  vassal  of  Russia.12 

Rather  hopeful  that  the  Hungarians  might  achieve  their  inde- 
pendence, the  American  government  decided  to  send  a  special 
diplomatic  agent  "towards"  Hungary.**    A.  Dudley  Mann,  then 


*  Burrows  was  a  New  York  merchant  high  up  in  Whig  political  circles. 
Devoted  to  the  water  he  spent  much  of  his  time  cruising  in  European  seas; 
hence  his  appearance  in  Warsaw. 

12  Sumner,  G.  P.  to  Robertson,  8  Mch.  1849.     Clayton  Mss. 

Sties  to  Clayton,  30  Ap.  1849,  21  May  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
Austrlai,  II. 

Ingersoll  to  Buchanan,  1  Ap.  1848,  Ibid.,  Russia,  XV. 

Donelson  to  Clayton,  7  May  1849,  Ibid.,  Prussia,  V. 

Rush  to  Clayton,  9  May  1849,  Ibid.,  France,  XXXI. 

Botts,  J.  to  Clayton,  13  Jl.  1849,  Ibid.,  Miscell.  Letters,  July-Aug.  1849. 

Burrows,  S.  E.  to  Clayton,  9  Jl.  1849,  Ibid. 

New  Orleans  Picayune,  8  May  1849,  4  Sept.  1849;  Newark  Daily  Advertiser, 
15  Ag.  1849. 

**  Vide,  chapter  IV. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  41 

in  Paris,  received  the  ill-fated  assignment.  He  believed  that  on 
the  Hungarian  plains  the  decision  would  be  made  as  to  whether 
Europe  should  be  despotic  or  republican.  If  the  Hungarians  should 
fail,  the  yoke  of  despotism  would  encircle  their  necks.  Should 
they  succeed,  the  dismemberment  of  the  Austrian  empire  and  the 
unification  of  Italy  would  ensue.  He  trusted  that  the  battle 
would  not  be  to  the  strong  and  that  he  might  be  able  to  report 
Hungary  successful  in  establishing  her  independence.  Before 
Mann  could  reach  Hungary,  however,  the  insurrectionary  gov- 
ernment had  become  itinerant.13 

During  the  successful  advance  the  Hungarians  received 
hearty  applause  for  their  fighting  qualities.  They  fought  like 
Americans  and  showed  all  the  earmarks  characteristic  of  freemen. 
Burrows  got  into  the  war  zone  to  ascertain  how  the  fighting 
compared  with  that  "at  Monterey  and  Buena  Vista."  He 
trusted  the  Russian  invaders  might  soon  meet  their  Saratoga. 
Convinced  by  what  he  saw  that  the  Magyars  could  not  be 
subdued  in  many  campaigns,  he  believed  they  could  never  be 
conquered.  Mann  wondered  how  opponents  at  least  twice  as 
strong  numerically  as  Hungary  could  be  overcome.  For  skill 
and  invincibility,  the  Magyars  had  no  superiors.  The  masterly 
strategy  exercised  by  the  Hungarian  general  Gorgei*  in  recap- 
turing the  strongly  fortified  city  of  Raab  evoked  much  praise. 
If  Russia  and  Austria  were  ultimately  defeated,  it  would  not  be 
due  to  their  lack  of  cooperation,  but  to  the  remarkable  ability 
of  the  "Spartan  people"  who  had  caused  rational  liberty  in 
continental  Europe  to  smile  and  to  hope.14 

The  stock  of  Kossuth,  Magyar  chief,  rose  in  American  minds. 
He  became  "a  new  impulse  to  the  cause  of  liberty  and  independ- 
ence." By  his  matchless  eloquence,  wrote  Mann,  he  had  aroused 
all   classes   to   the   defense   of   their   national   honor.     Women 


13  Mann  to  Clayton,  13  Jl.  1849,  8  Oct.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
Spec.  Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

*  Arthur  Gorgei,  trained  in  the  Austrian  military  service,  became  the  leading 
Hungarian  officer  during  the  revolution.  After  the  struggle  had  ended,  he 
lived  in  retirement,  if  not  disgrace. 

14  Mann  to  Clayton,  28  Jl.  1849,  8  Ag.  1849,  27  Sept.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of 
State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Burrows  to  Clayton,  14,  15,  16  Jl.  1849,  Ibid.,  Miscell.  Letters,  Jl.-Ag.  1849. 


42  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

marched  side  by  side  with  the  men.  Kendall  considered  Kossuth 
the  foremost  man  produced  by  the  revolutions.  In  administra- 
tive talent  he  ranked  him  alongside  Napoleon.  Liberals  admired 
Kossuth  for  what  he  had  thus  far  accomplished  and  they  had 
large  hopes  for  him  in  the  future.15 

Meanwhile  Mann  had  some  consternation  as  to  his  own  wel- 
fare. Since  the  Russian  Czar  attributed  the  spread  of  liberal 
principles  in  Europe  to  the  example  and  influence  of  America, 
Mann  wondered  what  would  happen  to  him  if  he  were  appre- 
hended. To  add  to  his  worries,  a  rumor  that  the  United  States 
was  prepared  to  recognize  an  envoy  from  Hungary  spread 
through  the  German  papers.  To  allay  suspicion,  Mann  sent  to 
several  journals  a  letter  from  Secretary  of  State  Clayton  in 
which  the  attitude  of  the  government  with  respect  of  Hungary 
was  clearly  stated.  This  letter  was  calculated  to  show  everyone 
that  the  American  policy  was  entirely  proper  and  just.16 

On  August  13, 1849,  attacked  by  the  superior  numbers  of  the 
coalition,  Gorgei  determined  to  have  "peace  at  any  price"  and 
surrendered  with  twenty-three  thousand  men.  This  action, 
Mann  knew,  would  terminate  hostilities.  That  Gorgei  had  been 
seduced  into  betraying  his  country  seemed  apparent.  At  first 
Stiles  believed  that  the  surrender  was  due  to  a  dispute  between 
Kossuth  and  Gorgei  with  the  possible  introduction  of  an  element 
of  treachery.  Later,  though  he  would  not  commit  himself  on 
Gorgei's  motive,  Stiles  declared  that  the  act  of  unconditional 
surrender  stood  forth  "without  palliation  on  the  pages  of 
history."17 

The  battle  for  Hungarian  freedom  had  been  fought  and  lost. 
Kossuth  and  a  handful  of  followers  fled  into  the  Ottoman  Empire. 
Convinced  that  there  was  no  longer  any  hope  for  Hungary, 


16  New  Orleans  Picayune,  30  Je.  1849. 
Mann  to  Clayton  as  in  note  14. 

M  Donelson  to  Clayton,  6  Ag.  1849,  Clayton  Mss. 

Mann  to  Clayton,  28  Jl.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents 
to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

17  Mann  to  Clayton,  17,  25  Ag.  1849,  27  Sept.  1849,  8  Oct.  1849,  Mss., 
Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Stiles  to  Clayton,  27  Ag.  1849,  Ibid.,  Austria,  II. 

Davis,  J.  C.  B.  to  Clayton,  21  Sept.  1849,  Ibid.,  England,  LX. 

Webb  to  Clayton,  15  Feb.  1850,  Clayton  Mss. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  43 

Mann  returned  to  Paris  thankful  that  he  had  avoided  any 
imprudence  which  might  have  injured  his  government.  By 
February  15,  1850,  the  American  representative  in  Vienna  could 
write  with  assurance,  "Austria  is  quiet."17 


44  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

IV 

Opinion  in  America   on   the  Austro-Hungarian   Revolts 

The  trend  of  opinion  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  follows  in 
general  the  same  course  as  that  of  Americans  in  Europe.  The 
government,  as  well  as  the  masses,  expressed  in  an  unmistakable 
manner  hearty  approval  of  the  ambitions  of  the  revolutionists. 

Before  the  injection  of  Hungarian  affairs  into  national  poli- 
tics, the  newspapers  with  one  accord  gave  assent  to  the  insur- 
rectionary hopes.  The  speed  with  which  the  old  empire  of 
Austria  toppled  under  pressure  of  "a  band  of  students  and  idlers" 
created  universal  surprise.  The  flight  of  Metternich,  as  bearing 
witness  to  the  death  of  despotism,  constituted  an  event  more 
important  than  the  French  Revolution.  Confidently  the  split- 
up  of  the  Austrian  empire  into  a  number  of  states  was  awaited. 
Austria  proper  would  then  be  absorbed  into  the  new  German 
empire.  The  news  of  the  flight  of  the  emperor  from  Vienna, 
coupled  with  rumors  of  the  creation  of  an  Austrian  republic, 
made  true  American  hearts  beat  fast.1 

Throughout  the  era  of  revolution,  the  people  in  the  United 
States  anticipated  a  general  war  in  Europe.  This  inevitable 
international  struggle  would  end  favorably  for  human  rights. 
If  a  general  war  should  break  out,  soliloquized  the  Richmond 
Whig,  America  would  gain  a  large  share  of  the  world's  carrying 
trade  and  would  find  besides  a  greater  market  for  her  bread- 
stuffs.  The  advance  of  Russia  into  Hungary  increased  the 
predictions  of  a  general  conflict.  Hungary  could  be  subdued 
only  through  a  long  and  bloody  war,  but  before  it  could  end  all 
Europe  would  be  drawn  into  the  whirlpool.  Through  such  a  war 
the  last  vestige  of  "divine  rights"  would  be  destroyed  and  the 
people  of  Europe  would  be  extended  all  the  rights  of  man.2 


1  Charleston  Mercury,  14  Ap.  1848;  Phila.  Ledger,  10  Ap.  1848,  24  Oct.  1848; 
Phila.  No.  Am.,  26  Oct.  1848. 

2  Phila.  No.  Am.,  10  Jl.  1848;  Phila.  Ledger,  23  Nov.  1848;  Richmond  Whig, 
29  Mch.  1848,  29  May  1848;  Boston  Atlas,  17  Ap.  1849;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  2 
Je.  1849. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  45 

The  stern  advance  of  the  monarchical  forces  soon  prostrated 
fond  American  hopes.  The  havoc  wrought  in  Prague  by  imperial 
armies  stunned  our  citizens.  In  spite  of  the  fall  of  Vienna, 
some  men  believed  that  democracy  would  yet  prevail.  The 
North  American  inferred  from  the  bombardment  of  Vienna 
that  the  revolutionary  movement  was  confined  to  the  city.  If 
Austrians  wanted  to  be  free  the  revolution  would  need  to  take 
root  in  the  country  and  be  carried  on  by  all  the  people.  As  1848 
drew  to  its  close,  the  newspapers  bewailed  the  fate  of  the  repub- 
lican element  in  Europe.  Liberalism  retreated  everywhere. 
It  began  to  look  as  if  the  revolutionary  movements  were  in  vain.3 

When  the  revolutions  cycled  into  a  civil  war  between  Austria 
and  Hungary,  newspaper  editorials  expressed  the  renewed 
public  interest.  The  issue  resolved  itself  into  one  of  nationality 
with  the  sovereignty  of  Hungary  at  stake.  Expressed  opinion 
delighted  in  the  Magyar  declaration  of  independence.  The 
ominous  appearance  of  the  Russian  legions  fighting  on  the  side  of 
Austria  stirred  American  republican  enthusiasts  to  a  frenzy. 
The  news  of  Russian  intervention  was  received  everywhere 
with  sorrow  and  indignation.  Russia  could  have  only  one  motive 
for  her  action;  namely,  to  secure  free  access  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  control  of  Turkey.  Would  England  and  France 
sustain  Hungary  in  the  unequal  struggle  against  Russia?  It  was 
hoped  that  all  lovers  of  liberty  would  unite  against  despotism. 
Stalwart  Americans  trusted  that  not  one  of  the  Russian  myr- 
midons would  be  left  to  tell  the  tale.  "May  the  Muscovite 
meet  a  Hungarian  Pultowa,"  prayed  the  Picayune.  All  agreed 
that  upon  Hungary  alone  rested  the  cause  of  European  freedom. 
She  must  fight  the  battles  on  her  own  plains,  and  if  she  should 
succeed,  the  reign  of  despotism  would  be  at  an  end,  but  if  she 
should  fail,  darkness  and  slavery  would  again  fall  like  a  pall 
over  Europe.4 

The  bravery  of  the  Hungarians,  especially  under  the  added 


*  Phila.  Ledger,  23  Nov.  1848;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  10  Jl.  1848,  30  Nov.  1848, 
15  Dec.  1848,  13  Jan.  1849;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  20  Ap.  1849;  33  Graham's  Mag., 
322;  22  The  Friend,  88. 

*  Boston  Atlas,  17  Ap.  1849,  26  Je.  1849;  Phila.  Ledger,  15  Mch.  1849,  16 
Je.  1849;  Richmond  Whig,  29  Mch.  1849,  25  May  1849;  Phila,  No.  Am.,  19 
Jl.  1849;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  3  JI.  1849;   17  So.  Literary  Messenger,  505  ff. 


46  Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe 

pressure  of  Russian  attacks,  drew  forth  great  praise  in  America. 
The  Richmond  Whig  thought  the  defense  as  "heroic  as  any  in 
modern  times."  Americans  sympathized  with  them  in  the  tre- 
mendous burden  they  were  bearing.  "Every  Whig  and  we 
trust  every  Democrat,"  ran  the  Washington  Republic,  "favored 
the  success  of  the  Magyars  against  the  combined  imperial 
forces."  Such  bravery  as  the  Hungarians  demonstrated  might 
yet  command  victory  for  them.  These  folk,  "the  Americans  of 
Europe,"  by  their  courage  and  intelligence  appeared  alone  of 
European  peoples  qualified  for  liberty.  Another,  even  more 
enthusiastic,  doubted  whether  the  world  had  ever  witnessed  a 
more  gallant  struggle  for  liberty  and  fatherland.  No  true 
descendant  of  those  who  fought  and  bled  in  1776  could  be  without 
sympathy  for  these  men  of  fortitude.  The  interest  aroused  by 
this  heroic  resistance  made  the  history  and  topography  of 
Hungary  as  well  known  to  the  general  reader  as  that  of  any 
other  country  in  Europe.5 

In  spite  of  rumors  of  reverses,  Americans  refused  to  believe 
the  Hungarian  cause  a  hopeless  one.  Tranquillity  in  Europe  would 
only  be  obtained  after  an  order  mutually  satisfactory  had  been 
agreed  on,  and  much  depended  on  the  outcome  of  Hungary's 
struggle.  Hungary  would  never  give  up  her  constitution,  said 
the  Picayune,  and  with  every  class  united  behind  her  she  might 
yet  be  victorious.  One  defeat  of  the  Russian  horde  would  bring 
all  the  Poles  into  the  conflict  on  the  side  of  Hungary.  France 
and  England  might  then  employ  an  armed  force  and  march  their 
troops  to  aid  the  Magyars.  The  Boston  Atlas  trusted  that  the 
contest  meant  the  opening  of  a  mighty  and  successful  struggle 
of  freedom  against  despotism.  Distinctly,  the  war  took  on  the 
aspect  of  a  struggle  between  liberty  and  despotism,  and  upon 
its  result  probably  depended  the  fate  of  Europe  for  centuries  to 
come.    The  people  are  conquering  into  their  rights,  proclaimed 


*  Richmond  Whig,  25  May  1849,  13,  16  Ag.  1849,  4  Sept.  1849;  Wash. 
Republic,  26  Je.  1849;  Phila.  Ledger,  20  Jl.  1849;  24  U.  S.  Mag.  and  Dem. 
Rev.,  568. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  47 

the  Cincinnati  Enquirer,  and  a  good  time  loomed  in  the  future 
though  the  present  might  be  dark.6 

Early  in  1849,  faith  in  the  immediate  success  of  Hungary 
began  to  wane.  Fears,  said  one,  proved  to  have  a  better  founda- 
tion than  wishes.  Freedom's  struggle  would  temporarily  end 
with  the  fall  of  Hungary,  but  the  principle  of  liberty,  being 
immortal,  could  never  perish.  For  Kossuth,  the  journals  voiced 
great  praise.  Many  looked  upon  him  as  in  certain  respects  the 
counterpart  of  Washington.  The  announcement  that  he  would 
retire  to  private  life  as  soon  as  a  republic  was  instituted  met  with 
approval.  Kossuth's  situation,  when  defeat  seemed  inevitable, 
was  compared  to  that  of  Washington  at  Valley  Forge.  One 
enthusiastic  admirer  urged  giving  the  name  of  the  illustrious 
Magyar  to  a  portion  of  American  territory.  Even  the  Liberator 
agreed  that  he  was  "a  sublime  specimen  of  what  the  world  calls 
patriotism."7 

When  the  Hungarians  stopped  their  retreat  and  began  to 
advance,  word  of  the  marvelous  progress  of  the  Magyar  arms 
consummating  in  the  recapture  of  Pesth  quickly  came  to  America. 
"God  grant  the  success  may  meet  no  reverses,"  implored  one 
writer.  The  North  American  expected  word  of  a  Hungarian 
advance  on  Vienna.  Peace  should  be  made  only  after  Hungary 
had  avenged  itself  against  the  Czar  and  repaid  a  debt  of  grati- 
tude to  the  Poles.  The  Tribune  anticipated  that  the  next  steamer 
would  bring  information  of  the  complete  expulsion  of  the  Rus- 
sians and  Austrians.  Providence  and  the  good  right  arms  of  the 
Magyars  had  saved  Hungary  from  becoming  another  Poland. 
At  the  Yale  Commencement  an  alumnus  announced  the  recent 
news  of  Hungarian  success  and  proposed  that  "all  who  could 
rejoice  in  it  and  give  glory  to  God  should  give  three  cheers," 
which  was  heartily  done.    Long  before  such  shouting  died  away, 


•N.  Y.  Tribune,  17,  26  May  1849;  Phila.  Sun.  Despatch,  27  May  1849, 
3  Je.  1849;  Boston  Atlas,  26  Je.  1849;  Phila.  Ledger,  31  May  1849;  New  Orleans 
Picayune,  18  May  1849,  16  Je.  1849;  Richmond  Whig,  12  Je.  1849;  Cincinnati 
Daily  Enquirer,  10  Ag.  1849. 

7  Wash.  Union,  9  Ag.  1849;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  16  Je.  1849;  Phila. 
Ledger,  20  Jl.  1849;  Richmond  Enquirer,  11  Sept.  1849;  25  U.  S.  Mag.  and 
Dem.  Rev.,  86. 


48  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

however,  the  main  Hungarian  army  had  lain  down  its  arms  and 
the  hope  of  freedom  had  vanished  into  thin  air.8 

Popular  enthusiasm,  aroused  by  the  Hungarian  successes, 
rose  to  a  high  pitch  in  a  series  of  public  meetings  held  throughout 
the  nation.  After  an  enthusiastic  rally,  recent  immigrants  in 
New  York  determined  to  design  a  suitable  Hungarian  flag  and 
send  it  to  Kossuth.  A  monster  mass  meeting  for  all  those  sym- 
pathizing with  "Freedom  of  the  World"  assembled  on  August 
27, 1849,  in  the  park  in  New  York.  Leading  men  of  the  city  played 
a  conspicuous  part  in  the  program.  From  three  stands,  speakers 
addressed  the  throng  in  English,  French,  Italian,  and  German. 
The  speeches  snarled  with  anti-Russian  sentiment.  A  resolution 
demanding  that  the  government  immediately  recognize  Hungary 
as  a  free  and  independent  nation  was  adopted.  A  spirited  meeting 
of  a  society,  the  "Young  Men  of  the  City  of  New  York,"  vigor- 
ously applauded  addresses  favoring  Hungary  and  Freedom. 
In  Jersey  City,  a  popular  assembly  hailed  the  Hungarian  leaders 
as  patriots  and  soldiers  of  heroic  mold.  It  was  recommended 
that  the  Federal  government  should  recognize  the  independence 
of  Hungary  "at  the  earliest  practicable  moment."  Similar 
resolutions  prevailed  in  Newark.  The  Boston  mayor  announced 
a  meeting  to  express  sympathy  for  the  struggles  of  Hungary. 
At  two  great  gatherings  in  Philadelphia,  presided  over  by  the 
most  distinguished  of  civic  leaders,  resolutions  of  sympathy 
were  passed.  The  meetings  invited  the  administration  at 
Washington  to  recognise  the  freedom  of  Hungary  "not  with 
reference  to  the  success  or  defeat  of  the  revolutionary  progress 
there  but  because  our  republican  brethren  are  fighting  for  their 
liberty."  After  adopting  measures  urging  the  government  to 
recognize  the  independence  of  Hungary,  a  Wilmington,  Dela- 
ware, assembly  appointed  a  committee  to  carry  on  active  propa- 
ganda for  the  Hungarian  cause.9 


8  Savannah  Republican,  31  Jl.  1849;  Phila.  Sun.  Despatch,  17  Je.  1849;  Cin- 
cinnati Daily  Enquirer,  17  Ag.  1849;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  11,  17  Ag.  1849;  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  2,  16  Ag.  1849;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  18  Ag.  1849;  Newark  Daily 
Advertiser,  17  Ag.  1849. 

9  N.  Y.  Tribune,  28  May  1849,  27-30  Ag.  1849,  1  Sept.  1849;  Newark 
Daily  Advertiser,  30  Ag.  1849;  Phila.  Ledger,  6  Jl.  1849,  16,  20  Ag.  1849; 
Liberator,  7  Dec.  1849. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  49 

In  the  West,  similar  groups  gathered.  Congressman  Disney 
harangued  a  great  crowd  in  Cincinnati.  On  this  occasion  a 
resolution  was  adopted  which  recognized  the  similarity  between 
11  the  struggle  of  1776  "  and  the  present  conflict.  Other  resolutions 
spoke  of  Kossuth  as  the  Washington  of  Hungary,  and  advocated 
the  cessation  of  all  intercourse  with  Austria.  Diplomatic  rela- 
tions, on  the  other  hand,  should  be  established  with  Hungary. 
A  nearby  literary  club  regarded  the  revolution  as  an  indication 
of  the  rapid  tendency  of  Europe  toward  American  institutions  and 
liberty.  In  a  public  meeting  in  Illinois  Abraham  Lincoln  pre- 
sented a  resolution  declaring  that  Hungary  commanded  the 
highest  admiration  and  had  the  warmest  sympathy  of  America 
in  the  struggle.  He  held  it  to  be  the  opinion  of  the  meeting 
that  "the  immediate  acknowledgment  of  the  independence  of 
Hungary  by  our  government  is  due  from  American  freemen  to 
their  brethren  in  the  general  cause  of  republican  liberty." 
Nor  was  the  interest  confined  to  the  North  and  West.  The 
citizens  of  Louisville  favored  recognition.  At  Little  Rock  an 
association  was  organized  in  which  each  member  agreed  to 
contribute  ten  cents  per  month  for  the  benefit  of  Hungary. 
One  of  the  largest  crowds  ever  gathered  in  New  Orleans  agreed 
to  give  substantial  aid  to  the  republican  cause  in  Europe.10 

The  cry  for  recognition  met  with  some  opposition  from  Whig 
papers.  The  Richmond  Whig  believed  that  much  of  the  agitation 
had  been  fomented  by  foreigners  unacquainted  with  the  tradi- 
tional American  policy.  America  sympathized  with  the  oppressed 
but  the  government  could  take  no  part  nor  would  it  allow  within 
its  borders  military  preparations  to  aid  Hungary.  America 
would  rejoice  in  the  overthrow  of  despots  the  world  over,  but 
those  "who  would  be  free,  themselves  must  strike  the  blow." 
The  North  American  urged  caution  with  respect  of  recognition. 
If  Hungary  should  prove  successful  the  fact  would  soon  be 
known  and  she  would  be  immediately  recognized." 

When  word  arrived  that  Gorgei's  army  had  surrendered  to  the 


10  Cincinnati  Gazette,  30  Ag.   1849;    Cincinnati  Daily  Enquirer,  21  Sept. 
1849;  Liberator,  7  Dec.  1849. 
Nicolay,  J.  S.  and  Hay,  J.,  Works  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  I,  158-9. 
»  Richmond  Whig,  12  Je.  1849;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  24  Ag.  1849. 


50  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Russian  forces,  it  was  announced  that  Hungary  had  at  last 
mounted  the  funeral  pyre  of  freedom.  Greeley,  thoroughly 
disappointed  by  the  defeat,  refused  to  believe  that  Europe  would 
remain  Cossack.  America  should  be  the  "agent  of  Providence" 
to  republicanize  Europe.  He  suggested  the  wide  dissemination 
in  Europe  of  pamphlets  which  would  stir  up  the  people's  minds 
against  their  government.  As  a  result,  thrones  would  be  shaken 
to  their  foundations.  He  advocated  subscriptions  to  a  "Pat- 
riotic Loan  for  Hungary."" 

The  report  of  the  Hungarian  defeat  produced  more  profound 
regret  in  this  country  than  any  other  event  in  the  history  of 
recent  political  convulsions  in  Europe.  The  news  went  over  the 
United  States  like  the  tolling  of  a  funeral  bell.  Numerous  poems 
expressed  the  hostile  feeling  toward  the  harsh  and  brutal  tactics 
of  the  Austrian  military  forces.  It  was  generally  conceded  that 
Hungary  would  have  been  victorious  had  Russia  not  intervened. 
The  Richmond  Whig,  on  the  other  hand,  confessed  that  Hungary's 
course  in  the  struggle  strengthened  its  belief  in  the  doctrine 
"that  every  nation  had  the  degree  of  liberty  which  it  deserved." 
With  her  people  determined  to  be  free  no  force  could  have  con- 
quered them.  By  far  the  greater  number  of  news  journals, 
however,  merely  bewailed  the  submission  of  Hungary  as  the 
destruction  of  the  last  vestige  of  liberalism.  America,  said  the 
Union,  would  gladly  welcome  the  defeated  leaders  if  they  could 
escape.13 

Among  public  men,  interest  in  Austria  and  Hungary  did  not 
become  greatly  aroused  until  the  struggle  resolved  itself  into  a 
civil  war.  At  no  time  could  Van  Buren  be  persuaded  that  a  general 
war  would  break  out  among  the  European  states.  He  told  a 
friend  he  had  far  more  interest  in  affairs  in  Hungary  than  in 
those  of  his  own  country.  Gilpin*  wrote  Van  Buren  that  nothing 
had  created  so  strong  a  sympathy  in  his  heart  as  the  proclama- 
tions and  proceedings  of  the  struggling  republicans.    Napoleon's 


12  N.  Y.  Tribune,  4,  6,  7  Sept.  1849;  Phila.  Ledger,  7,  14  Sept.  1849;  St. 
Louis  Republican,  8  Sept.  1849;  Wash.  Union,  8  Sept.  1849;  Phila.  No.  Am., 
7  Sept.  1849;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  8,  14  Sept.  1849;  Richmond  Whig,  11 
Sept.  1849;  25  U.  S.  Mag.  and  Dem.  Rev.,  560. 

*H.  D.  Gilpin  (1801-60)  had  been  Van  Burets  attorney-general,  1840-1. 
He  was  a  frequent  contributor  to  political  periodicals. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  51 

prophecy  hastened  to  fulfillment;  Cossackism  or  Republicanism 
would  dominate  Europe.  Crittenden  declared  that  if  he  were 
President,  in  his  first  message  he  would  denounce  the  interference 
of  despots  with  the  struggles  of  peoples  for  free  governments. 
He  would  "  speak  aloud  the  great  doctrines  of  liberty  and  free 
government."  Calhoun  observed  that  if  Hungary  succeeded  in 
maintaining  herself  against  the  coalition,  the  condition  of 
Russia  would  speedily  become  critical.  From  his  rural  retreat, 
Tyler  revealed  his  opinions  in  unmistakable  terms.  If  the 
Hungarians  succeeded,  they  would  have  done  more  for  the  cause 
of  humanity  than  had  been  achieved  since  the  American  Revolt 
tion.  For  Kossuth  he  had  the  greatest  praise.  The  opponents  of 
Hungary  appeared  to  have  become  but  little  better  than  demons. 
America  should  protest  against  their  outrageous  conduct  and  if 
protest  failed  she  should  manifest  her  displeasure  by  stopping  all 
diplomatic  intercourse.  Prayers  would  continue  to  ascend  for 
the  success  of  the  oppressed.  Webster  said  that  the  sympathies 
of  everyone  were  enlisted  in  the  Hungarian  struggle  for  liberty, 
that  until  the  "despotic  power  from  abroad  intervened"  he  had 
had  more  hope  for  Hungary  than  for  any  other  part  of  Europe. 
Restless  after  the  Mexican  campaigns,  G.  B.  McClellan  applied 
to  Clayton  for  permission  to  go  to  Hungary  as  a  special  agent  so 
as  to  ascertain  the  possibility  of  republican  success.  Especially 
did  he  want  to  look  the  situation  over  "asa  military  man  should." 
McClellan  admitted  his  keen  admiration  for  the  unusual  bravery 
the  Hungarians  exhibited  during  the  fighting  and  condemned 
the  Austrian  barbarity.  The  Governor  of  Pennsylvania  in  his 
annual  message  declared  that  the  people  of  the  United  States 
looked  with  deepest  solicitude  on  the  outcome  of  the  revolt.13 


18  Van  Buren  to  Kemble,  18  Ap.  1848.    Van  Buren  Mss. 

Gilpin  to  Van  Buren,  13  Je.  1849.     Ibid. 

Crittenden  to  Clayton,  28  Je.  1848.     Clayton  Mss. 

Calhoun  to  Clemson,  24  Ag.  1849,  A.  H.  A.,  Repts.,  1899,  771. 

Niles  to  Welles,  17  Sept.  1849.    Welles  Mss. 

Tyler  to  Tyler,  R.,  16  Jl.  1849,  Tyler,  W.  G.,  Letters  and  Times  of  the 
Tylers,  II,  491. 

Curtis,  G.  T.,  Life  of  Webster,  II,  558. 

McClellan  to  his  sister,  Maria,  Jan.  1849.    McClellan  Mss. 

McClellan  to  Clayton,  19  Ag.  1849.    Clayton  Mss. 

McClellan  to  his  mother,  3  Mch.  1850.    McClellan  Mss. 

Annual  Message  of  Gov.  Johnston,  1  Jan.  1850,  Papers  of  the  Govs.,  Penna. 
Archives,  4th  Series,  VII. 


52  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

As  with  the  revolutions  in  Germany,  a  sound  view  of  American 
thought  on  the  movements  in  the  Austrian  empire  may  be  gleaned 
from  the  official  policy  of  the  government.  Buchanan  ordered 
Stiles  to  keep  him  informed  as  to  everything  that  occurred  during 
the  "critical  state  of  affairs,' '  but  refused  to  accede  to  his  request 
for  funds  to  employ  an  additional  agent.  He  heartily  approved 
Stiles'  course  in  exposing  the  deputation  that  attempted  to  stir 
up  the  Viennese  students  claiming  that  they  represented  the 
United  States.  Likewise  Buchanan  commended  Stiles  for  his 
method  of  procedure  in  handling  the  Hungarian  appeal  for  an 
armistice.  He  expressed  the  hope  that  the  accession  of  Francis 
Joseph  would  be  followed  by  an  era  of  order  and  tranquillity 
which  would  promote  the  lasting  happiness  of  the  country.  But 
the  important  expressions  of  opinion  came  after  Buchanan  had 
given  the  direction  of  foreign  affairs  into  the  hands  of  his  friend, 
J.  M.  Clayton.1* 

In  German  affairs,  the  Whig  Administration,  as  has  been 
observed,  pursued  a  conservative  policy.  When  Hungarian 
independence,  however,  seemed  a  possibility,  it  adopted  very 
different  tactics.  Early  in  June,  1849,  the  government  received 
appeals  from  Professor  L.  R.  Breisach,  a  Hungarian  in  New  York, 
urging  that  a  diplomatic  representative  be  sent  to  the  "free  and 
independent  republican  government  of  Hungary"  for  the  purpose 
of  recognizing  the  same.  Hungary  would  probably  be  glad  to 
enter  into  commercial  relations  with  the  United  States  through 
the  splendid  port  of  Fiume.  Clayton  replied  that  the  American 
practice  and  policy  had  long  been  to  recognize  all  governments 
which  exhibited  to  the  world  proofs  of  their  power  to  maintain 
themselves.  If  Hungary  proved  successful,  he  believed  Congress 
would  sanction  her  recognition  and  then  the  United  States 
would  be  glad  to  enter  into  diplomatic  and  commercial  relations 
with  her.15 


"  Buchanan  to  Stiles,  5  Ap.  1848,  6  Jl.  1848,  31  Ag.  1848,  Mss.,  Dept.  of 
State,   Inst.,   Austria,    I. 

Buchanan  to  Hiilsemann,  6  Feb.  1849,  Ibid.,  Notes  to  German  States,  VI. 

"Breisach,  L.  R.  to  Taylor,  9  Je.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Miscell. 
Letters,  May-June,  1849. 

Breisach  to  Clayton,  18  Je.  1849,  27  Ag.  1849.    Clayton  Mss. 

Clayton  to  Breisach,  25  Je.  1849,  31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Sen.  exec,  doc,  43. 

Wash.  Intelligencer,  24  Jl.  1849,  3  Ag.  1849. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  53 

Despite  this  evasive  note,  Clayton  had  ordered  the  roving 
diplomat,  A.  Dudley  Mann,  then  in  Paris,  to  proceed  "towards" 
Hungary.  Though  Clayton  questioned  the  ultimate  success 
of  the  revolutionists,  he  wanted  "to  obtain  information  in 
regard  to  Hungary  and  her  resources  and  prospects  with  a  view 
to  an  early  recognition  of  her  independence  and  the  formation  of 
commercial  relations."  In  his  letter  of  instructions,  the  Sec- 
retary reviewed  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Hungary  and  added  that  if  she  should  succeed  "we  desire  to  be 
the  vefy  first  to  welcome  her  entrance  into  the  family  of  nations." 
Russia's  action  to  sustain  the  iron  rule  of  Austria  had  aroused 
most  painful  solicitude  in  America.  If  Hungary  established  a 
firm  and  stable  goverment,  recognition  would  be  recommended 
at  the  next  session  of  Congress.16 

Relying  implicitly  on  Mann,  the  President  left  this  delicate 
and  important  mission  almost  wholly  to  his  discretion  and 
prudence.  Accompanying  the  instructions  were  credentials 
giving  Mann  "the  full  authority  for  and  in  the  name  of  the 
United  States  ...  to  agree,  treat,  and  consult  and  negotiate 
of  and  concerning  all  matters  and  subjects  interesting  to  both 
nations  .  .  .  and  to  conclude  and  sign  treaties  or  conventions 
touching  the  premises."  Few  foreign  agents  have  ever  been 
permitted  such  discretionary  powers  as  these  committed  to 
Mann.*  Clayton  informed  his  friend  Crittenden  of  his  action 
and  pleaded  with  him  to  urge  the  President  to  allow  him  free 
rein  so  that  America  might  "keep  up  with  the  spirit  of  the  age." 
Meanwhile  a  Hungarian  agent,  Count  Wass,  had  been  presented 
to  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  had  been  informed  "that  if  Hun- 
gary sustained  herself,  there  was  no  reason  why  the  United 
States  should  not  recognize  her."  When  the  Democratic  papers 
attacked  the  Hungarian  policy  which  they  considered  pusillani- 
mous and  undignified,  Whig  retorts  hinted  at  the  despatch  of  an 
agent.16 


18  Clayton  to  Mann,  18  Je.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Spec.  Missions,  I. 

Clayton  to  Crittenden,  11  Jl.  1849,  Coleman,  C.C.,  Life  of  J.  J.  Crittenden, 
I   344-5. 

'  Boston'  Atlas,  19  Jl.  1849;   N.  Y.  Tribune,  14  Ag.  1849;  Wash.  Republic,  17 
Sept.  1849;  Phila.  Sun.  Despatch,  23  Sept.  1849,  28  Oct.  1849. 

*  Vide,  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  I,  220. 


54  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Clayton  set  curiosity  at  ease  through  an  inclusion  of  the  pro- 
ceedings with  regard  to  Hungary  in  the  President's  annual  mes- 
sage. "  In  accordance  with  the  general  sentiment  of  the  American 
people  who  deeply  sympathized  with  the  Magyar  patriots,"  an 
agent  had  been  dispatched  thither  to  indicate  America's  willing- 
ness to  recognize  her  if  she  should  prove  stable.  Russian  inter- 
ference, however,  had  prevented  the  completion  of  the  task  of 
throwing  off  the  Austrian  yoke.  The  message  hastened  to  add 
that  despite  the  fact  that  popular  sympathy  had  been  strongly 
enlisted  in  the  Hungarian  cause,  the  government  had  at  no  time 
interfered  in  the  contest.17 

Soon  after  the  reading  of  the  message,  Douglas  offered  a 
resolution  in  the  Senate  requesting  a  copy  of  the  instructions 
given  to  Mann  together  with  his  correspondence  in  so  far  as  it 
was  "consistent  with  the  public  interest."  A  similar  resolution 
was  presented  in  the  House.  After  a  two  months  wait,  the  reso- 
lution was  adopted  and  the  documents  in  two  parts,  including 
the  instructions,  were  handed  to  the  Senate,  April  3,  1850.* 
Clayton  accompanied  the  documents  with  a  statement  reiterat- 
ing the  fact  that  the  government  had  neither  accredited  an 
agent  to  Hungary  nor  had  it  received  any  communication  from 
her.  Concluding,  he  repeated  that  had  Hungary  been  successful 
"we  should  have  been  the  first  to  welcome  her  into  the  family  of 
nations."17 

Before  the  publication  of  these  documents,  Mann  assured 
Clayton  that  he  would  have  no  regrets  if  all  his  letters  were 
printed,  since  there  were  only  a  few  sentences  in  them  he  would 
care  to  correct.  Presently  the  correspondence  appeared  before 
the  European  public  "and  met  with  the  unqualified  praise  of  all 
Europeans   animated    by   humane   and   generous   sentiments." 


17  Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  Pres.,  V,  12,  41.  31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong. 
Globe,  159,  294,  587,  630. 

Mann  to  Clayton,  19  Feb.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents 
to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Mann  to  Clayton,  16  May  1850.    Clayton  Mss. 

*The  second  part  of  the  manuscripts  containing  most  of  Mann's  letters 
remained  closed  to  historical  investigation  for  over  half  a  century. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  55 

Some  Austrian  journals,  however,  advocated  that  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  United  States  should  be  severed — a  suggestion 
that  provoked  much  merriment.  Meanwhile  the  Austrian 
Government  had  decided  to  express  its  disfavor  over  the  Mann 
mission.17 

The  Austrian  protest  on  the  Mann  mission  and  the  consequent 
reaction  in  the  United  States  enable  us  to  develop  further  the 
attitude  and  opinion  of  the  American  government  concerning  the 
revolutionary  movement.  The  fact  that  America  had  sent  an 
agent  towards  Hungary  was  widely  known  in  Europe.  To 
Mann's  surprise,  on  his  return  to  Paris,  Count  Teleki,  the  late 
accredited  minister  of  Hungary  to  France,  greeted  him  most 
heartily,  and  expressed  appreciation  of  the  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment in  sending  him  to  Hungary.  The  American  agent  never 
understood  how  information  relative  to  his  mission  had  leaked 
out.  Schwartzenberg,  the  Austrian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
had  complained  to  his  envoy  in  America,  Hiilsemann,  of  the 
sending  of  Mann.  Somehow  or  other,  Schwartzenberg  saw  or  got 
knowledge  of  the  original  instructions.  Particularly  did  the 
phrase  in  the  instructions  "the  iron  rule  of  Austria"  cause  him 
to  wince.  Hiilsemann  pressed  on  Clayton  the  views  of  his 
government  on  the  subject,  and  when  Webster  succeeded  Tay- 
lor's secretary,  the  remonstrances  were  directed  to  him.  Webster 
found  on  examination  of  the  archives  that  nothing  in  writing  had 
passed  between  Clayton  and  Hiilsemann.  He  would  let  the 
matter  rest.18 

But  the  Austrian  persisted.  On  September  30,  1850,  he  penned 
a  note  to  Webster  which  outlined  the  Austrian  position  on  the 
dispute.  After  pointing  out  that  the  mission  violated  the  prin- 
ciple of  non-intervention,  he  declared  Mann's  errand  laid  him 
open  to  arrest  as  a  spy.     Did  not  America  realize  that  Austria 


18  Mann  to  Clayton,  25  Oct.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec. 
Agents  to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Schwartzenberg  to  Hiilsemann,  5  Nov.  1849,  Van  Tyne,  C.  H.,  Letters  of 
Daniel  Webster,  454—6. 

Hiilsemann  to  Webster,  27  Jl.  1850,  Ibid.,  448. 

Webster  Memorandum,  Ibid.,  449. 

Webster  to  Fillmore,  16  Jan.  1851,  Webster  Works,  National  Edition,  IV,  585. 

Vide,  Curti,  M.  E.,  Austria  and  the  United  States,  1848-52,  154-5. 


56  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

— the  nation  that  had  struggled  twenty-five  years  against  the 
French  Revolution — could  not  be  overcome  by  the  few  months 
rebellion  of  Hungary?  Austria  was  offended  at  the  harsh 
language  in  which  Mann's  instructions  were  couched  and  at  the 
inflammatory  anti-Austrian  statements  found  in  the  American 
press.  The  whole  matter  might  have  passed  away  quietly  had 
the  Mann  correspondence  not  been  published.  Now  Austria 
formally  protested  against  the  proceedings  of  the  American 
government.  With  the  curt  remark  that  civil  war  might  possibly 
occur  anywhere,  Hulsemann  expressed  the  desire  of  his  govern- 
ment to  cultivate  relations  of  friendship  and  good  understanding. 
Relations  he  hoped  were  only  momentarily  weakened,  but  they 
could  not  again  be  seriously  disturbed  "without  placing  in 
jeopardy  the  best  interests  of  the  countries."  After  studying 
the  note,  Webster  recognized  that  his  prediction  of  a  quarrel 
with  Austria  would  result  from  it.  He  begged  Fillmore  to  reflect 
carefully  on  the  matter  so  that  a  satisfactory  reply  might  be 
made.     On  October  24,  he  completed  his  answer.19 

The  reply  portrays,  in  the  peculiar  style  of  its  author,  the 
extent  of  American  interest  in  the  "extraordinary  events  which 
have  occurred,  not  only  in  Austria,  but  in  many  parts  of  Europe 
since  February,  1848."  Webster  proposed  to  tell  Europe  just  what 
"America"  meant  and  to  impress  on  foreign  minds  the  unparal- 
leled growth  of  this  country.  At  the  same  time,  he  hoped  to 
touch  national  pride  at  home  and  strike  thereby  at  those  who 
hinted  at  disunion.20  Bearing  these  intents  in  mind,  it  becomes 
easy  to  understand  the  bombastic  reply  designated  in  history 
as  the  "Hulsemann  Letter." 

On  December  21,  1850,  Webster  sent  this  famous  note.  After 
summarizing  the  protest  and  complaint  of  Austria,  he  argued 
that    the     basis     of    the     protest — the     publication     of     the 


19  Hiilsemann  to  Webster,  30  Sept.  1850,  31  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  Sen.  exec,  doc,  9. 
Webster  to  Fillmore,  3  Oct.  1850,  Webster,  D.  F.,  Priv.  Corr.  Daniel  Webster, 

II,  463. 

Webster  to  Fillmore,  24  Oct.  1850,  Webster  Works,  National  Edition,  IV,  573. 

Vide,  Hunter,  W.  to  Webster,  D.  F.,  3  May  1854,  Van  Tyne,   Letters  of 
Daniel  Webster  449—50. 

20  Webster  to  Ticknor,  16  Jan.  1851,  Webster  Works,  National  Edition,  IV, 
586. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  57 

Mann  correspondence — was  entirely  a  domestic  affair.  Hence 
Austria  had  no  right  to  take  cognizance  of  it.  Out  of  deference 
to  the  Austrian  government  and  in  justice  to  the  late  President 
Taylor,  he  proposed  to  restate  the  history  of  the  whole  affair 
and  to  show  the  consistent  neutral  policy  of  America.  Interest 
in  the  revolutionary  movements  had  been  in  proportion  as  these 
extraordinary  events  appeared  to  have  their  origin  in  those  ideas 
of  responsible  and  popular  governments  on  which  the  American 
constitutions  themselves  were  wholly  founded.  "In  the  preva- 
lence on  the  other  continent  of  sentiments  favorable  to  republican 
liberty,"  he  observed  the  results  of  the  reaction  of  America 
upon  Europe.  In  every  way  the  United  States  shared  in  the 
progress  of  the  age,  and  they  could  not  "fail  to  cherish  always  a 
lively  interest"  in  the  fortunes  of  nations  struggling  for  institu- 
tions like  their  own.  Regardless  of  this  feeling,  America  claimed 
"no  right  to  take  part  in  the  struggles  of  nations"  contending 
for  popular  institutions  and  national  independence.21 

After  outlining  the  circumstances  that  led  to  the  despatch 
of  Mann,  Webster  continued  with  an  elaborate  argument  defend- 
ing the  nature  and  the  purpose  of  the  mission.  The  ink  fairly 
boiled  when  he  attacked  the  passage  in  Hiilsemann's  note  which 
had  designated  Mann  as  a  spy.  Had  he  been  treated  as  such, 
"the  spirit  of  the  people  of  this  country  would  have  demanded 
that  immediate  hostilities  be  waged."  The  policy  of  Austria's 
ally,  Russia,  in  intervening  had  tremendously  increased  American 
sympathies  for  Hungary.  With  a  parting  shot  expressing  little 
fear  of  anything  Austria  might  do  in  opposition  to  the  United 
States,  Webster  indicated  his  pleasure  over  the  constitution 
recently  granted  by  Austria  which  contained  "many  of  the 
American  principles."  The  letter  emphasized  with  incisiveness 
at  once  the  interest  of  Americans  in  the  cause  of  political  liberty 
and  the  extent  to  which  the  government  would  go  to  defend 
its  policy.21 

The  favorable  newspaper  comments  denote  the  reception  of 


81  Webster  to  Hiilsemann,  21  Dec.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Notes  to 
German  States,  VI. 
Vide,  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  II,  535-6. 


58  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

the  letter  by  the  public.  The  Washington  Union  spoke  enthu- 
siastically of  the  clear  and  eloquent  presentation  of  American 
principles.  The  reply  would  circulate  through  Europe  and  serve 
to  demonstrate  the  superiority  of  the  American  system  and  to 
inspire  European  patriots  with  new  confidence.  While  we  should 
remain  aloof  from  foreign  quarrels,  said  another,  we  should  con- 
vince states  over  there  of  the  sincere  sympathy  Americans  had 
for  peoples  who  struggle  for  those  principles  which  "we  believe 
to  be  the  natural  inheritance  of  men."23 

A  further  index  of  the  almost  universal  approval  that  the 
letter  received  may  be  secured  from  individual  opinions.  Fill- 
more wrote  Webster  of  "his  unanswerable  and  unanswered  letter 
to  the  Austrian  Mission."  Clayton  acknowledged  his  thanks 
for  the  able  defense  of  his  policy;  Hiilsemann  had  been  satis- 
factorily disposed  of.  Gilpin  rejoiced  that  Webster  could  express 
to  the  oldest  empire  in  Europe  those  sentiments  regarding  repub- 
lican institutions  which  every  American  proudly  acknowledged. 
Francis  Lieber  thanked  him  for  the  "leonine  letter,"  a  copy  of 
which  he  sent  to  Germany  where  it  would  "warm  a  heart  as 
much  as  it  has  mine."  Ticknor,  the  novelist,  in  a  letter  to  his 
friend  Sir  Edmund  Head,  Lieutenant-Governor  of  New  Bruns- 
wick, referred  to  it  as  "satisfactory  to  the  whole  of  this  country 
without  distinction  of  party."  The  Pennsylvania  Legislature 
passed  a  resolution  of  approbation.  But  a  discordant  note 
marred  the  harmony  of  the  whole.  Brownsori 's  Magazine, 
edited  by  a  man  of  Catholic  persuasion,  roundly  denounced 
Webster's  reasoning  as  "extraordinary,  indefensible  and  ex- 
tremely dangerous."  But  he  desired  to  point  out  a  far  graver 
fault  than  the  reasoning;  namely,  that  Webster  defended  the 
sympathy  of  the  American  government  and  people  with  Euro- 
pean rebels  in  general  and  the  Magyars  in  particular  on  a  ground 
fatal  to  all  political  right  and  social  order.  Webster  had  pandered 
to  the  basest  passions  of  his  countrymen.23 


nWash.  Union,  31  Dec.  1850;  Phila.  Ledger,  6  Jan.  1851;  Phila.  Sun. 
Despatch,  5  Jan.  1851. 

23  Fillmore  to  Webster,  19  JI.  1851.    Webster  Mss. 

Clayton  to  Webster,  12  Jan.  1851,  Van  Tyne,  Letters  of  Daniel  Webster, 
452. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  59 

From  Americans  abroad  came  words  of  commendation. 
Abbott  Lawrence,*  Minister  to  Great  Britain,  saw  in  the  letter 
principles  that  tended  to  elevate  the  position  of  the  country  at 
home  and  abroad.  Men  everywhere  in  Europe  who  valued 
constitutional  liberty  would  appreciate  it,  and  it  should  serve 
to  strengthen  those  who  were  struggling  to  establish  civil  rights. 
He  handed  a  copy  to  the  doughty  Palmerston.  Folsom,  envoy 
at  the  Hague,  observed  that  friends  of  liberty  there  gave  due 
meed  of  praise  to  the  contents  of  the  letter  and  its  author.  In 
Austria  the  minister,  McCurdy,  found  the  friends  of  free  institu- 
tions highly  satisfied  with  Webster's  reply.  Among  Americans 
there  developed  a  great  degree  of  pride  and  a  species  of  enthu- 
siasm over  the  letter.24 

A  Senate  resolution  requesting  all  the  correspondence  that  had 
passed  between  Webster  and  the  Austrian  Charge,  was  approved 
on  December  26,  1850.  Immediately  the  contents  of  the  docu- 
ments produced  a  sensation.  Underwood  declared  that  the  corre- 
spondence ought  to  warm  the  heart  of  every  true  American. 
We  should  sympathize  with  the  efforts  made  in  every  corner  of 
the  earth  for  the  purpose  of  establishing  free  and  liberal  principles 
among  men.  But  when  a  motion  to  print  10,000  copies  of  the 
correspondence  for  general  distribution  was  offered,  Jefferson 
Davis  opposed  "  making  much  ado  about  nothing,"  for  the  paper 
contained  only  the  traditional  American  doctrines.  With  his 
usual  dignity  and  reserve  Clay  urged  caution  in  the  Austrian 
policy.  Should  an  American  state  revolt  and  an  agent  be  sent 
towards  it  by  a  foreign  power,  would  American  sentiment  differ 


Webster  to  Clayton,  15  Jan.  1851,  Ibid.,  453. 

Gilpin,  H.  D.  to  Webster,  22  Jan.  1851.    Webster  Mss. 

Lieber,  F.  to  Webster,  13  Feb.  1851.     Ibid. 

Boardman  to  Webster,  20  Jan.  1851.     Ibid. 

Ticknor,  G.  to  Head,  7  Jan.  1851,  Ticknor,  B.,  Life  etc.  George  Ticknor,  271. 

Johnson  to  Webster,  20  Mch.  1851,  Penna.  Archives,  4th  Series,  Papers  of 
of  the  Governors,  VII. 

8  Brownson  Quarterly  Mag.,  198,  229. 

♦Abbott  Lawrence  (1792-1855),  was  a  Congressman,  1834-6,  1839-40.  In 
1848  he  had  been  a  prominent  candidate  for  the  Vice- Presidency. 

24  Lawrence,  A.  to  Webster,  27  Jan.  1851.    Webster  Mss. 

Lawrence,  A.  to  Webster,  7  Feb.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  England, 

Folsom,  G.  to  Webster,  18  Feb.  1851,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Netherlands,  XIV. 
McCurdy,  C.  J.  to  Webster,  14  Mch.  1851,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Austria,  III. 


60  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

from  that  now  held  by  Austria?  Why  stir  up  trouble  since 
Hungary's  fate  had  been  sealed?  Printing  the  documents  might 
prove  a  fresh  source  of  irritation  to  Austria.  With  such  oppo- 
sition, the  measure  failed  by  three  votes.  On  the  succeeding  day, 
Douglas  moved  to  reconsider  the  action,  since  some  people  con- 
sidered the  previous  vote  either  a  censure  on  Webster  or  else  a 
disagreement  with  the  sentiments  advanced  by  him  in  the  cor- 
respondence. His  plea  carried  the  day  and  as  a  compromise 
5,000  copies  were  ordered  to  be  printed.25 

Owing  in  part  to  the  unsettled  condition  of  affairs  in  Europe, 
Austria  did  not  feel  disposed  to  cross  swords  with  Webster  again. 
In  a  note  which  the  latter  considered  very  amiable,  Hulsemann 
announced  that  although  the  letter  of  December  21,  displeased 
his  government,  nevertheless,  assured  by  Fillmore's  declaration 
of  "good  will  towards  foreign  powers  and  of  abstention  from 
interference  in  their  internal  affairs,"  Austria  was  ready  to  close 
the  discussion.     Webster  acquiesced  in  this  view.26 

American  opinion  may  again  be  estimated  in  the  racy  debates 
consonant  with  a  resolution  of  Senator  Cass  to  suspend  diplo- 
matic relations  with  Austria.  Col.  J.  Watson  Webb,  editor  of 
the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer,  had  been  angling  for  some 
time  to  secure  an  appointment  to  a  foreign  mission.  First  he 
sought  the  one  in  "Germany",  then  that  in  Spain.  President 
Taylor  considered  him  unfit  to  hold  any  office.  Eventually, 
however,  Webb  obtained  from  him  the  mission  to  Austria,  and 
on  December  1,  1849,  without  waiting  for  Senate  confirmation, 
set  out  for  Vienna.27 


25  31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  135,  136. 

26  Rives,  W.  C.  to  Webster,  20  Feb.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
France,  XXXIII. 

Hulsemann  to  Webster,  11  Mch.  1851,  Webster  Works,  National  Edition, 
XII,  179. 

Webster  to  Hulsemann,  15  Mch.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Notes  to 
German  States,  VI. 

27  Webb  to  Crittenden,  16  Dec.  1848.    Crittenden  Mss. 
Webb  to  Clayton,  Mch.  1849.    Clayton  Mss. 
Clayton  Memorandum,  31  May  1849.     Ibid. 

Clayton  to  Webb,  21  Nov.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Austria,  I. 
Phila.  Ledger,  20  Ag.  1849,  29  Nov.  1849,  3,  11  Dec.  1849. 
31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Sen.  Jol.,  15,  66,  94,  117. 
31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  A  pp.,  54-8. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  61 

As  has  been  noted,  public  meetings  in  the  previous  summer 
had  urged  the  discontinuance  of  the  Austrian  mission.  The 
clamor  grew  in  volume  and  intensity.  Petitions  circulated 
everywhere  urging  Congress  to  suspend  diplomatic  relations, 
while  the  newspapers  portrayed  the  almost  universal  antipathy 
to  Austria.  All  free  people,  said  a  typical  one,  should  unite  in 
"unmitigated  condemnation  of  Austria  as  a  nest  of  pirates  of 
which  humanity  demands  extinction."  The  canny  Cass  seized 
the  opportunity  to  build  up  his  political  capital.  On  December 
24,  1849,  he  moved  in  the  Senate  that  "the  committee  on 
foreign  relations  be  instructed  to  inquire  into  the  expediency  of 
suspending  diplomatic  relations  with  Austria."  Shortly  there- 
after, Cass  opened  the  debate  by  reminding  the  Senate  that  the 
resolution  merely  inquired  and  therefore  could  not  be  offensive 
to  Austria.  He  would  be  glad  when  the  government,  "reflect- 
ing the  true  sentiments  of  the  people,"  would  express  sympathy 
with  the  millions  struggling  for  liberty.  The  views  of  Clay  and 
Webster,  he  thought  from  past  declarations,  would  coincide  with 
his.  The  history  of  the  Hungarian  struggle  had  "awakened 
too  deep  an  interest"  in  this  country  to  need  a  review  at  his 
hands.    The  American  people  would  approve  of  the  resolution.27 

The  newspapers  received  the  Cass  measure  according  to  their 
political  affiliation.  The  Whig  papers  carried  on  a  running 
attack.  The  "official  organ,"  the  Washington  Republic,  con- 
ceded that  its  feelings  corresponded  with  those  of  Cass,  but 
disliked  his  mode  of  expression.  Others  beheld  in  the  spectacle 
the  ambitious  Cass  urging  the  measure  in  order  to  bolster  his 
waning  prestige  through  the  country.  ''The  title  of  the  publica- 
tion is  Hungarian,"  parroted  the  Liberator,  "but  anyone  can 
see  that  the  main  object  is  to  call  attention  to  the  portrait  of 
the  author  on  the  opposite  page."  On  the  other  hand,  the 
journals  of  the  Democracy  raised  loud  their  voices  in  approval. 
In  a  series  of  editorials  in  the  Washington  Union,  the  Cass  resolu- 
tion found  service  as  the  text.  After  denouncing  the  pusillani- 
mous policy  of  Clayton  which  favored  the  divine  right  of  kings,  it 
praised  the  eloquent  attempt  of  Cass  as  a  satisfactory  expression 
of  the  American  feeling.  Further,  it  declared  the  Whig  Party  to 
be  hostile  to  the  cause  of  freedom  in  Europe  and  to  be  sympa- 


62  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

thetic  with  the  despotisms  of  the  old  world.  It  estimated  later 
that  the  response  of  the  public  press  to  Cass'  speech  showed  that 
nine-tenths  of  the  people  favored  suspension  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions as  a  rebuke  to  Austria.  The  semi-independent  Philadelphia 
Ledger  praised  very  highly  the  resolution  and  the  speech.28 

Meanwhile  the  debate  on  the  resolution  proceeded  in  the 
Senate.  Hale,  who  favored  the  measure,  used  the  opportunity 
to  make  one  of  his  absurdly  witty  speeches.  He  pointed  out 
that  many  other  countries  deserved  to  be  cut  off  diplomatically, 
since  they  had  committed  crimes  as  dastardly  as  those  perpe- 
trated by  Austria.  Clay  believed  the  measure  ill-advised  and 
worthless.  In  Hungary  and  its  heroic  people  he  had  a  profound 
interest,  but  nothing  beneficial  to  them  would  result  from  such 
an  inquiry  as  Cass  favored.  Foote,  in  a  beastly  tirade,  made 
bold  to  reply  to  Clay  declaring  that  the  Cass  proposal  meant 
American  sympathy  for  oppressed  Hungary  and  was  a  declara- 
tion of  indignation  at  the  suffering  to  which  her  noble  people 
had  been  subjected.  One  voice  would  be  heard  from  American 
freemen  and  that  would  be  "unanimous  sympathy  for  down- 
trodden Hungary  and  our  measureless  contempt  for  her 
tyrannical  oppressors.' '  R.  M.  T.  Hunter  roundly  denounced 
the  intervention  policy  which  he  somehow  saw  in  the  resolution. 
Another  Senator  wondered  whether  the  resolution  would  not  be 
an  invasion  of  the  rights  of  the  President.29 

In  view  of  the  opposition  to  Cass'  proposal,  Underwood  sub- 
mitted a  substitute  resolution : 

"That  while  the  people  of  the  United  States  sympathize  with  popular 
movements  to  reform  political  institutions  inconsistent  with  the  enlightened 
opinions  of  the  present  age  .  .  .  they  disclaim  the  right  to  meddle  with  the 
domestic  policy  of  other  nations." 

Supposing  that  the  Cass  measure  alone  could  not  muster 
enough  votes,  Foote  offered  a  resolution  proposing 


"  Wash.  Republic,  5  Jan.  1850;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  7,  12  Jan.  1850;  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  11  Jan.  1850;  Phila.  Ledger,  28  Dec.  1849,  7  Jan.  1850;  Liberator,  11 
Jan.  1850;   Wash.  Union,  1,  8,  11,  24  Jan.  1850. 

29  31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  103-6,  113-4. 

31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  A  pp.,  43-7,  84-91. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  63 

"that  the  heroic  struggles  for  freedom  in  Hungary  are,  in  the  judgment  of  the 
Senate,  entitled  to  the  warmest  sympathy  and  respect  of  the  American  people 
and  government,  as  well  by  reason  of  the  virtues  they  have  exhibited,  as  of 
the  sufferings  they  have  been  fated  to  endure," 

together  with  the  original  Cass  measure  and  a  third  provision 
granting  land  on  liberal  terms  to  Hungarian  refugees  in  this 
country.  Simultaneously  Soule  advocated  that  the  government 
bring  Kossuth  to  America.  The  Senate,  however,  soon  became 
wholly  occupied  with  the  Clay  compromise  measures,  and  the 
Foote  scheme,  like  its  predecessor,  temporarily  dropped  out  of 
sight.30 

Individuals  outside  of  the  Senate  freely  expressed  their  views 
with  respect  of  the  resolution  proposing  suspension  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  Austria  and  of  the  resultant  debate.  Webster 
thought  Cass'  speech  a  popular  one  and  Clay's  response  "a 
sensible  performance  with  some  fooleries  such  as  he  always  com- 
mits." The  Cass  policy  towards  Austria,  wrote  W.  L.  Marcy, 
met  with  the  approval  of  the  people.  From  abroad  came  word 
of  the  ill  effects  of  the  proceedings.  A.  Dudley  Mann  feared  that 
nothing  could  be  accomplished  by  suspending  relations.  Fay 
commented  on  the  great  excitement  the  discussion  produced  in 
Europe.  From  every  side  he  heard  that  "all  the  pride  recorded 
in  the  history  of  the  Popes,  Kings  and  Emperors  never  equalled 
that  of  the  Burghers  of  the  United  States."  While  in  conversa- 
tion with  Prince  Schwartzenberg,  Webb  warned  him  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  acts  of  the  government  and  those  of  an 
individual  (Cass)  opposed  to  the  government.  He  told  him  that 
in  the  American  public  mind  there  was  a  very  general  feeling  of 
sympathy  for  Hungary.  In  its  whole  policy  with  regard  to 
Hungary  the  government  merely  reflected  public  sentiment.31 


30  31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  244,  293. 
Ibid.,  App.,  143-8. 

31  Webster  to  Harvey,  9  Jan.  1850,  Webster  Works,  National  Edition,  IV,  529. 
Marcy  to  Dickinson,  27  Jan.  1850,  Dickinson,  Correspondence  D.  S.  Dickin- 
son, 420. 

Mann  to  Clayton,  10  Jan.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents 
to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Fay  to  Clayton,  5  Feb.  1850,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  VI. 
Webb  to  Clayton,  15  Feb.  1850,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Austria,  III. 


64  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

The  Democracy  made  another  move  which  was  designed  to 
display  its  sympathy  for  the  lost  Hungarian  cause  by  refusing  to 
confirm  the  appointment  to  Austria  of  Editor  Webb  who  had 
numerous  political  enemies  in  the  Senate.  After  a  lengthy 
debate,  the  Senate  refused,  34  to  7,  to  approve  the  Webb  nomina- 
tion; whereupon  Cass  renewed  his  activity  to  prevent  any 
minister  going  to  Vienna.  His  plea  failed  to  win  approval,  for 
by  a  vote  of  28  to  17,  the  Senate  signified  its  unwillingness  to 
sever  the  diplomatic  relations.    Politics  ended  at  the  seashore.33 


»  Sen.  Exec.  Jol.,  VIII,  115,  116,  129,  137. 
31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  588,  745-6. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  65 


The  Conquered  Hero  Comes 

Before  the  defeat  and  surrender  of  the  Hungarian  forces, 
many  of  the  soldiers  had  escaped  from  the  Austrian  empire. 
Some  found  a  haven  in  France  and  England,  while  the  close 
associates  of  Kossuth  joined  him  in  seeking  safety  within  the 
boundaries  of  Turkey.  Eventually  after  a  petty  diplomatic 
dispute  between  Turkey  (with  Great  Britain  and  France  second- 
ing her)  and  Austria  and  Russia,  Kossuth  and  his  comrades 
were  confined  in  the  heart  of  Asia  Minor. 

With  hearts  strangely  warmed  for  the  Hungarians,  Americans 
continued  to  evince  their  interest  in  them  by  the  way  in  which 
they  followed  their  fortunes.  When  Russia  and  Austria  de- 
manded that  Turkey  release  to  them  the  revolutionary  heroes, 
Americans  became  indignant.  One  group  living  in  Paris  which 
included  Colt  the  inventor,  Saunders  the  editor  of  the  Democratic 
Review,  and  a  number  of  Southerners,  urged  the  minister  in 
Constantinople  to  protect  Kossuth,  "an  example  of  our  Wash- 
ington," and  his  companions.  The  envoy  might  be  sure  of 
approval  from  home  for  there  the  people  had  ' '  risen  en  masse  to 
sympathize  with  Hungary. "  America  would  demand  that  every 
energy  be  exerted  in  behalf  of  the  refugees.  On  the  other  side 
of  the  Atlantic,  the  voice  of  the  influential  Webster,  then  a 
United  States  Senator,  boomed  forth  its  opposition  to  the 
Russian  demand,  as  a  violation  of  human  justice  and  national 
law.  The  great  republic  of  the  world  should  speak  out  its 
hostility  to  such  an  infamous  request.1 

From  time  to  time,  word  reached  the  United  States  of  the 
desperate  straits  in  which  the  refugees  were  situated.  Observers, 
noting  the  strong  predilection  of  the  Hungarians  for  the  United 
States,  anticipated  that  many  would  migrate  thither.  Appeals 
to  aid  them  as  "republicans  and  Christians"  were  circulated 


1  Americans  in  Paris  to  Carr,  D.  S.,  22  Sept.  1849,  (Copy)  19  Dec.  1849, 
Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Turkey,  XI. 
Curtis,  G.  T.,  Life  of  Webster,  II,  558. 


66  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

in  the  American  press.  Poets  devoted  their  talents  to  Kossuth, 
"exile  on  a  foreign  strand,"  and  to  his  desecrated  Hungary. 
Editors  wondered  whether  the  government  would  lend  a  hand 
in  the  liberation  of  the  heroes.  The  suggestion  that  Kossuth 
might  come  to  America  was  by  no  means  a  new  one.2 

The  frequent  repetition  in  1849-50  of  the  plea  to  transport 
Kossuth  to  this  country  suggests  widespread  interest.  If  the 
government  would  not  act,  private  individuals  offered  to  raise 
through  voluntary  subscription  a  sum  adequate  enough  to  bring 
him  to  America.  Before  the  legislature  of  Ohio,  a  Rev.  Mr. 
Tefft  depicted  the  marvelous  struggle  carried  on  by  the  Hun- 
garians and  urged  action  to  secure  the  release  of  Kossuth.  Imme- 
diately the  legislature  passed  a  resolution  declaring  it  to  be  the 
duty  of  Congress  to  take  steps  calculated  to  bring  Kossuth  and 
his  family  to  America.  Indiana  wanted  the  government  to  act 
in  order  to  obtain  an  amelioration  of  the  conditions  of  the 
Hungarian  patriots.3 

Meanwhile  the  national  government  had  determined  upon  its 
course  of  action.  Assistance  would  be  rendered  the  refugees  pro- 
vided no  entanglement  with  Austria  or  Russia  should  arise  there- 
from. On  this  basis  Clayton,  Secretary  of  State,  ordered  Marsh,* 
the  recently  appointed  Minister  at  the  Porte,  to  intercede.  The 
government  would  be  glad  to  convey  the  exiles  to  America  in  one 
of  the  national  ships — a  measure  which  would  certainly  please 
the  American  people.  These  instructions  preceded  by  three 
weeks  a  resolution  of  Senator  Soule  requesting  "the  President 
to  intercede  with  Turkey  to  secure  the  liberation  of  Kossuth  and 
companions."4 


2  35  Knickerbocker  Mag.,  169,  203;  36  Ibid.,  571;  37  Ibid.,  318;  Phila 
Sun.  Despatch,  16  Je.  1850. 

Mann  to  Clayton,  9  Sept.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents 
to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

•Moore,  C.  W.  to  Webster,  31  Jl.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Miscell. 
Letters,  Jl.-Ag.  1851. 

Tefft,  B.  F.,  Kossuth  and  Hungary,  8. 

Acts  of  48th  Gen.  Ass.  of  Ohio,  711. 

Gen.  Laws  of  Indiana,  34th  Session,  233. 

*  George  P.  Marsh  (1801-1882)  diplomatist  and  philological  scholar. 
1842-49,  M.  C.  from  Vermont;    1849-53,  Minister  to  Turkey. 

4  Clayton  to  Marsh,  12  Jan.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Turkey,  I. 

31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Senate  Jol.,  132. 

Brown,  J.  P.  to  Clayton,  19  Dec.  1849,  18  Feb.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State, 
Repts.,  Turkey,  XI. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  67 

In  the  absence  of  the  Minister,  the  business  at  the  Legation 
in  Constantinople  had  devolved  upon  the  dragoman,  J.  P.  Brown. 
Influenced  by  the  obviously  favorable  opinion  held  by  Americans 
for  Hungary  and  by  the  official  attitude  as  expressed  in  Taylor's 
annual  message,  Brown  had  been  unusually  generous  in  granting 
to  the  Hungarians  permits  which  enabled  them  to  obtain  entrance 
into  their  own  country  or  safe  passage  to  Switzerland.  British 
agents  allowed  similar  evasions.  Brown  kept  foremost  in  mind, 
however,  the  traditions  of  neutrality  in  European  politics.4 

In  a  letter  to  Kossuth,  Brown  expressed  the  high  admiration 
in  which  Americans  held  the  unfortunate  leader.  The  American 
people  would  readily  grant  him  a  free  asylum  in  their  land,  and 
his  acceptance  would  flatter  them  immensely.  Although  Kos- 
suth in  his  reply  cherished  the  sympathy  of  America,  he  said  he 
would  not  leave  Turkey.  This  reply  greatly  surprised  Brown 
who  had  suggested  to  his  government  that  Kossuth  desired  to 
visit  the  United  States.  Nevertheless,  he  advocated  government 
action  to  succor  the  "noblest  yet  the  most  unfortunate  patriot 
of  his  times."  He  ventured  to  urge  the  Turkish  government  not 
to  accede  to  the  Austrian  demand  to  detain  Kossuth  for  a  specific 
period.  He  felt  justified  in  his  action  since  he  knew  of  the  atti- 
tude of  the  American  press  towards  Kossuth.5 

As  soon  as  Marsh  reached  Constantinople,  he  acted  on  the 
instructions  received  from  Clayton.  At  once,  he  commanded 
Captain  Long  of  the  United  States  ship,  Mississippi,  to  wait  in 
Constantinople  while  he  ascertained  whether  the  Sultan  would 
grant  the  refugees  a  release.  If  the  Porte  agreed,  the  refugees 
would  be  conveyed  to  America  by  Captain  Long.  Though 
Marsh  believed  that  Turkey  desired  to  comply  with  Clayton's 
suggestion,  he  doubted  whether  the  government  would  act 
since  it  feared  the  hostility  of  Austria  and  Russia.  His  fears 
proved  well  grounded,  for  on  March  25,  1850,  the  Turkish 
minister  replied  that  the  Hungarians  would  not  be  permitted  to 
leave  the  country.  Three  weeks  later,  however,  Marsh  reported 
that  the  Hungarians  at  Broussa  had  been  removed  to  Kutaieh 
in  Asia  Minor  and  that  they  would  be  released  in  the  fall.     A 


*  Brown,  J.  P.  to  Clayton,  15  Jan.  1850,  18  Feb.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State 
Repts.,  Turkey,  XL 


68  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

hundred  who  had  not  been  incarcerated  inland  applied  to  Marsh 
for  the  means  of  migrating  to  America,  but  he  felt  unable  to 
grant  their  request.  He  pleaded  with  Clayton  for  power  to  do 
something  to  realize  the  hopes  of  the  refugees  who  antici- 
pated aid  from  the  United  States.  Time  and  again  he  appealed 
to  the  Sultan  in  their  behalf.  At  length  the  latter  offered  to 
transport  gratis  all  the  refugees,  save  those  detained  in  Asia 
Minor,  to  England,  provided  the  United  States  would  convey 
them  thence  to  America.  With  regret,  Marsh  declined  the 
liberal  offer.  The  refusal  disappointed  the  Porte,  which  confidently 
expected  that  its  proposal  would  meet  with  the  approval  of  the 
United  States  since  Americans  had  shown  such  "strong  mani- 
festations of  popular  sympathy."6 

Frequent  appeals  obliged  Marsh  to  contribute  from  his  per- 
sonal resources  to  aid  the  suffering  outcasts.  Such  donations 
caused  him  serious  embarrassment,  but  he  felt  impelled  to 
make  them  because  of  the  expressions  of  public  sympathy  which 
came  from  America.  Webster,  now  Secretary  of  State,  wrote 
Marsh  that  the  executive  could  do  nothing  to  reimburse  him  or 
to  alleviate  the  hardships  of  the  refugees,  since  Congress  had 
refused  to  make  an  appropriation  for  that  purpose.7 

From  his  place  of  banishment,  Kossuth  issued  an  address  to 
the  American  people  which  contained  a  statement  of  the  de- 
mands of  his  country  together  with  the  narrative  of  events  that 
led  to  Hungary's  debacle.  American  newspapers  carried  the 
letter  to  thousands  of  readers.  Kossuth  also  wrote  an  appeal 
to  the  government  in  which  he  pleaded  for  intervention  with 
the  Turkish  authorities  so  that  he  might  obtain  his  release  and 
then  migrate  to  America.8 

Meanwhile  Brown,  the  dragoman,  had  returned  to  Washington 


6  Marsh  to  Long,  7  Mch.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Repts.,  Med.  Squadron 
1849-1852. 

Marsh  to  Clayton    14,  25  Mch.  1850,  18  Ap.  1850,  15  May  1850,  19  Je. 
1850,  4  Jl.  1850,  19  Ag.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Turkey,  XII. 

7  Marsh  to  Webster,  15  Nov.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Turkey, 
XII. 

Webster  to  Marsh,  25  Jan.  1851,  Ibid.,  Inst.,  Turkey,  I. 
*N.   Y.  Tribune,  20  Oct.  1851;    Phila.  Ledger,  15  Feb.  1851;    3  Harper's 
Monthly,  562. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  69 

and  got  into  communication  with  Webster.  He  emphasized 
the  suffering  endured  by  the  unfortunate  revolutionists  and  told 
of  their  desire  to  migrate  to  America.  Kossuth,  said  he,  now- 
hoped  that  he  might  soon  be  "enabled  to  seek  a  quiet  home  on  the 
soil  of  America."  After  recounting  the  cause  for  the  previous 
failure  to  secure  the  release  of  Kossuth,  Brown  implored  Webster 
to  try  again,  since  the  time  of  detention,  so  he  thought,  would 
soon  be  ended.9 

While  Kossuth  and  some  companions  fled  eastward,  others  of 
the  Hungarians  sought  a  temporary  asylum  in  the  western 
part  of  Europe.  Before  the  close  of  1849,  some  of  these  refugees 
made  plans  to  conie  to  New  York  where  a  relief  association  with 
the  Mayor  as  President  and  Treasurer,  had  been  organized  to 
aid  the  destitute.  Ladislaus  Ujhazy,  ex-Governor  of  Comorn, 
assembled  a  group  of  refugees  in  London  and  embarked  for  this 
country.  In  a  note  of  introduction  to  Taylor  and  Clayton, 
Lawrence,  Minister  to  England,  wrote  enthusiastically  about  this 
man  and  his  family.  A  card  of  similar  purport  was  written  to 
A.  J.  Donelson  who  returned  from  England  on  the  boat  with 
Ujhazy.  The  latter  proposed  to  establish  a  permanent  home  in 
the  Middle  West  in  which  all  the  refugees  might  gather.10 

The  reception  accorded  Ujhazy  and  his  companions  gives 
another  clue  to  opinion  on  the  revolutionary  movements.  From 
the  time  of  their  landing  in  New  York  until  their  departure  for 
the  West,  many  events  indicate  the  trend  of  feeling.  With 
great  warmth,  the  Governor  of  New  York  assured  a  home  and 
an  asylum  to  the  brave  though  unsuccessful  defenders  of  liberty. 
In  Philadelphia,  after  a  most  enthusiastic  welcome  the  party 
received  a  public  reception  in  Independence  Hall.  Some  of  the 
demonstrations  bordered  on  the  ridiculous.  Various  amusement 
houses  gave  the  proceeds  of  a  performance  for  the  benefit  of  the 


9  Brown  to  Webster,  26  Sept.  1850,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Turkey, 
XIII. 
™  Phila.  Ledger,  15  Oct.  1849, 14  Dec.  1849. 
Lawrence  to  Clayton,  19  Nov.  1849.     Clayton  Mss. 
Lawrence  to  Donelson,  19  Nov.  1849.     Donelson  Mss. 
1 1  Iowa  Jol.  of  History  and  Politics,  480  if. 


70  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Hungarians.  It  was  now  known  that  Ujhazy  intended  to  ask 
Congress  for  aid  in  securing  the  release  of  Kossuth." 

In  a  very  cordial  note,  President  Taylor  welcomed  the  Ujhazy 
group  to  "the  natural  asylum  of  the  oppressed  from  every  clime," 
where  he  trusted  they  might  find  a  second  home.  When  they 
came  to  Washington,  Taylor  received  them  very  pleasantly. 
Once  more  he  spoke  of  the  sympathy  engendered  in  America 
by  the  revolutionary  movements  and  repeated  that  if  Hungary 
had  succeeded  in  becoming  independent,  America  would  have 
been  first  to  welcome  her  into  the  family  of  nations.  He  hoped 
Kossuth  might  speedily  join  his  comrades.  Later  the  party  made 
visits  to  the  Senate,  to  the  House,  and  to  the  Supreme  Court  as 
well  as  to  individual  officials  of  prominence.  The  Democratic 
Washington  Union  severely  criticized  the  Taylor  Cabinet  for  not 
calling  upon  Ujhazy,  and  suggested  that  the  foreign-born  voters 
keep  this  snub  in  mind.  After  some  lobbying  in  order  to  procure 
land  the  exiles  left  Washington,  spent  an  enjoyable  day  in 
Baltimore  and  moved  on  to  New  York.  Thence  they  set  out 
for  Iowa  via  Buffalo  and  the  Lakes.12 

The  best  opportunity  for  a  livelihood  for  these  penniless 
victims  of  misfortune  lay  in  the  virgin  soil  of  the  Middle  West. 
With  an  eye  on  the  foreign-born  vote  which  Cass  and  the 
Democracy  aimed  to  capture,  Seward  introduced  a  measure  in 
the  Senate  granting  land  free  of  all  charges  to  Hungarians  or  other 
exiles  upon  their  arrival  in  America.  During  a  debate  on  the 
public  domain  Senator  Sam  Houston  advocated  the  gift  of  some 
of  the  millions  of  idle  acres  to  them.*  Presently  Seward  pressed 
his  motion  and  pleaded  that  it  be  sent  to  the  appropriate  com- 
mittee. Objection  came  from  Douglas  who  disliked  the  prefer- 
ence given  foreigners  over  native-born  citizens.  Dawson  looked 
upon  the  measure  as  a  Seward  bid  to  gain  votes,  an  allegation 


nPhila.  Ledger,  14  Dec.  1849,  10  Jan.  1850,  6,  7  Nov.  1851;  Pkila.  Sun. 
Despatch,  13  Jan.  1850,  5  May  1850;  11  Iowa  Jol.  of  History  and  Politics, 
480  ff. 

12  Wash.  Union,  17,  29  Jan.  1850;   11  Iowa  Jol.  of  History  and  Politics,  480  ff. 

*  In  an  analogous  case  in  1834,  Congress  granted  land  to  Polish  exiles 
conditionally  upon  their  cultivation  of  the  soil  allotted  and  the  payment  within 
ten  years  of  the  minimum  price.  Debates  in  Cong.,  Vol.  X,  col.,  2127,  4799; 
Ibid.,  Appendix,  351. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  71 

which  the  accused  vehemently  denied.  From  the  legislature 
of  New  York  came  a  memorial  favoring  the  Seward  bill,  provided 
that  the  persons  receiving  the  land  became  actual  settlers  thereon. 
Benton  offered  a  petition  from  his  constituents  requesting  that 
Missouri  land  be  given  the  refugees.  A  memorial  from  the 
legislature  of  Iowa  begged  Congress  to  grant  Ujhazy  and  his 
associates  the  land  in  Decatur  County  whereon  they  had  settled. 
Similar  resolutions  and  petitions  of  a  like  tenor  were  presented 
to  later  Congresses.13 

A  settlement,  New  Biuda,  was  started  in  Decatur  County, 
Iowa,  in  an  area  considered  fertile  and  beautiful.  Here  Ujhazy 
confidently  awaited  the  arrival  of  his  friend  and  chief,  Kossuth. 
The  energetic  workers  soon  cleared  the  soil  and  acquired  a 
splendid  herd  of  cattle  together  with  a  few  horses.  Plans  had 
been  conceived  for  the  construction  of  a  town  of  moderate  pro- 
portions. The  settlers  lived  in  hope  that  aid  would  be  rendered 
them  by  the  Federal  government.  In  a  cautious  letter,  Cass  gave 
no  definite  promise  concerning  land,  but  assured  Ujhazy  of  the 
fervent  sympathy  the  American  people  had  for  the  Hungarians. 
"I  entertain  a  confident  hope  that  the  subject  (of  land)  will 
receive  the  favorable  consideration  of  Congress  at  its  next  ses- 
sion," wrote  Seward.  The  exiles  might  be  sure  that  Seward 
personally  would  aid  them.  President  Fillmore  believed  that 
Congress  would  deal  generously  with  the  Hungarians,  because 
of  the  deep  sympathy  Americans  had  for  the  oppressed  every- 
where. Despite  many  fine  phrases  and  flowery  promises,  the 
exiles  never  obtained  any  free  land.14 

From  time  to  time  other  refugees  joined  forces  with  the 
original  group  at  New  Buda.  One  scout  had  orders  to  select  a 
site  for  a  colony  of  3,000  Hungarian  exiles.  When  Kossuth  did 
arrive,  he  talked  long  with  an  Iowa  delegation  concerning  the 
conditions  at  New  Buda.     The  details  pleased  him  and  he 


13  31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  128,  263-8. 

31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Sen.  JoL,  113,  216,  463. 

31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  House  JoL,  409,  475. 

Laws  of  the  State  of  New  York,  73rd  Session. 

"Fillmore  to  Ujhazy,  21  Oct.  1851,  11  Buff.  Hist.  Soc,  316-7.  Wash. 
Intelligencer,  19  Feb.  1852;  Boston  Atlas,  9  Dec.  1851;  11  Iowa  Jot.  of  History 
and  Politics,  484-7. 


72  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

decided  to  ask  Congress  to  approve  an  act  for  free  land.  By 
the  time  he  reached  St.  Louis,  however,  Ujhazy  had  sold  his 
home  and  had  prepared  to  move  on  to  Texas.  By  dint  of  hard 
labor  they  had  opened  farms,  but  the  climate  proved  unsuitable 
for  the  cultivation  of  those  products  which  they  had  raised  in 
Europe.15 

A  new  interest  in  the  revolutionary  heroes,  still  captives  in 
Asia  Minor,  coincides  with  the  widespread  approval  which 
greeted  Webster's  grandiose  Hulsemann  letter.  On  February 
17,  1851,  Senator  Foote  introducted  a  joint  resolution  which 
empowered  the  President  to  dispatch  a  vessel  to  fetch  Kossuth 
to  America.  After  slight  amendment  by  Shields,  the  Senate 
adopted  the  Foote  measure  and  on  the  same  day  the  bill  was 
presented  for  action  in  the  House.  Southern  members,  such  as 
Cobb  of  Alabama  and  Toombs  of  Georgia,  suggested  that  the 
government  tend  to  its  own  business.  Due  to  the  opposition, 
largely  Southern,  the  bill  had  to  lie  over  four  days  before  being 
passed.16 

Before  the  House  approved  the  bill,  Webster  sent  a  note  to 
Marsh,  in  which  he  spoke  of  the  unsuccessful  attempt  of  his 
predecessor  to  secure  the  release  of  Kossuth  because  the  Sultan 
had  decided  to  confine  him  for  a  year.  That  period  now  having 
elapsed,  the  United  States  renewed  its  hope  that  he  might  be 
freed.  Webster  reaffirmed  the  old  policy  that  this  government 
had  "no  desire  or  intention  to  interfere  in  any  manner  with 
questions  of  public  policy  or  international  or  municipal  relations 
of  other  governments."  Since  danger  of  a  new  revolt  no  longer 
existed,  why  should  not  the  Turkish  government  release  the 
captives  and  permit  them  "to  cross  the  ocean  to  the  unculti- 
vated regions  of  America  and  leave  forever  a  continent  which 
to  them  has  been  more  gloomy  than  the  wilderness?"    Anticipat- 


*Phila.  Ledger,  7  Oct.  1851;  N.  Y.  Herald,  31  Oct.  1851;  Phila.  No.  Am., 
20  Sept.  1850;  Savannah  Republican,  18  Mch.  1852;  Wash.  Union,  13  Jan. 
1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  25  Mch.  1852;  11  Iowa  Jot.  of  History  and  Politics, 
486-7. 

"31  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  710,  731,  777-9. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  73 

ing  the  House  action,  Webster  assured  Marsh  that  the  govern- 
ment would  furnish  ships  to  transport  the  Hungarians.17 

Before  Brown,  the  Turkish  dragoman  on  furlough,  returned 
to  his  post  in  Constantinople,  he  advised  Webster  that  definite 
arrangements  should  be  made  with  naval  officers  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean for  a  vessel  to  carry  the  liberated  Hungarians  to  America. 
Immediately  Webster  told  Marsh  that  if  the  Sultan  should 
release  Kossuth,  he  should  advise  with  Morgan,  the  ranking 
officer  of  the  Mediterranean  fleet,  as  to  the  measures  to  effect 
the  end  in  view.  In  the  same  packet  went  a  letter  from  Graham, 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  ordering  Morgan  to  send  the  Mississippi 
to  receive  the  exiles  as  soon  as  he  learned  that  they  could  depart 
for  the  United  States.  Morgan  sent  an  officer  of  judgment, 
Lieutenant  Drayton,  to  Constantinople  to  arrange  the  departure. 
Such  attention  from  an  official  source,  he  felt,  would  carry 
much  weight  with  the  Porte.*  l8 

In  the  absence  of  both  Marsh  and  Brown,  Homes,  assistant 
dragoman,  laid  before  the  Turkish  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs 
the  contents  of  Webster's  letters.  In  his  earlier  correspondence 
Homes  showed  clearly  his  doubt  as  to  whether  the  refugees 
preferred  America  to  England  or  France.  In  either  of  the  latter 
countries  they  would  be  close  at  hand  in  case  a  new  revolution- 
ary wave  galvanized  Hungary  into  action.  If  they  should  go 
to  America,  Austria  would  desire  to  stipulate  that  they  remain 
there  for  several  years.  After  presenting  the  application  for  the 
liberation  of  Kossuth,  Homes  ventured  to  suggest  to  Webster 
that  the  status  quo  would  be  maintained  since  Turkey  stood  in 
holy  awe  of  Austria  and  Russia.  Kossuth  had  written  Homes 
that    if    the   Hungarians    should   be   freed,   they  would  come 


17  Webster  to  Marsh,  28  Feb.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Inst.,  Turkey,  I. 
Cass  to  Webster,  18  Mch.  1851,  Van  Tyne,  Letters  of  Daniel  Webster,  461. 

*  Simultaneously  Morgan  commanded  Capt.  J.  C.  Long,  V.  S.  S. 
Mississippi,  to  repair  to  Constantinople  and  confer  with  Marsh  on  all  matters 
relative  to  the  Kossuth  departure.  When  the  latter  was  released,  he  should 
be  taken  aboard  and  carried  to  New  York. 

18  Brown  to  Webster,  1  Ap.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Turkey,  XIII. 
Webster  to  Marsh,  4  Ap.  1851,  Ibid.,  Inst.,  Turkey,  I. 

Graham  to  Morgan,  4  Ap.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Record  of  Confid. 
Letters,  II. 

Morgan  to  Graham,  28  May  1851,  Ibid.,  Med.  Squadron,  1849-1852. 
Morgan  to  Long,  5  Ag.  1851,  Ibid. 


74  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

to  America  under  no  obligation  to  remain  longer  than  they 
pleased.  Ultimately  Homes  received  definite  assurance  that 
the  release  would  occur  September  1,  1851.  He  then  wondered 
whether  American  or  British  vessels  would  bear  them  away.19 

Upon  his  return  to  Turkey,  Brown  assumed  charge  of  the 
negotiations  with  respect  of  Kossuth.  On  September  1,  every- 
thing appeared  favorable  for  the  release.  Brown,  too,  imagined 
that  the  United  States  would  find  England  a  rival  claimant  for 
the  honor  of  carrying  away  the  famous  revolutionist.  England 
pressed  her  invitation  upon  the  Grand  Vizier,  who  left  the  de- 
cision in  the  matter  entirely  to  the  pleasure  of  Kossuth.  In 
the  meantime,  Captain  Long  had  been  acting  under  the  instruc- 
tions of  his  superior.  After  coaling  in  Genoa,  he  steamed  for 
Smyrna  and  in  the  neighborhood  of  that  place  ran  aground,  a 
mishap  that  necessitated  a  short  delay.  Fear  prevailed  lest 
the  accident  might  deter  Kossuth  from  boarding  the  Mississippi; 
he  might  after  all  depart  in  an  English  vessel.  On  September  10, 
however,  all  fears  were  banished  when  Kossuth  and  his  retinue 
boarded  the  Mississippi  which  had  been  handsomely  pre- 
pared for  the  illustrious  guest.  Altogether  sixty  refugees 
were  taken  aboard;  two  of  whom  later  requested  to  be  put 
ashore  at  Smyrna.  As  soon  as  he  could  breathe  freely,  Kossuth 
declared  that  in  the  United  States  he  did  not  seek  "an  asylum 
for  exiles  .  .  .  but  an  avenger  .  .  .  against  the  oppressors 
of  a  holy  cause/'20 

On  the  following  day  the  voyage  began,  and  in  spite  of  the 
rough  water  they  reached  Spezzia  on  September  21,  coaled  up, 
and  came  into  Marseilles  on  September  26.  At  both  these  cities 
republican  demonstrations  led  to  difficulties  between  Captain 


19  Homes  to  Webster,  18  Feb.  1851,  5,  25  Ap.  1851,  5,  15  May  1851,  5  Je. 
1851,  5  Jl.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Turkey,  XIII. 

Homes  to  Morgan,  15  May  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Med.  Squadron, 
1849-1852. 

20  Brown  to  Webster,  24  Jl.  1851,  25  Ag.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts., 
Turkey,  XIII. 

Long  to  Graham,  10  Nov.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Capts.  Letteis, 
Jl.-Dec,  1851. 

Marsh  to  Webster,  18  Sept.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Turkey, 
XIII. 

McCurdy  to  Webster,  4  Sept.  1851,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Austria,  III. 

N.  Y.  Tribune,10  Oct.  1851;  Phila.  Ledger,  8  Sept.  1851,  4  Nov.  1851. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  75 

Long  and  Kossuth.  At  Spezzia,  Kossuth  indicated  his  intention 
of  going  to  England  before  proceeding  to  the  United  States;  for 
that  purpose  he  desired  to  be  put  off  at  Marseilles.  From  this 
city,  he  planned  to  travel  through  France  to  London  in  order  to 
confer  with  some  compatriots.  After  consulting  with  them,  he 
would  return  to  the  Mississippi  at  Gibraltar.  Though  loth  to  do 
so,  Morgan  granted  Long  permission  to  disembark  Kossuth  at 
Marseilles.  Accordingly  on  the  arrival  at  Marseilles  a  request 
for  the  privilege  of  traveling  through  France  was  addressed  to  the 
Minister  of  the  Interior.  The  government  of  Louis  Napoleon 
seems  to  have  been  averse  to  having  this  great  revolutionist 
pass  through  the  French  Republic  for  his  plea  received  a  negative 
response.21 

Greatly  disappointed,  Kossuth  sent  a  copy  of  his  request 
together  with  the  official  refusal  to  Le  Peuple,  a  Marseillian 
journal  of  a  distinct  "red"  hue.  Then  ensued  a  great  republican 
demonstration  for  Kossuth  in  the  city  and  about  the  ship  which 
constituted  his  home.  Finally,  fearing  an  emeute,  the  prefect 
forbade  Kossuth  to  land  again  in  Marseilles.  The  American 
consul  Hodge  sent  this  order  to  Captain  Long  and  further  re- 
quested that  Kossuth  abstain  from  sending  any  other  articles  to 
newspapers  while  under  the  United  States  flag,  since  it  might 
appear  that  we  encouraged  the  attempt  to  produce  a  disturbance. 
Long  soon  wished  he  were  rid  of  his  inflammatory  cargo.  The 
present  duty  surpassed  in  unpleasantness  any  in  which  he  had 
ever  engaged.  Kossuth  interpreted  the  Hodge  letter  as  an 
allegation  that  he  had  compromised  the  American  flag.  In 
consequence  of  this  insulting  insinuation  he  would  leave  the 
Mississippi  at  Gibraltar,  and  upon  his  arrival  in  America  would 
appeal  to  the  people  to  judge  whether  or  not  he  had  compromised 
their  flag  and  their  government.  Long  denied  that  Kossuth 
had  compromised  the  flag,  but  suggested  that  there  had  been 
danger  of  it.  Agreeable  to  the  Captain's  request,  Kossuth 
remained  out  of  sight  during  the  balance  of  the  stay.  When  the 
vessel  reached  Gibraltar,  accompanied  by  his  family  and  the 


21  The  bulky  correspondence  involved  may  be  found  in  Mss.,  Dept.  of 
State,  Consular  Letters,  Marseilles,  V.  Much  of  it  has  been  printed  in  32 
Cong.,  1  Sess.,  House  exec,  doc,  78. 


76  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

closest  of  his  comrades,  Kossuth  disembarked  for  England. 
Before  he  left  the  ship,  the  strained  relations  had  been  exchanged 
for  feelings  more  friendly,  but  news  of  the  difficulties  and  of  the 
unpleasant  occurrences  which  ensued,  speedily  reached  the 
United  States.21 

Letters  revealed  to  the  country  the  apparent  nature  of  the 
misunderstanding  and  served  to  produce  further  expressions  of 
opinion.  An  American  attache  in  Paris,  supposedly  a  man  of 
discernment  and  judgment,  decried  Kossuth  as  "a  humbug  and 
a  demagogue  of  the  first  water."  His  conduct  at  Marseilles 
had  been  "unjustifiable  in  the  highest  degree."  The  writer 
trusted  that  official  Washington  would  not  be  humbugged  and 
deceived  by  this  meretricious  company.  A  former  member  of 
Congress  writing  from  Marseilles  gave  Hodge  and  the  officers  of 
the  Mississippi  a  clean  slate,  and  emphasized  that  Kossuth  had 
earlier  planned  to  stop  in  England  to  stir  up  revolutionary  excite- 
ment. The  Herald  felt  that  the  despatches  received  at  the  Navy 
Department  from  Morgan  and  Long  would  "dampen  somewhat 
the  enthusiasm  for  Kossuth."  The  prophecy  proved  correct, 
for  time  and  again  during  the  next  six  months,  the  dispute 
created  difficulty  and  tended  to  change  opinion  concerning  the 
Hungarian  leader." 

The  Marseilles  incident  undoubtedly  aided  immensely  in 
turning  the  New  York  Herald  from  a  friend  of  Kossuth  into  an 
avowed  enemy.  It  announced  that  the  Hungarian  approached 
this  country  to  procure  the  means  to  carry  on  his  revolutionary 
schemes  and  not  to  seek  a  permanent  residence.  The  Intelli- 
gencer, accepting  the  letter  from  the  attache  in  Paris  as  an 
adequate  warning,  argued  that  Congress,  when  it  invited  Kos- 
suth, had  no  intention  of  enlisting  this  government  in  any 
European  revolutionary  projects.  In  reply,  the  Union  saw  in 
the  position  of  the  Intelligencer  merely  an  index  of  the  undemo- 
cratic feeling  that  controlled  its  policies.  Americans,  said  the 
Tribune,   would   not   aid   schemes  of   revolution   and   brought 


«  Newark  Daily  Advertiser,  31  Oct.  1851;  N.  Y.  Herald,  1,  3,  Nov.  1851; 
Wash.  Union,  6  Nov.  1851;  Phila.  Ledger,  4  Nov.  1851;  Wash.  Intelligencer, 
5  Nov.  1851;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  7  Nov.  1851. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  77 

Kossuth  here  to  show  that  "they  dared  honor  the  hero  of  liberty " 
despite  the  opposition  of  monarchs.  Denouncing  the  apparent 
effort  through  the  Marseilles  episode  to  prejudice  American  minds 
against  Kossuth,  the  Philadelphia  Ledger  asked  that  he  be  heard 
before  being  condemned.22 

On  November  10,  1851,  the  Mississippi  with  the  Hungarians, 
minus  the  Kossuth  party,  docked  in  New  York.  Reporters 
worked  assiduously  to  ascertain  the  opinion  of  officers  and  crew 
concerning  the  great  hero  and  the  Marseilles  imbroglio.  News 
that  Long  and  the  Hungarian  chief  parted  company  on  friendly 
terms  led  the  Herald  and  the  Picayune  to  modify  their  earlier 
statements.  The  constant  intercourse  of  the  naval  officers  in 
the  Mediterranean  with  "monarchical  and  aristocratic  digni- 
taries" explained  to  the  Tribune  their  action  in  the  Marseilles 
affair.  Temporarily,  at  least,  the  incident  reacted  in  Kossuth's 
favor,  although  the  Richmond  Whig  saw  clearly  that  the  Hun- 
garian had  "acted  with  great  insolence  and  folly."  Captain 
Long  requested  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  publish  Kossuth's 
last  letter  to  him  which  would  show  the  people  that  a  friendly 
feeling  existed  at  the  time  of  the  separation  at  Gibraltar.  After 
approving  Long's  conduct  of  the  journey,  Graham  assented  to 
Long's  request  in  order  to  obliterate  any  "erroneous  impression 
with  regard  to  the  treatment  of  Kossuth  whilst  on  board  ship."23 

Despite  the  publication  of  this  letter,  common  opinion  con- 
tinued to  feel  that  Long  had  done  Kossuth  an  injustice.  Long 
had  to  deny  an  allegation  that  Kossuth  had  challenged  him  to 
mortal  combat.  In  another  letter,  he  intimates  his  chagrin  at 
the  "unmerited  reproach"  his  policy  received.  He  stressed  the 
fact  that  relations  at  the  time  of  departure  were  very  cordial. 
Eventually  a  call  for  the  papers  relative  to  the  dispute  passed 
the  House.  The  documents  were  then  printed  and  of  course 
served  to  revive  interest  in  the  dispute.  One  journal  saw  in  them 
proof  that  Commodore  Morgan  had  a  far  greater  interest  in 


23  New  Orleans  Picayune,  11  Nov.  1851;  N.  Y.  Herald,  11  Nov.  1851: 
N.  Y.  Tribune,  12  Nov.  1851;  Richmond  Whig,  25  Nov.  1851. 

Long  to  Graham,  11  Nov.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Captain's  Letters, 
Jl.-Dec,  1851. 

Graham  to  Long,  11,  14  Nov.  1851,  Ibid.,  Officers,  Ships  of  War,  XLVI. 


78  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

European  functionaries  than  "for  an  exiled  patriot  and  cham- 
pion of  liberty.' '  The  people  would  sustain  Kossuth,  for  though 
the  flag  had  been  compromised  Kossuth  had  not  been  guilty. 
The  Vienna  correspondent  of  the  Boston  A  tlas  wrote  that  the 
publication  of  the  correspondence  there  produced  an  agreeable 
sensation,  since  it  condemned  Kossuth.  Personally,  he  thought 
the  letters  condemned  certain  cringing  American  officials  abroad. 
From  another  quarter  sounded  a  different  note.  The  letters 
clearly  repeated  the  casuistry  and  humbuggery  of  Kossuth  for 
which  the  American  people  would  not  stand.  Nor  would  they 
permit  any  man  "to  assail  their  glorious  navy."  The  Savannah 
Republican  denied  that  Long  had  erred.24 

On  the  Mississippi  came  forty-two  of  Kossuth's  companions 
and  the  reception  accorded  them  was  a  harbinger  of  the  welcome 
the  chief  would  receive.  As  guests  of  the  city  of  New  York  they 
bade  farewell  to  the  vessel  of  mercy  and  took  up  their  lodging  in 
the  Irving  House.  In  a  number  of  public  addresses,  Colonel 
Berzenczey,  the  leader  of  the  party,  expressed  the  gratitude  of  his 
compatriots  for  their  release  from  Turkey.  The  Mayor  of  New 
York  in  a  felicitous  vein  welcomed  the  refugees.  Before  a  huge 
audience  in  Brooklyn,  Henry  Ward  Beecher  greeted  them  heartily 
and  assured  them  that  America  deplored  the  Russian  interven- 
tion which  had  caused  the  Hungarian  defeat.  Berzenczey 
brought  a  letter  from  Kossuth  addressed  to  the  Secretary  of 
State  in  which  he  asserted  that  poor  health  and  the  desire  to 
arrange  some  personal  affairs  had  caused  him  to  interrupt  his 
journey  to  America.25 

While  Kossuth's  companions  tossed  on  the  Atlantic  he  enjoyed 


24  N.  Y.  Tribune,  14  Jan.  1852,  16  Feb.  1852;  Phila.  Ledger,  23  Feb.  1852; 
Boston  Atlas,  13  Ap.  1852;  N.  Y.  Herald,  24  Jan.  1852;  Savannah  Republican, 
26  Feb.  1852. 

32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  391. 
32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  House  Jol.,  376. 

25  N.  Y.  Herald,  11-19  Nov.  1851;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  11  Nov.  1851;  Phila. 
No.  Am.,  13  Nov.  1851. 

Long  to  Graham,  11  Nov.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  Navy,  Captain's  Letters, 
Jl.-Dec,  1851. 

Kossuth  to  Webster,  18  Oct.  1851,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Miscell.  Letters, 
Oct..  1851. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  79 

a  royal  reception  in  England.  The  ovation  accorded  him  sur- 
passed that  which  any  other  individual,  save  only  the  Queen, 
could  receive.  Bright  and  Cobden  joined  in  making  him  welcome. 
Workingmen  by  the  thousands  applauded  the  Hungarian's 
fiery  orations.  Since  American  newspapers  freely  printed 
accounts  of  the  generous  welcome,  the  visit  served  to  augment 
the  enthusiasm  here.  Americans  in  England  gave  vent  to  their 
opinions  on  Kossuth.  Abbott  Lawrence,  Minister  at  the  Court 
of  St.  James,  declared  that  Kossuth  fully  deserved  the  admiration 
of  all  lovers  of  constitutional  government  and  freedom.  Citizens 
of  the  United  States  regardless  of  party  affiliation  would  welcome 
him  heartily.  A  former  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  Robert  J. 
Walker,  potent  in  the  councils  of  the  Democracy,  expressed 
himself  unequivocably  in  favor  of  the  oppressed  whose  champion 
Kossuth  was.26 

At  a  reception  banquet  tendered  Kossuth  in  Southampton 
many  notable  Americans  were  in  attendance.  Colonel  T.  B. 
Lawrence,  son  of  the  Minister,  assured  the  distinguished  guest 
that  a  cordial  welcome  awaited  him  in  America.  Croskey, 
consul  at  Southampton,  intimated  that  the  time  rapidly  ap- 
proached when  the  United  States  would  be  forced  to  take  a  more 
active  part  in  European  affairs.  Walker  argued  that  one  state 
had  no  right  to  interfere  with  another  as  Russia  had  so  recently 
done.  In  the  near  future  he  envisaged  a  conflict  between  the 
forces  of  liberty  and  despotism,  in  which  England  would  be 
supported  by  millions  of  his  countrymen  eager  to  defend  the 
divine  principles  of  constitutional  government.  Vessels  would 
be  insufficient  to  transport  those  who  would  desire  to  come  to 
Europe  to  fight  for  so  holy  a  cause.  Side  by  side  the  two  nations 
stood  in  defense  of  Kossuth  and  the  ends  he  strove  to  attain.26 

Both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  reverberated  with  Walker's  speech. 
In  Washington  the  Union  revelled  in  the  "fearless  and  eloquent 
terms  in  which  our  distinguished  fellow  citizen  responded  to  the 
spirit  of  the  occasion."    The  Intelligencer  savagely  attacked  the 


tPhila.  No.  Am.,  10,  15,  26  Nov.  1851;  Wash.  Union,  2,  18  Nov.  1851; 
14  Am.  Review,  537;  Wash.  Intelligencer,  20  Nov.  1851;  Phila.  Ledger,  20 
Nov.  1851. 


80 


Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 


speech.  America  would  not,  should  not,  interfere  in  European 
politics.  The  North  American  denied  that  Americans  would 
flock  to  Great  Britain  to  aid  in  the  overthrow  of  despotism.26 

In  the  course  of  his  tour  through  England,  Kossuth  suggested 
Walker  as  his  candidate  for  the  Presidency  of  the  United  States. 
Nor  was  this  thought  the  chance  expression  of  the  orator,  for  on 
three  separate  occasions  he  made  like  declarations.  Some  critics 
recognized  in  this  gesture  the  hand  of  Kossuth,  but  the  voice  of 
England.  On  November  24,  Kossuth  set  sail  for  New  York. 
Reviewing  his  stay  in  England,  Thurlow  Weed,*  then  in  London, 
concluded,  "He  created  a  stir  here  and  is  regarded  as  a  man  of 
decided  ability.  .  .  .  He  is  cast  for  a  part  in  the  world's 
drama  and  means  to  play  out  the  play"27 


27  Phila.  Ledger,  4  Dec.  1851;  N.  Y.  Herald,  28  Nov.  1851.  Barnes,  T.  W., 
Memoirs  of  Thurlow  Weed,  II,  201. 

*  Thurlow  Weed  (1797-1&82)  a  Whig  journalist  of  importance  in  New 
York,  and  a  confederate  of  Seward. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  81 

VI 

Congress  Debates  the  Exile's  Reception 

While  the  Humboldt,  bearing  the  Hungarian  leader,  made  its 
way  over  the  Atlantic,  Congress  beat  about  to  determine  the 
method  of  receiving  him.  Fillmore  in  his  annual  message  re- 
counted the  activity  of  the  government  in  securing  the  release  of 
"Governor"  Kossuth.  After  reiterating  that  America  offered  a 
safe  asylum  for  "those  whom  political  events  exiled  from  their 
own  home,"  in  a  discreet  manner  he  placed  on  Congress  the 
decision  as  to  the  way  in  which  the  Hungarians,  brought  hither 
by  its  authority,  should  be  treated.  He  thus  relieved  the  execu- 
tive of  any  possibility  of  trouble  with  Austria  over  Kossuth's 
reception.1 

In  the  Senate  Foote  announced  that  at  the  instance  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  he  proposed  to  offer  a  joint  resolution 
for  the  reception  and  entertainment  of  the  Hungarian.  As 
presented,  the  measure  created  a  joint  committee  of  Congress  to 
welcome  "the  governor"  and  to  assure  him  of  "the  profound 
respect  entertained  for  him"  by  Congress  and  people  alike.  As 
sponsor  of  the  measure,  Foote  emphasized  that  he  acted  merely 
as  "the  organ  of  those  who  entertain  the  common  American 
feeling"  in  reference  to  the  distinguished  statesman.  There 
had  been  but  one  Washington,  there  was  but  one  Kossuth. 
Regardless  of  party,  opposition,  largely  Southern,  became  vocal. 
Dawson,  a  Georgia  Whig,  objected  to  showing  as  a  senator  the 
respect  as  an  individual  he  held  for  Kossuth.  The  people  and 
not  the  government  should  extend  the  welcome.  Underwood, 
Clay's  colleague,  feared  that  an  official  reception  might  lead 
to  an  inference  that  the  government  favored  the  doctrine  of 
intervention.  From  the  North  came  a  different  note.  Cass 
sought  the  opportunity  "to  let  off  steam"  and  "bid  for  popu- 
larity," said  an  administration  paper.  With  all  his  heart  he 
wanted  the  resolution  pushed  through  expeditiously.     Kossuth 


1  Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  the  Presidents,  V,  119-120. 


82  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

should  be  received  as  the  nation's  guest.  A  champion  of  free-soil, 
J.  P.  Hale,  capitalized  the  opportunity  by  pointing  out  the 
irrefutable  similarity  between  the  subject  people  in  America 
and  those  in  Europe.  In  an  amendment  be  advocated  that  an 
expression  favorable  to  the  oppressed  everywhere  be  included. 
Thus  he  attempted  to  unite  indissolubly  the  antislavery  program 
with  sympathy  for  freedom  in  Europe.  In  the  face  of  these 
developments  Foote  withdrew  his  resolution.2 

On  the  very  day  that  Kossuth  landed  in  New  York,  a  substi- 
tute bill  introduced  by  Senator  Seward  welcomed  "  Louis  Kossuth 
to  the  capital  and  the  country  in  behalf  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States."  Seward  declared  that  since  the  exile  had  been 
brought  here  by  an  act  of  Congress  he  should  be  accorded  a 
reception  in  the  national  capital.  Miller  and  Stockton,  Senators 
from  New  Jersey,  spoke  in  favor  of  the  Seward  proposal,  although 
they  wanted  it  distinctly  understood  that  intervention,  which 
some  people  might  see  hinted  at  in  a  reception,  was  distinctly 
indefensible.  Chase  of  Ohio  and  Hale  of  New  Hampshire  sup- 
ported whole-heartedly  the  sentiments  held  by  their  free-soil 
colleague,  Charles  Sumner  of  Massachusetts,  who  in  his  maiden 
speech  in  the  Senate  paid  an  eloquent  tribute  to  the  Hungarian 
and  the  cause  of  liberty,  and  announced  his  intention  of  voting 
for  the  Seward  measure.3 

The  Democracy  of  the  Northwest  eagerly  proclaimed  opinions 
on  the  reception  and  its  implications.  Shields  of  Illinois  offered 
an  amendment  which  provided  an  introduction  to  the  Senate 
similar  to  that  accorded  Lafayette  a  generation  earlier.  More 
hard  things,  he  believed,  had  been  said  about  the  Hungarian  in 
the  Senate  than  in  Europe.  In  no  wise  did  the  resolution  com- 
mit the  government  to  intervene  in  Hungary.  Stephen  A. 
Douglas  believed  that  the  Russian  intervention  into  the  Austro- 


2  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  5,  12,  21-3,  25,  30. 

A  thorough  account  of  the  Austrian  policy  in  regard  to  the  Kossuth  visit 
may  be  found  in  Curti,  op.  ciL,  173-184. 

3  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  41-2,  44,  50-3. 
Chase  to  his  wife,  10  Dec.  1851.     Chase  Mss. 

Choate  to  Sumner,  29  Dec.  1851,  Works  of  Chas.  Sumner,  III,  3. 
Tyler  to  Cunningham,  15  Feb.  1852,  Tyler,  Life  and  Times  of  the  Tylers, 
II,  499. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  83 

Hungarian  dispute  was  a  violation  of  the  law  of  nations  such  as 
to  authorize  England  or  the  United  States  to  interfere  had  either 
chosen  to  do  so.  He  could  not  see  how  the  proposed  reception  to 
Kossuth  could  cause  offense  to  any  power  on  earth.  Walker  of 
Wisconsin  went  further.  Against  such  interference  as  Russia 
had  committed  in  the  affairs  of  Hungary,  he  would  in  the  future 
interpose  both  moral  and  physical  force  with  or  without  England. 
Surely  the  Hungarian  patriot  deserved  a  cordial  welcome.  Rhett, 
Borland,  and  Mallory,  Southern  Democrats,  favored  Seward's 
resolution.4 

Other  Southern  Senators  raised  their  voices  in  protest.  Berrien 
of  Georgia,  a  well-known  conservative  Whig,  feared  Europe 
might  soon  be  visited  by  another  revolutionary  convulsion. 
Difficulties  might  then  arise  from  the  Kossuth  reception.  In 
view  of  this  possibility,  he  proposed  an  amendment  which 
declared  that  the  reception  of  the  Hungarian  did  not  indicate 
that  Congress  proposed  to  depart  from  the  settled  policy  of  the 
government  which  forbade  all  interference  with  the  domestic 
concerns  of  other  nations.*  Badger,  North  Carolina,  saw  nothing 
but  evil  in  the  whole  affair.  Clemens  of  Alabama  based  his 
opposition  on  the  ground  that  it  would  lead  to  interference  in  the 
politics  of  Europe.5 

After  a  lengthy  debate,  shorn  of  amendment,  the  original 
Seward  bill  passed  by  a  vote  of  33-6  with  the  entire  opposition 
from  the  South — four  Whigs,  two  Democrats.  Seward  won  a 
great  victory  both  for  himself  and  the  cause  he  championed.** 
Finally  the  Shields  suggestion  for  a  committee  of  three  obtained 
approval,  though  not  without  the  opposition  of  the  South. 
Party  lines  failed  to  hold  as  had  been  the  case  in  the  votes  on 
the  Clay  compromise  measures.  "In  many  respects,"  said  the 
Boston  Atlas,  "this  legislation  has  no  parallel  in  the  annals  of 


4  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  34,  53,  70,  82,  90. 

*  By  a  two  to  one  vote  the  Senate  declined  to  approve  this  amendment. 

5  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  41-2,  44,  50-3. 

**"Mr.  Webster  had  taken  Foote  into  close  confidence  and  they  had 
arranged  to  anticipate  me  as  they  thought  on  Kossuth.  Foote  introduced 
his  resolution;  slavery  took  alarm;  Webster  advised  Foote  (he  says)  to 
withdraw.  I  supplied  a  new  resolution,  and  after  all  manner  of  contrivance 
to  displace  it,  the  Democrats  were  obliged  to  vote  for  it."  Seward  to  Weed, 
26  Dec.  1851,  Seward  at  Washington,  II,  176. 


84  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

of  Congress ;  in  its  results  it  will  mark  an  advance  movement  in 
the  history  of  human  progress  and  the  rights  of  man."6 

Meanwhile  the  House  debated.  Very  definitely  and  inex- 
tricably the  question  of  the  reception  to  Kossuth  had  intertwined 
itself  with  the  traditional  foreign  policy  and  with  the  abolition 
movement.  As  in  the  Senate,  the  opposition  developed  its 
main  strength  from  Southern  men  irrespective  of  party  affilia- 
tion. On  the  first  move  to  adopt  the  Seward  bill  in  the  House 
the  opposition  emerged  victorious,  but  after  the  Senate  passed 
the  measure  the  House  acquiesced  by  the  overwhelming  vote 
of  181—16  with  every  negative  vote  from  the  South.  After 
reading  the  speeches  Kossuth  delivered  in  New  York,  Smith  of 
Alabama  denounced  him  unsparingly.  With  biting  invective 
he  charged  the  exile  with  attempting  to  instruct  Americans  in 
the  correct  interpretation  of  Washington's  doctrines.  He  argued 
that  the  President  should  arrest  Kossuth  for  such  speeches. 
A  resolution  for  a  committtee  of  five  to  present  the  Hungarian 
paved  the  way  for  a  further  revelation  of  the  distinct  nexus 
between  the  revolutionary  movement  in  Europe  and  the  slavery 
question.  One  Southern  representative  wanted  it  clearly  under- 
stood that  if  the  House  adopted  the  measure,  it  did  so  believing 
that  Kossuth  had  no  sympathy  for  the  Abolitionists.  He  pointed 
out  that  Abolitionists  in  the  House,  such  as  Giddings,  Mann,  and 
Rantoul,  had  been  especially  eager  to  welcome  the  refugee;  in  the 
Senate,  Seward  and  Sumner  had  been  in  the  van  in  the  matter. 
Stephens,  a  Georgia  Whig,  held  that  the  passage  of  the  resolution 
could  not  be  construed  otherwise  than  as  an  endorsement  of  the 
principle  of  intervention.  Two  Whigs,  whose  districts  lay  in 
southern  Ohio,  had  a  similar  fear.  Millson,  a  Virginia  Democrat, 
on  the  other  hand,  saw  neither  a  commitment  to  intervention  in 
the  affairs  of  Hungary  nor  any  necessary  connection  between 
slavery  and  a  public  welcome  to  the  Hungarian.  He  based  his 
disapproval  on  the  ground  that  the  resolution  showed  bad  taste. 
Another  Virginian  denied  that  the  march  of  free  principles  in 


6  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Sen.  Jol.,  59. 

Phila.  No.  Am.,  19  Dec.  1851;  Boston  Atlas,  16  Dec.  1851;   N.  Y.  Tribune, 
20  Dec.  1851. 
Chase  to  his  wife,  11  Dec.  1851.     Chase  Mss. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  85 

Europe  constituted  an  advance  against  the  South,  although  he 
conceded  that  the  vote  on  the  reception  had  assumed  a  sectional 
character.  Among  Northern  representatives  the  sentiment 
showed  sharp  divisions.  One  offered  an  amendment  that  the 
measure  should  not  be  construed  as  impairing  the  Clay  com- 
promise measures.  Several  Northerners  believed  that  the  United 
States  should  now  commit  itself  unequivocally  to  the  inter- 
vention doctrine.  Eventually  the  proposal  for  the  introduction 
committee  of  five  secured  a  favorable  vote,  123-54;  Southerners 
numbering  45,  opposed  the  resolution,  fought  hard,  but  lost. 
"The  South  and  the  'Old  Hunkers'  have  been  in  a  tight  place," 
wrote  Horace  Mann.  "How  could  they  vote  to  honor  one 
fugitive  from  slavery,  and  chain  and  send  back  another?"7 


7  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  58,  96,  186-191,  200. 

32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  A  pp.,  101. 

32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  House  Jol.,  123. 

Choland  to  Welles,  31  Dec.  1851.     Welles  Mss. 

Mann  to  Clap,  E.  W.,  5  Jan.  1852,  Mann,  Life  of  Horace  Mann  I,  345. 


86  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

VII 
Vox  Populi,  Vox  Dei? 

While  the  government  debated  the  nature  of  its  welcome 
to  the  distinguished  exile,  the  masses  in  the  Northern  cities 
gave  vent  to  their  feeling  in  an  unmistakable  manner.  Long 
before  Kossuth's  arrival  in  New  York,  great  enthusiasm  in  his 
favor  presaged  a  cordial  welcome.  The  Herald  termed  him 
"despotism's  great  foe,"  and  declared  that  the  day  of  his  recep- 
tion should  be  another  Fourth  of  July. 

From  the  time  that  the  naval  salute  on  December  5,  1851, 
announced  his  approach  to  the  commercial  capital  until  his 
departure,  he  received  a  grand  and  tremendous  ovation.  One 
observer  of  the  events,  writing  nearly  half  a  century  later,  con- 
fessed that  he  still  felt  "the  shouts  of  welcome  tingling  in  his 
veins. "  The  reception  attained  such  proportions,  said  he,  because 
Kossuth  was  "a  martyr  representing  in  his  failure  all  the  down- 
trodden nationalities  of  Europe"  which,  "by  the  swift  reactions 
that  followed  the  spasms  of  1848,"  had  succumbed  to  the  despots. 
America  welcomed  him  as  the  protagonist  of  great  principles,  and 
the  acclamation  was  bestowed  not  upon  Kossuth  the  man  but 
upon  him  as  the  representative  and  champion  of  liberty  against 
the  despotic  powers  of  Europe.  At  the  same  time,  the  welcome 
exhibited  the  American  detestation  of  the  tyranny  of  Austria 
and  the  perfidy  of  Russia.  The  Richmond  Enquirer  recognized 
him  as  the  "embodiment  of  the  popular  thought  of  Europe  .  .  . 
the  incarnation  of  the  genius  of  freedom  .  .  .  who  has  kindled 
hopes  of  liberty  buried  for  ages  under  despotism."  It  was  not 
Kossuth  whom  the  American  people  were  to  honor  "but  the 
noble,  eternal  and  ever-enduring  principles  of  which  that  mighty 
man  is  the  able  and  eloquent  exponent  and  vindicator."  In 
the  light  of  these  views,  the  reception  given  the  Hungarian 
leader  assumes  its  real  significance.1 


1  N.  Y.  Herald,  15  Oct.  1851,  22,  24  Nov.  1851,  4  Dec.  1851;   New  Orleans 
Picayune,  22  Oct.  1851,  11  Nov.  1851;  Richmond  Enquirer,  24  Dec.  1851. 
Godwin,  P.,  Commemorative  Addresses,  127. 
32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  82. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  87 

At  the  very  outset  the  reception  which  "surpassed  any  that 
would  be  accorded  any  other  European  or  living  American" 
took  on  every  aspect  of  a  frenzy.*  The  telegraph  wires  trans- 
mitted nothing  but  Kossuth  news.  A  thoughtful  editor  utilized 
the  excitement  for  a  disquisition  on  national  characteristics  in 
which  he  predicted  that  the  enthusiasm  would  be  succeeded  by  a 
violent  reaction.  The  mission  became  a  theme  for  the  clergy; 
one  of  whom  proclaimed  that  present  events  were  intended  to 
precede  the  coming  of  Christ.  Kossuth  had  been  sent  by  God 
to  prepare  the  way.  Political  observers  noticed  that  the  devo- 
tion had  no  party,  sex,  or  color  limits,  but  inspired  young  and  old 
with  a  holy  zeal  never  before  witnessed.  If  any  party  should 
oppose  "Kossuthism",  it  would  assuredly  be  doomed  to  defeat. 
The  Intelligencer  correspondent  feared  that  the  tides  of  popular 
enthusiasm  might  sweep  the  ship  of  state  from  the  old  estab- 
lished moorings  into  the  maelstrom  of  European  politics.  The 
masses  displayed  their  exuberance  in  parades,  serenaded  the 
Magyar  with  speeches,  and  a  large  number  made  contributions 
to  a  liberation  fund.2 

Shortly  after  Kossuth  and  his  party  had  settled  in  a  hotel, 
individuals  and  delegations  began  pouring  in  to  express  sympathy 
for  the  cause  associated  with  his  name.  To  all  he  responded  in  a 
remarkable  manner.  Indeed  the  superior  quality  of  his  diction 
together  with  the  Oriental  flourishes  he  used  account  in  some 
measure  for  the  great  personal  tribute  meted  out  to  him.**  M.  P. 
Fillmore,  the  President's  son  and  private  secretary,  expressed 
his  father's  desire  to  welcome  the  exile  at  the  seat  of  the  govern- 


*  The  reception  was  equalled  only  by  that  given  Dewey  on  his  return 
from  Manila,  writes  a  reliable  contemporary  of  both  events.    McClure,  A.  K., 

Recollections  of  a  Half  Century,  199. 

2  N.  Y.  Tribune,  8,  13  Dec.  1851;  Wash.  Union,  24  Dec.  1851;  Wash.  Intel- 
ligencer, 17  Dec.  1851;  Phila.  Sun.  Desp.,  7  Dec.  1851;  4 Harper's  Monthly,  265. 
Belmont  to  Buchanan,  6  Dec.  1851.     Buchanan  Mss. 
Byrsdall  to  Buchanan,  18  Dec.  1851.     Ibid. 

**  During  his  confinement  in  a  Hapsburg  prison  and  in  a  Turkish  fortress, 
Kossuth  had  capitalized  his  time  by  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  the  English 
language,  chiefly  from  the  Bible  and  Shakespeare. 


88  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

ment.  Disgruntled  by  the  acrimonious  Senatorial  debate, 
Kossuth  questioned  whether  he  would  go  to  Washington  at  all. 
Unless  Congress  voted  to  receive  him,  he  would  immediately 
return  to  Europe  without  accepting  any  more  American  hos- 
pitality. Ambng  the  other  prominent  callers  were  W.  H.  Stiles, 
late  Charg6  to  Austria,  Senator  Fish  of  New  York,  Governor 
Hunt  of  the  same  state,  and  Lt.  Governor  Lawrence  of  Rhode 
Island.  Towns,  large  and  small,  sent  representatives  laden 
with  portentous  resolutions  and  with  invitations  to  visit  them. 
To  the  Philadelphia  delegation  he  refused  to  say  whether  he 
would  go  beyond  New  York.  He  intimated  that  had  knowledge 
of  the  Congressional  proceedings  reached  him  before  he  left 
England  he  would  have  hesitated  about  coming  at  all.  Later, 
after  William  Hunter  an  attache  in  the  State  Department 
handed  him  the  formal  invitation  of  the  Senate  to  visit  it,  much 
of  the  bitterness  passed  away.3 

Organizations  and  societies  of  every  description  waited  on 
the  famous  revolutionist  with  bulky  addresses — some  written  in 
English,  others  in  German,  Spanish,  and  Hungarian.  Deputations 
appeared  from  the  various  evangelical  religious  bodies.  Nor 
did  the  educational  world  permit  the  occasion  to  pass  without 
some  demonstration  on  its  part.  Columbia  College  came  en 
masse,  while  President  King  identified  Kossuth  with  the  cause 
of  education  and  good  letters.  Yale  paid  similar  respects.  In 
case  another  revolution  should  prove  unsuccessful,  the  students 
of  the  Ballston  Law  School  agreed  to  provide  for  Kossuth's 
children.  The  New  York  Board  of  Education  sent  an  invitation 
to  a  banquet.4 

Divers  sorts  of  groups  phrased  their  sentiments  in  many  well- 
chosen  words.  The  Democrats  with  an  invitation  to  Tammany 
Hall,  and  the  Whigs    with  a  thousand  dollars,  called  to  voice 


'  Godwin  to  Sumner,  8  Dec.  1851.     Sumner  Mss. 

Fillmore  to  Webster,  16  Dec.  1851.    Webster  Mss. 

Phila.  No.  Am.,  11  Dec.  1851;  N.  Y.  Herald,  9  Dec.  1851;  N.  Y.  Tribune, 
9,  10  Dec.  1851.    Greeley  urged  Kossuth  to  overlook  the  debates  in  Congress. 

'Boston  Atlas,  12  Dec.  1851;  Liberator,  19  Dec.  1851;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  8-19 
Dec.  1851;  N.  Y.  Herald,  8-19  Dec.  1851. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  89 

their  sympathy.  The  New  England  Society  and  the  New  York 
Bar  adopted  resolutions  expressive  of  their  feelings  for  depressed 
Hungary.  The  Total  Abstinence  Society  sent  a  message  in  a 
similar  vein.  After  a  declaration  of  fellow-feeling,  a  colored 
delegation  announced  that  it  would  give  a  liberty  offering 
"even  though  it  may  be  but  the  widow's  mite."  A  situation 
pregnant  with  trouble  arose  when  a  committee  from  the  Amer- 
ican and  Foreign  Anti-Slavery  Society  presented  itself.  Fortu- 
nately the  spokesman  merely  voiced  sympathy  with  the  cause 
of  Hungary,  said  nothing  as  to  abolition,  and  explained  that 
the  visit  had  not  been  prompted  by  a  desire  to  connect  the  guest 
with  any  party  in  this  country.  Kossuth  lavishly  thanked  the 
committee  for  not  attempting  to  entangle  him  in  any  domestic 
issue.  He  hoped  that  others  would  exhibit  the  same  consideration.4 

Representatives  of  labor  likewise  obtained  interviews.  The 
Brotherhood  of  the  Union,  a  workingmen's  society,  and  the 
Workingmen's  Industrial  Congress,  a  radical  combination, 
offered  resolutions  of  sympathy.  The  Novelty  Iron  Works, 
Taussig's  Military  Leather  company,  the  watch  case  manu- 
facturers, the  cash  boys  from  Stewart's  store,  each  presented 
letters  of  approval  together  with  material  aid.  The  officers  and 
men  of  the  ship  Mississippi,  and  a  group  of  Mexican  war  volun- 
teers received  a  hearty  welcome.  Several  societies  admitted 
"the  lion  of  the  hour"  into  full  membership.  Quickly  his  name 
was  inscribed  on  the  rolls  of  the  American  Bible  Society,  the 
New  York  Typographical  Union,  and  the  Mercantile  Library. 
The  Philoclean  Society  of  Rutgers  College  extended  him  an 
honorary  membership,  while  the  Mechanics  Mutual  Benefit 
Society  eagerly  offered  a  life  insurance  policy.  An  enterprising 
artist  brought  a  picture  of  R.  J.  Walker,  which  led  Kossuth  to 
remark  that  if  everyone  in  the  United  States  entertained  the 
same  principles  as  that  gentleman  the  world  would  soon  be  free. 
Not  to  be  outdone,  a  composer  produced  a  piece  of  music  which 
he  called  the  "Kossuth  Welcome  Quick-Step."4 

Unfortunates  of  many  lands  made  themselves  known  to 
Kossuth.  The  Italian  Foresti,  a  friend  of  Mazzini,  was  followed 
by  Kahgegagabowh,  an  Indian  refugee.  Hungarians,  Cuban 
exiles,  Austrians,  Jews,  all  alike  paid  homage  to  the  champion 


90  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

of  political  and  religious  liberty.  Altogether,  groups  to  the 
number  of  forty,  in  ten  days,  caused  Kossuth  to  listen  and  respond 
to  their  divagations.  Well  might  the  claim  be  advanced  that 
New  York  exhibited  more  interest  in  this  European  character 
than  in  any  other  save  possibly  Lafayette.4 

While  these  deputations  continued  to  crowd  on  him  by  day,  the 
evenings  were  devoted  to  addresses  wherein  the  Magyar  defined 
his  mission.  In  a  series  of  formal  speeches  he  outlined  his  policy 
and  his  aims.  On  December  6,  1851,  Castle  Garden  resounded 
with  the  first  prepared  pronouncement.  England,  said  he, 
whose  fraternal  greeting  he  brought,  desired  an  alliance  with  the 
United  States  to  secure  to  every  nation  the  sovereign  right  to 
dispose  of  itself.  After  stating  that  he  would  not  have  left 
troubled  Europe,  save  only  to  give  warm  thanks  to  Congress  for 
his  liberation  from  Turkey,  he  declared  that  generous  act  a  mani- 
festation of  America's  resolution  to  throw  its  weight  into  the 
balance  where  the  fate  of  Europe  would  be  determined.  He 
desired  not  the  support  of  a  party  or  a  faction,  for  he  proposed  to 
abstain  from  domestic  affairs,  but  of  a  united  people.  "Within 
the  limit  of  your  laws,"  he  continued,  "  I  will  use  every  honest 
exertion  to  gain  your  operative  sympathy  and  your  financial, 
material,  and  political  aid  for  my  country's  freedom  and  inde- 
pendence." As  France  had  aided  the  colonists  three-quarters 
of  a  century  earlier,  so  he  wanted  the  United  States  to  succor 
Hungary.4 

Typical  newspapers  reacted  sharply  to  the  implications  of 
the  speech.  Though  the  editor  of  the  Herald  foresaw  some  modifi- 
cation of  the  foreign  policy,  he  denounced  the  Kossuth  program 
as  utterly  chimerical  and  impossible.  Even  the  Tribune,  a 
staunch  admirer  of  the  champion,  dissented  from  the  speech, 
and  affirmed  that  America  still  believed  in  the  old  policies  of 
neutrality  and  of  no  entangling  alliances.4 

Since  a  further  elaboration  of  policy  seemed  advisable,  Kos- 
suth supplied  the  need  in  a  splendid  attempt  before  a  distin- 
guished assemblage  which  included  Bancroft  and  Irving,  the 
historians,  Governor  Cleveland  of  Connecticut,  and  Congress- 
man Rantoul  of  Massachusetts.  Letters  from  many  public 
men  conveyed  their  regret  at  being  unavoidably  absent.    Web- 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  91 

ster's  note  contained  the  statement  that  the  distinguished  guest 
knew  the  government's  sympathy  for  him  as  was  shown  by  send- 
ing a  national  vessel  to  bring  him  from  Turkey.  Clay  wrote: 
"It  would  afford  me  great  satisfaction  to  be  able  to  unite  in  any 
demonstration  ...  to  that  .  .  .  gentleman."  In  his  speech, 
after  a  hurried  recital  of  the  reasons  why  the  United  States 
should  abandon  the  foreign  policy  of  Washington,  Kossuth 
enumerated  the  definite  things  he  wanted  America  to  do.  First, 
he  wanted  America  to  agree  that  the  Russian  intervention  into 
Hungarian  affairs  constituted  a  violation  of  international  law, 
which  if  repeated  would  not  be  regarded  indifferently;  second, 
Great  Britain  should  be  asked  to  unite  in  this  policy. 
Further,  he  advocated  that  meetings  be  held  to  declare 
American  approval  of  Hungarian  independence.  Lastly,  he 
desired  that  financial  aid  either  as  a  gift  or  as  a  loan  might  be 
forthcoming.  The  tremendous  applause  indicated  the  impres- 
sion made  by  the  speaker  on  his  audience,  and  when  Webb,  editor 
of  the  Courier  and  Enquirer,  and  a  man  favorably  disposed  toward 
Austria,  attempted  to  speak  in  opposition,  cries  and  coughs 
prevented  him.4 

These  speeches  contain  the  substance  of  the  more  than  five 
hundred  other  addresses  that  Kossuth  delivered  while  in  the 
United  States.  Thoroughly  conversant  with  the  hostility  to  him 
and  his  mission  at  the  national  capital,  he  hoped  to  arouse  a 
public  opinion  strong  enough  to  cause  his  opponents  to  alter 
their  convictions.  But  he  failed,  for  the  speeches  alienated 
many  who  had  hitherto  been  his  potent  supporters.  For  example, 
the  Washington  Union,  which  interpreted  the  vociferous  applause 
as  northern  approval  of  Kossuth's  program,  realized  the  political 
significance  of  the  reception.  Certainly  the  country  would  unite 
in  cordial  approval  of  the  Hungarian  cause  and  of  unhesitating 
condemnation  of  the  policy  which  crushed  it,  but  beyond  that 
point  the  United  States  would  not  budge.5 

Expressions  of  opinion  at  a  banquet  tendered  the  Hungarian 
by  the  New  York  Press  Association  again  evince  the  great  enthu- 
siasm for  his  cause.    The  company  included  such  powers  in  the 


6  Wash.  Union,  14  Dec.  1851. 


92  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

journalistic  world  as  Charles  A.  Dana,  Horace  Greeley,  Henry  J. 
Raymond,  and  Parke  Godwin,  also  Henry  Ward  Beecher,  a 
Rev.  Mr.  Brace,  recently  released  from  an  Austrian  dungeon, 
and  President  King  of  Columbia;  William  Cullen  Bryant 
presided.*  When  the  latter  read  a  short  curt  note  from  Webster 
declining  to  be  present,  a  storm  of  hisses  and  groans  arose  in  all 
parts  of  the  hall — a  movement  not  overlooked  at  Washington. 
In  his  oration,  Kossuth  praised  the  titanic  influence  and  size 
of  the  independent  American  press.  He  anticipated  its  generous 
aid  in  securing  the  formation  of  societies  to  collect  funds  to  be 
loaned  to  Hungary.  At  another  banquet,  given  by  the  New 
York  Bar,  Kossuth  addressed  the  assembly  in  a  like  fashion. 
Afterwards,  a  respected  Judge  Duer  pleaded  that  the  Hungarian's 
proposals  should  not  hastily  be  adopted  by  the  government. 
Mature  deliberation  should  precede  action.  Soon  after  the 
speech  ended,  the  disorder  became  so  great  that  the  chief  guest, 
vexed,  retired.6 

After  these  speeches,  America  understood  precisely  what 
Kossuth  wanted.  The  responses  must  have  confirmed  in  his 
mind  the  facts  that  although  he  made  a  great  popular  appeal, 
an  appreciable  element  of  the  conservative  class  opposed  his 
hopes.  His  plea  for  material  aid,  however,  met  with  a  rather 
generous  response.  Genin,  a  hatter,  (as  an  advertisement, 
claimed  a  competitor)  contributed  a  thousand  dollars  and 
expected  ninety-nine  other  men  to  do  likewise.  A  Mr.  O'Reilly 
offered  either  a  thousand  dollars  or  two  hundred  acres  of  land. 
Groups  of  workingmen  sent  in  respectable  sums.  From  Boston 
came  300  muskets,  to  which  a  man  from  Buffalo  adJed  ten. 
Even  members  of  the  Peace  Society  made  contributions.  Some 
real  sacrifices  were  made  for  the  cause  of  European  liberty. 
The  cash  boys  in  Stewart's  store  offered  five  dollars.  One  indi- 
vidual enclosed  four  dollars,  half  of  his  week's  wages;  another 
sent  three  dollars,  a  fifth  part  of  his  month's  pay.    On  one  day 


<N.  Y.  Tribune,  16  Dec.  1851;  N.  Y.  Herald,  17  Dec.  1851;  Wash.  Intelli- 
gencer, 18  Dec.  1851. 

Hudson,  F.,  Journalism  in  America. 

*  After  considering  the  men  in  attendance,  the  Herald  termed  it  an  abolition 
affair  and  alleged  that  that  faction  completely  controlled  the  refugee.  N.  Y, 
Herald,  17  Dec.  1851. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  93 

the  receipts  amounted  to  $2,497.07.  From  a  speech  delivered 
in  Beecher's  Plymouth  Church,  a  sum  variously  estimated  at 
from  $5,000  to  $12,000  was  added  to  the  fund.  Horace  Greeley 
who  furnished  $1,000  and  induced  the  WJiigs  to  give  a  similar 
amount,  becamfe  a  most  ardent  advocate  of  a  Hungarian  loan. 
He  urged  that  $1,000,000  be  raised  to  accompany  Kossuth  on 
his  return  to  Europe.  Accordingly  a  committee  with  George 
Bancroft  as  temporary  chairman  was  organized  to  push  the  loan. 
When  Hungarian  bonds  appeared,  Greeley  proposed  that  every 
man  purchase  at  least  a  day's  work  worth  and  that  some  should 
buy  a  week's  work  worth.  Material  aid,  wrote  a  correspondent, 
has  been  contributed  in  unexpected  abundance;  the  subscription 
totalled  $11,523.92.  A  hostile  writer  claimed  that  Kossuth  sent 
the  money  daily  to  the  bank  and  exchanged  it  for  gold  for  which 
he  had  "a  peculiar  fondness."7 

After  the  Senate  vote  of  invitation,  Kossuth  arranged  to  go 
to  the  national  capital.  His  departure  from  New  York  evoked  a 
series  of  expressions  from  the  newspapers.  "He  leaves  us,"  read 
the  Tribune,  "inspired  by  a  very  general  conviction  that  this 
country  both  could  and  should  do  something  decisive  in  behalf 
of  European  liberty.  He  has  taught  thousands  to  prize  the 
rich  blessings  of  civil  and  religious  liberty.  We  are  better 
citizens  and  better  Americans  for  having  seen  Louis  Kossuth." 
Another  journal  was  pleased  that  he  departed  for  the  South, 
away  from  the  malign  influences  that  surrounded  him  in  the 
metropolis.  In  its  New  Year  poem,  the  Herald  in  rapturous 
verse  reviewed  the  visit  of  the  celebrated  Magyar. 

"When  Kossuth  came  that  splendid  day 

Ah!  who  shall  e'er  forget 
When  first  upon  our  city's  soil 

His  wandering  feet  were  set 
The  scene  transcending  e'en  the  scene 

To  welcome  Lafayette. 


7  N.  Y.  Tribune,  IS,  18,  23  Dec.  1851,  4  Feb.  1852;   Wash.  Union,  24  Dec 
1851;  Boston  Atlas,  31  Dec.  1851. 


94  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Tis  gone  with  all  those  thrilling  scenes 

By  night,  and  day  by  day 
Of  honors  to  the  Magyar  Chief 

Thru  his  eventful  stay. 
They're  gone!    Their  moral,  their  effect 

Will  never  pass  away."8 

Philadelphia     received     "the     greatest     living     apostle     of 
human    liberty"    and    his    party    with    a    tumult    which    vied 
in   quality   and   quantity  with   that   in   New  York.      In  the 
former  city,  the  largest  throng    on    record    crowded    about 
Independence  Hall  that  it  might  touch  the  hem    of  the  gar- 
ment of  the  great  guest.    The  German  citizens  aroused  interest 
and  enthusiasm  with  a  monster  torchlight  parade.    At  a  recep- 
tion banquet,   George  M.   Dallas,   Polk's  Vice-President,   and 
United  States  Senators  Cooper  and  Cameron,  occupied  seats  on 
the  platform.     In  a  letter  to  the  committee,  Buchanan  agreed 
that  America  had  greater  sympathy  for  Hungary  than  for  any 
other  nation  save  possibly  Russia.     In  the  great  struggle  soon 
to  occur  he  hoped  that  Hungary  "under  the  guidance  of  her 
patriotic,  enlightened  Governor"  might  emerge  "a  free,  an  inde- 
pendent and  a  powerful  republic."    A  series  of  resolutions  known 
as   the   Harrisburg   Resolutions,   which   endorsed   the   Kossuth 
program  as  enunciated  in  his  New  York  speeches,  was  approved 
amidst  wild  acclamation.     Dissident  voices  secured  little  atten- 
tion.     Morton    McMichael,   a    Whig   stalwart,    tried   to   warn 
against  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  government  in  the  affairs 
of  Hungary,  and  Major-General  Patterson's  derogatory  remarks 
were  drowned  in  turbulent  clamor.    On  another  occasion,  Rev. 
John  Chambers,  leader  of  the  evangelical  clergy,  invoked  divine 
blessing  on  the    Hungarian's  cause.      Material    aid    appeared 
in  appreciable  quantities.     Houses  of  entertainment  tendered 
the  receipts  from  benefit  performances.    The  soft  felt  hat  intro- 
duced by  the  Hungarian  "Beau  Brummel"  soon  became  the 
accepted  style  and  won  a  popularity  never  lost.9 


*N.  Y.  Tribune,  22  Dec.  1851;  Wash.  Union,  24,  27  Dec.  1851;  N.  Y. 
Herald,  1  Jan.  1852. 

9  Phila.  Ledger,  26-29  Dec.  1851,  2  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  25  Dec.  1851; 
Wash.  Union,  14  Jan.  1852;  Phila.  Sun.  Despatch,  28  Dec.  1851. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  95 

Baltimore  repeated  the  cordiality  of  New  York  and  Philadel- 
phia. Through  the  sheer  eloquence  of  the  orator  thousands  more 
were  drawn  into  accord  with  Kossuth's  views.  Numerous 
endorsements  were  given  the  Harrisburg  Resolutions.  Once 
more  crowds  battled  the  inclement  December  weather  in  order 
to  glimpse  the  hero.  A  Hebrew  lodge  presented  a  banner  con- 
taining likenesses  of  Moses,  Washington,  and  Kossuth.  An 
enterprising  druggist  heralded  a  new  mixture  guaranteed  to 
conquer  "Kossuth  Grippe"  which  hundreds  developed  from 
exposure.  To  this  day,  Baltimoreans  speak  in  glowing  terms 
of  a  dainty  pastry  concoction,  Kossuth  cake,  whose  origin 
coincides  with  the  memorable  visit.  Kossuth  cigars  still  choke 
uninformed  speculators.10 

By  the  time  Kossuth  reached  the  capital  city,  the  probability 
of  American  desertion  of  the  foreign  policy  enjoined  by  Wash- 
ington had  begun  to  grow  faint.  Public  men,  statesmen  and 
politicians  alike,  feared  the  difficulties  the  visit  might  create 
with  Austria.  Yet  the  latter  group  sedulously  utilized  Kossuth, 
in  so  far  as  it  could,  for  personal  or  partisan  ends.  Extensive 
preparations  had  been  made  to  receive  the  guest  and  his  approach 
caused  a  great  stir.  The  House,  Administration,  diplomatic  and 
social  circles,  stand  aghast  with  fear  and  trembling,  wrote  the 
Washington  correspondent  of  the  Tribune.  Nurses  frightened 
their  children  to  sleep  with  the  Hungarian  name.  Cognizant 
of  the  potential  strength  in  the  movement  and  wishing  to  do 
nothing  impolitic,  Webster,  Secretary  of  State,  faced  the  visit 
with  consternation.  He  knew  that  his  chances  for  the  forth- 
coming presidential  nomination  and  ultimate  election  might 
hinge  on  his  manoeuvers  during  Kossuth's  stay  in  Washington. 
Quite  embarrassed,  he  confessed  himself  at  a  loss  to  know  just 
what  to  do  or  say.  He  would  conduct  himself  with  caution  so 
as  to  keep  clear  of  Scylla  and  Charybdis.  He  would  draw  a  sharp 
line  of  demarcation  between  his  official  course  of  action  and  his 
procedure  as  a  private  citizen.  Officially,  he  proposed  to  follow 
the  established  policy,  and  in  new  exigencies  to  be  guided  by  the 


i°  Baltimore  Patriot,  29  Dec.  1851;    Wash.   Union,  31  Dec.  1851;    N.   Y. 
Tribune,  29-30  Dec.  1851;  Phila.  Ledger,  29  Dec.  1851. 


96  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

English  example.  A  haunting  fear  ran  through  his  mind  that 
Democratic  politicians  might  use  this  opportunity  to  bring  the 
country  to  the  doctrine  and  practice  of  intervention.  Influenced 
by  this  dread,  he  wrote  the  Minister  in  England,  "I  am  sure 
you  see,  and  I  wish  others  might  see  the  expediency  and  import- 
ance of  settling  everything  connected  with  England  without 
delay."" 

The  Kossuth  party  reached  Washington  December  30,  1851, 
and  immediately  Seward  and  Shields,  of  the  Senatorial  recep- 
tion committee,  took  it  in  charge.  Soon  after  the  arrival, 
Webster  called  and  indicated  that  the  President  desired  to  meet 
the  distinguished  guest  on  the  morrow.*  Close  on  the  heels  of 
the  Secretary  of  State  came  a  delegation  from  the  famous  Jackson 
Democratic  Association  to  evince  an  interest  in  the  European 
refugees.  Next  day,  Fillmore  received  Kossuth  at  the  White 
House." 

The  presidential  reception  revealed  to  the  Magyar  the  atti- 
tude of  the  government  toward  his  pleas.  Kossuth,  Seward, 
Shields,  and  three  Cabinet  officers  composed  the  party.  Though 
Webster  preferred  to  have  the  Senate  committee  present  the 
guest,  the  dignity  fell  upon  him.  Straightway  Kossuth  read  a 
short  address  which  conveyed  his  gratitude  for  the  hearty  wel- 
come accorded  him  by  the  nation.    Then  he  continued, 

"I  stand  before  your  Excellency  a  living  protestation  against  the  violence 
of  foreign  interference  oppressing  the  sovereign  right  of  nations  to  regulate 
their  own  domestic  concerns.  .  .  .  May  I  be  allowed  to  take  it  for  an 
augury  of  better  times  that  in  landing  on  the  happy  shores  of  this  glorious 
republic,  I  landed  in  a  free  and  powerful  country  whose  honored  magistrate 
proclaims  to  the  world  that  this  country  cannot  remain  indifferent  when  the 


11  N.  Y.  Tribune,  31  Dec.  1851,  5  Jan.  1852;   N.  Y.  Herald,  4  Dec.  1851. 

Webster  to  Paige,  25  Dec.  1851,  Webster,  F.,  Private  Corres.,  II,  499. 

Webster  to  Haven,  23  Dec.  1851,  Ibid.,  II,  497. 

Webster  to  Lawrence,  29  Dec.  1851,  Webster  Works,  National  Ed.,  IV,  633. 

*  After  his  visit,  Webster  wrote  to  a  friend,  "a  gentleman  .  .  .  hand- 
some .  .  .  intellectual  .  .  dignified,  amiable  and  graceful  in 
his  manners,"  but  added,  "I  shall  treat  him  with  all  personal  and  individual 
respect  but  if  he  should  speak  to  me  of  the  policy  of  intervention  I  shali  have 
ears  more  deaf  than  adders."  Webster  to  Blatchford,  30  Dec.  1851,  Webster, 
F.,  Priv.  Corres.,  II,  501. 

"  Wash.  Union,  31  Dec.  1851. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  97 

strong  arm  of  a  foreign  power  is  invoked  to  stifle  public  sentiment  and  repress 
the  spirit  of  freedom  in  any  country?"13 

The  character  of  the  address  took  the  President  unawares. 
It  had  been  agreed  beforehand  that  Kossuth  should  make  no 
allusion  to  the  subject  of  intervention.  On  the  spur  of  the 
moment,  then,  Fillmore  happily  replied.    In  part  he  said, 

"As  an  individual  I  sympathized  deeply  with  you  in  the  struggle  for  the 
independence  and  freedom  of  your  native  land.  The  American  people  can 
never  be  indifferent  to  such  a  contest;  but  our  policy  as  a  nation  in  this  respect 
has  been  uniform  from  the  commencement  of  our  Government;  and  my  views 
as  the  Chief  Magistrate  of  this  nation  are  fully  and  freely  expressed  in  my 
recent  message  to  Congress.  They  are  the  same  whether  speaking  to  Congress 
here  or  to  the  nations  of  Europe.  Should  your  country  be  restored  to  inde- 
pendence and  freedom  I  should  then  wish  you  ...  a  restoration  to  your 
native  land,  but  should  that  never  happen,  I  can  only  repeat  my  welcome  to 
you  and  your  companions  here  and  pray  that  God's  blessing  may  rest  upon  you 
wherever  you  may  cast  your  lot." 

The  interview  lasted  only  twenty  mintues  but  that  time  was 
ample  to  convince  Kossuth  that  American  official  interest  in 
European  liberty  differed  widely  from  that  suggested  by  the 
popular  demonstrations.  The  Magyar's  face  registered  extreme 
disappointment  as  he  left  the  reception  room.  Well  pleased  with 
the  presidential  response,  Webster  wrote, 

"Sympathy,  personal  respect  and  kindness,  but  no  departure  from  our 
established  policy."14 

The  newspapers  reacted  to  this  speech  in  their  usual  manner. 
Journals  which  formerly  had  supported  the  European  refugee 
critically  attacked  the  presidential  reply.  The  Union  said, 
"the  President  has  fallen  short  of  the  wishes  entertained  by  the 


"  N.  Y.  Tribune,  5  Jan.  1852. 

14  Fillmore's  Speech,  10  Buff.  Hist.  Soc.  Proceedings,  426. 
Butler,   Reminiscences  of  Daniel  Webster,   in  Moore,   Digest   International 
Law,  VI,  53. 
Webster  to  Blatchford,  31  Dec.  1851,  Webster,  F.,  Private  Corres.,  II,  501. 
N.  Y.  Herald,  1  Jan.  1852. 


98  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

people  of  the  country"  as  to  what  was  due  to  the  representative 
of  the  principle  involved  in  the  Hungarian  struggle.  He  should 
have  assured  the  guest  of  our  disapprobation  as  a  government 
of  the  principle  on  which  Russia  acted.  Another  commented 
on  the  executive  reception  as  not  "what  the  dignity,  the  honor 
and  the  position  of  the  country  demanded."  Through  material 
aid,  the  people  had  concretely  exhibited  their  sympathy,  but 
the  frigid  executive  welcome  was  unmanly.  The  whole  affair 
revealed  a  vacillating  policy  toward  European  monarchies. 
Papers  that  had  consistently  opposed  Kossuth's  audacious 
proposals  approved  Fillmore's  action.  The  Herald  suggested 
that  despite  the  personal  sympathy  of  the  President  with  the 
cause,  as  an  official,  he  needed  to  be  guided  strictly  by  the  pro- 
ceedings of  Congress.  In  spite  of  the  great  excitement,  the 
wisdom  of  Washington  had  prevailed  upon  the  President  and  had 
led  him  to  remain  loyal  to  the  well-established  policy.  Realizing 
that  Kossuth's  anticipations  had  been  severely  dampened  by 
Fillmore's  reply,  the  North  American  declared  that  Kossuth  had 
received  just  the  reply  his  speech  warranted.15 

Chagrined  over  the  turn  of  events,  Kossuth  remained  sulky 
if  not  unmannerly  throughout  the  rest  of  his  stay  in  Washington. 
On  New  Year's  Day,  he  called  on  Secretary  and  Mrs.  Webster 
and  when  the  latter  attempted  to  open  conversation  with  him 
by  remarking  on  the  brightness  of  the  day,  he  replied  that  the 
weather  had  no  interest  for  him,  that  "his  mind  was  absorbed  in 
painful  thoughts  about  his  country."  Two  days  later,  the  Presi- 
dent gave  a  dinner  in  honor  of  Kossuth  with  General  Scott, 
Commodore  Morris,  Ampere,  the  noted  French  savant,  and 
several  Cabinet  officers  in  attendance.  During  the  gathering  one 
could  not  fail  to  notice  the  stately  constrainment  of  the  honored 
one.  Fillmore  remarked  that  the  rebuff  at  his  presentation 
explained  "the  moody  Hamlet"  attitude.16  |g||f 

Having  come  to  Washington  at  the  behest  of  the  Senate,  to 


«  Wash.  Union,  1  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Herald,  1  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune, 
8  Jan.  1852;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  5  Jan.  1852;  St.  Louis  Rep.,  10  Jan.  1852. 

16  Butler,  Reminiscences  of  Daniel  Webster,  in  Moore,  Digest  International 
Law,  VI,  52-53. 

Phila.  No.  Am.,  5,  6  Jan.  1852. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  99 

which  was  added  an  invitation  to  visit  the  House,  Kossuth  next 
called  on  these  bodies.  Attired  in  military  costume,  accom- 
panied by  a  share  of  his  retinue,  and  escorted  by  Senators 
Shields,  Seward,  and  Cass,  the  Magyar  was  introduced  to  the 
Senate  in  the  selfsame  words  used  on  presenting  Lafayette. 
The  crowded  galleries  offered  no  applause.  Temporary  adjourn- 
ment gave  every  Senator  the  opportunity  to  greet  the  Hungarian 
chief.  The  whole  proceeding  reflected  favorably  upon  the  dignity 
and  character  of  the  Senate.  Much  the  same  ceremony  pre- 
vailed in  the  House,  save  that  Kossuth  said:  "The  legislative 
authorities  of  this  great  republic  bestow  the  highest  honors 
upon  a  persecuted  exile  not  conspicuous  for  glory  .  .  .  but 
engaged  in  a  just  cause.  There  is  a  triumph  of  republican 
principles  in  this  fact."  At  best,  the  receptions  appeared  formal, 
matter-of-fact  and  cold,  yet  the  Tribune  believed  the  whole 
affair  signified  a  step  forward  as  a  nation,  for  in  itself,  the  recep- 
tion by  both  branches  of  Congress  constituted  a  protest  on  the 
part  of  the  country  against  Austrian  oppression  and  Russian 
interference.17 

In  a  letter  to  King,  President  of  the  Senate,  expressing  his 
appreciation  for  the  welcome,  Kossuth  made  clear  that  he  never 
desired  the  United  States  "to  put  in  jeopardy  its  own  welfare 
and  prosperity  for  the  sake  of  Hungary,"  but  he  hoped  some 
pronouncement  on  the  international  law  at  stake  in  the  case  would 
be  made  by  the  Senate.  When  the  Committee  on  Printing 
reported  in  favor  of  printing  this  letter  an  animated  debate 
ensued.  Once  more  the  Senate  expressed  its  varying  attitude 
toward  the  Kossuth  pleas.  Ultimately  by  a  vote  of  only  21-20 
the  Senate  granted  the  committee's  request.18 

A  group  of  men  from  each  House  arranged  a  public  dinner 
for  the  Hungarian  champion.  The  active  managers  included 
Representatives  Clingman,  North  Carolina  Whig,  and  Mann„ 
Massachusetts  Free  Soiler,  and  Senator  Gwin,  California  Demo- 


17  Wash.  Union,  6  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  14  Jan.  1852. 
32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  199,  225. 

18  N.  Y.  Tribune,  20  Feb.  1852;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  27  Feb.  1852. 
32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Sen.  miscell.  doc.,  39. 

32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Sen.  Jol.,  213. 


100 


Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 


crat.  Kossuth  accepted  the  invitation  for  January  7,  and  prom- 
ised the  committee  that  he  would  not  then  discuss  the  subject 
of  intervention.  Three  hundred  guests  gathered  to  meet  and 
hear  the  great  orator.  It  was  by  far  the  most  illustrious  assem- 
blage that  greeted  him  during  his  visit.  Cabinet  members, 
Senators,  and  Representatives,  together  with  a  sprinkling  of  the 
judiciary  put  in  their  appearance.  Senator  King  presided  with 
Kossuth  and  Webster  at  either  side.  Responding  to  a  toast  to 
the  President,  Webster  assured  the  company  that  the  President 
was  firmly  attached  "to  the  great  principles  of  political  and 
religious  liberty  and  national  independence"  which  the  guest 
represented.  Kossuth,  in  turn,  delivered  a  "well  wrought  chap- 
ter of  political  philosophy"  in  which  he  referred  to  the  aid  the 
United  States  had  received  from  France.  Abiding  by  his  agree- 
ment, no  mention  was  made  of  intervention.  Touches  of  pathos 
added  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  speech  which  was  generally 
acknowledged  as  among  the  most  successful  efforts  he  made  in 
America.  During  the  speech  Seward  shocked  his  neighbor  by 
his  excessive  applause  with  hands  and  feet,  while  Webster 
remained  as  motionless  as  a  Sphinx.  Presently  Webster  had  an 
opportunity  to  give  free  rein  to  his  convictions.19 

The  Secretary  of  State  had  hesitated  about  attending  the 
banquet  and  indeed  came  only  to  prevent  the  statement  being 
made  that  no  member  of  the  administration  would  pay  Kossuth 
the  respect  of  attendance.  Such  a  declaration  would  provoke 
popular  attack  especially  in  the  interior.  In  a  dignified  but 
elaborate  speech  Webster  declared  the  welcome  would  most 
certainly  have  an  influence  across  the  water.  Real  human  liberty 
and  human  rights  were  everywhere  gaining  the  ascendancy. 
The  Hiilsemann  letter  written  in  the  free  air  of  New  Hampshire 
reflected  his  convictions  on  these  principles.  With  a  flourish 
he  concluded,  "Hungarian  Independence,  Hungarian  control 
of  her  own  destinies — Hungary  a  distinct  nationality  among 
the  nations  of  Europe."     This  speech,  though  it  fell  heavily 


"  Phila.  No.  Am.,  1,  2,  5,  10  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  8  Jan.  1852. 
Butler,  Reminiscences  of  Daniel  Webster,  in  Moore,  Digest  International 
Law,  VI,  54. 
Corwin  to  Crittenden,  8  Jan.  1852.     Crittenden  Mss. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  101 

on  the  ears  of  the  audience,  contained  opinions  very  different 
from  those  he  had  expressed  earlier  in  the  evening  in  reply  to  the 
President's  toast.*  Certainly  the  effect  of  the  message  across  the 
Atlantic  would  arise  frOm  who  said  it  rather  that  what  was 
said.**  Now  the  Tribune  exonerated  Webster  from  any  share  in 
the  shabby  treatment  meted  out  to  the  guest  by  the  executive 
branch  of  the  government.  Other  papers  considered  the  speech 
a  fair  bid  for  the  German  vote.  Many  Hungarian  enthusiasts, 
however,  complained  that  Webster  had  not  gone  far  enough; 
a  grievance  to  which  he  replied,  by  stating  that  he  wanted  to 
observe  consistency  with  other  speeches,  and  though  conserva- 
tive, he  wanted  to  guard  against  the  charge,  by  his  political 
opponents,  of  coolness  in  the  cause  of  liberty.  Last,  but  not 
least,  he  wished  to  preserve  peace  with  other  governments.20 

After  Webster,  other  presidential  aspirants  at  the  banquet 
sought  to  record  their  opinions  on  European  liberty  and  the  true 
American  policy  in  relation  to  it.  Unprepared  for  a  speech, 
Douglas  wanted  the  United  States  to  remain  aloof  in  case  of  a 
new  Hungarian  struggle  for  freedom  until  Russia  intervened; 
then  the  country  should  decide  its  mode  of  action.  This  attitude 
pleased  the  South,  and  after  a  peculiarly  happy  allusion  to  the 
unhappy  Irish,  he  felt  he  had  satisfied  two  elements  of  the  na- 
tion. Cass,  who  had  lost  the  Presidential  election  in  1848, 
went  a  step  in  advance  of  Douglas  and  favored  intervention 
"to  sustain  the  great  national  law  which  prescribed  that  one 
power  should  not  interfere  with  the  domestic  concerns  of 
another."  He  said  nothing,  however,  about  practical  inter- 
vention. By  the  time  Cass  finished,  the  wine  had  flowed  quite 
freely  and  the  reception  of  his  speech  reminded  one  guest  of 


*  One  contemporary  explains  the  change  thus:  In  the  first  speech  Webster 
carefully  guarded  his  remarks  "but  later  in  the  evening  when  the  champagne 
had  flowed  freely,  he  indulged  in  what  appeared  to  be  his  impromptu  indi- 
vidual opinions,  but  he  unluckily  dropped  at  his  seat  a  slip  of  paper,  on  which 
his  gushing  statements  had  been  carefully  written  out. "  Poore,  B.  P.,  Perley's 
Reminiscences,    404. 

**  A  study  of  the  Austrian  reaction  to  Webster's  speech  has  been  made  by 
Curti,  op.  ciU,  184. 

20  Webster  to  Fillmore,  7  Jan.  1852,  Webster,  F.,  Priv.  Corres.,  II,  503. 

N.  Y.  Tribune,  12,  14  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Herald,  10  Jan.  1852;  New  Orleans 
Picayune,  18  Jan.  1852. 

Bird  to  Clayton,  12  Jan.  1852.     Clayton  Mss. 


102  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

"  nothing  but  a  revival  at  a  Methodist  camp  meeting  in  full 
blaze/ '  The  fervor  continued  unabated  while  Seward  announced 
himself  in  accord  with  Cass.  General  Houston  left  the  room  so 
as  to  avoid  being  called  on  to  speak.*  The  Congressional  ban- 
quet had  thus  resolved  itself  into  an  occasion  for  political  stump 
speeches.  Prestige  and  votes  loomed  larger  in  the  eyes  of  these 
politicians  than  any  abstract  doctrine  of  human  liberty  for 
Europe.21 

The  reception  accorded  the  distinguished  Magyar  had  a 
distinct  reaction  in  the  chancelleries  of  Europe.  McCurdy 
awaited  notice  from  the  Austrian  authorities  that  diplomatic 
relations  had  been  severed.  Nevertheless,  the  customary 
diplomatic  civilities  were  accorded  him.  Austria  laid  the 
blame  for  the  misunderstanding  with  the  United  States  at  the 
door  of  Webster.  In  Berlin,  Barnard  recognized  that  a  distinct 
change  had  occurred  in  the  relationships  between  the  Austrian 
Minister  there  and  himself.  This  attitude  was  assumed  because 
of  the  deep  resentment  Austria  felt  over  the  character  of  the 
reception  accorded  her  subject  revolutionists.  When  news 
of  Fillmore's  reaffirmation  of  Washington's  policy  reached 
Prussia,  Barnard  observed  that  a  better  feeling  towards  the 
United  States  unmistakably  prevailed.  From  St.  Petersburg 
too,  the  Minister  wrote  of  the  coldness  of  the  Russian  cabinet. 
The  speeches  of  Kossuth  against  the  Czar  had  struck  home. 
At  any  moment,  the  Minister  expected  an  official  complaint 
over  the  Kossuth  affair.  He  noticed  an  animus  on  the  part  of 
the  Austrian  representative  at  the  court  of  the  Romanoffs.22 

Another  angle  of  the  story  which  indicates  the  interest  of 


*  General  W.  S.  Scott,  a  candidate  for  the  Whig  nomination  for  the  Presi- 
dency, had  gone  to  Richmond  to  escape  the  gathering.      Poore,  B.  P.,  Perley's 

J^fttWl/WLSCBTlfP^     404* 

21  N.  Y.  Herald,  10  Jan.  1852;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  10  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune, 
9,  12  Jan.  1852;  New  Orleans  Picayune,  18  Jan.  1852. 

22  McCurdy  to  Webster,  12  Jan.  1852,  2,  27  Mch.  1852,  24  Jl.  1852,  3  Oct. 
1852,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Austria,  III. 

Barnard  to  Webster,  10  Feb.  1852,  1  Mch.  1852,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Prussia,  VII. 
Brown,  N.  S.  to  Webster,  28  Jan.  1852,  29  Feb.  1852,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Russia, 
XV. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  103 

America  in  the  revolutionists  is  to  be  seen  in  the  activities  of 
the  government  with  respect  of  Kossuth's  family  in  Europe. 
McCurdy  informed  Webster  that  two  of  Kossuth's  sisters  had 
been  imprisoned  while  other  relatives  suffered  for  lack  of  money. 
He  wanted  funds  sent  him  that  he  might  aid  the  unfortunates. 
Webster  showed  the  letter  to  Kossuth.  The  latter  requested 
the  Secretary  to  instruct  McCurdy  to  protect  these  relatives. 
Webster  agreed  to  the  request  with  the  understanding  that  the 
Charge  should  have  due  regard  for  his  official  position  in  any 
action  he  might  undertake.  Kossuth  handed  Webster  a  bill 
on  London  for  $500  to  be  used  to  aid  his  sisters.  Fearing  that 
the  letter  containing  the  money  might  be  opened  in  Austria, 
Webster  transmitted  it  to  Barnard,  the  Minister  at  Berlin,  who 
despatched  his  secretary,  Fay,  with  the  letter  and  the  bill  to 
McCurdy.  When  confirming  receipt  of  the  message,  McCurdy 
informed  Webster  that  the  sisters  remained  imprisoned  and  that 
nothing  could  be  done  to  alleviate  their  condition.  With  no 
attempt  at  concealment  from  the  Austrian  government,  he  pro- 
posed to  hand  the  money  in  small  sums  directly  to  Kossuth's 
mother.  After  some  difficulty  and  delay,  he  succeeded  in  making 
the  necessary  arrangements,  whereby  sixty  florins  a  week  were 
turned  over  to  her.  To  prevent  any  erroneous  interpretation  of  his 
activity,  a  copy  of  every  note  sent  her  was  dispatched  to  the 
Austrian  government.  McCurdy  later  became  the  intermediary 
for  the  transmission  of  letters  from  the  sisters  to  Kossuth.  Upon 
their  release  from  prison  they  intended  to  quit  Austria  and  seek 
the  hospitable  shores  of  America.23 

During  the  remainder  of  his  stay  in  Washington,  Kossuth 
spent  his  time  in  attendance  on  social  functions  and  in  receiving 
delegations  from  various  parts  of  the  Union.  After  a  tremen- 
dous intramural  struggle,  the  Jackson  Democratic  Association 
decided  to  invite  him  to  speak  at  their  big  annual  celebration. 
The  banquet  surpassed  in  brilliance  and  decorum  the  Congres- 


23  McCurdy  to  Webster,  13  Dec.  1851,  30  Jan.  1852,  2,  27  Mch.  1852,  10 
Ap.  1852,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Austria,  III. 

Webster  to  McCurdy,  5  Jan.  1852,  Ibid.,  Inst.,  Austria,  I. 
Webster  to  Barnard,  6  Jan.  1852,  Ibid.,  Inst.,  Prussia,  XIV. 


104  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

sional  affair.  In  his  letter  of  regret  to  the  committee,  John 
Tyler  prophesied  that  the  time  approached  when  all  oppressed 
nations  would  bring  their  pleas  to  the  American  Senate  and 
receive  justice  even  as  they  had  done  in  ancient  Rome.  Kossuth 
sounded  the  keynote  for  the  other  speeches  when  he  pleaded  that 
the  Association  unite  with  him  in  favor  of  intervention.  Speakers, 
one  after  another,  affirmed  their  allegiance  to  the  cause.  With 
more  vigor  than  previously,  Cass  maintained  that  the  despotic 
powers  of  Europe  had  in  their  destruction  of  Hungary  offended 
against  all  recognized  laws  of  nations.  "I  am  willing,"  said  he, 
"as  a  member  of  Congress  to  pass  a  declaration  tomorrow  in 
the  name  of  the  American  people"  maintaining  that  every 
independent  nation  under  heaven  has  a  right  to  establish  just 
such  a  government  as  it  pleases.  Douglas  advocated  a  more 
progressive  foreign  program.  "I  think  it  is  time  America  had  a 
foreign  policy — a  policy  predicated  upon  a  true  interpretation 
of  the  law  of  nations  ...  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the 
age."  In  a  kindred  vein,  A.  J.  Donelson,  then  editor  of  the 
Washington  Union,  trusted  that  Kossuth  might  return  to 
Europe  bearing  glad  tidings  "as  the  inspired  John  when  he 
announced  the  advent  of  our  Saviour."  Opposition  papers 
interpreted  the  meeting  as  a  further  indication  of  the  Democracy's 
attempt  to  capture  the  Kossuth  enthusiasm  for  purposes  of  the 
approaching  election.  On  the  other  hand,  important  Democratic 
journals  repeated  their  antagonism  to  anything  savoring  of 
intervention.24 

Senators  and  Congressmen  galore  called  on  the  distinguished 
exile.  One  congressional  delegation  urged  on  Kossuth  the 
necessity  of  ridding  himself  of  Seward  and  his  clique  if  he  expected 
a  welcome  in  the  South.  Senator  Truman  Smith,  an  adminis- 
tration leader,  during  his  call  declared,  that  the  Hungarian  was 
"de  jure"  if  not  "de  facto"  the  Governor  of  Hungary.  With 
Senator  Cooper,  a  Pennsylvania  Whig,  came  a  set  of  resolutions 
favorable  to  Kossuth  which,  when  presented,  led  the  recipient 


24  Blair,  F.  P.  to  Van  Buren,  1,  9  Jan.  1852.    Van  Buren  Mss. 
Proceedings  at  the  Banquet  of  the  Jackson  Democratic  Association,  1852. 
N.  Y.  Tribune,  9  Jan.  1852;  Richmond  Whig,  8  Jan.  1852;   Richmond  En- 
quirer, 13  Jan.  1852. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  105 

to  deliver  a  panegyric  on  this  State  which  had  become  "a  splen- 
did star  in  the  dark  night"  of  his  course.  The  Magyar  assured 
an  Ohio  delegation  that  he  would  tour  the  West  before  his  return 
to  Europe.25 

Other  public  men  and  individuals  of  prominence  expressed 
their  opinions  on  the  mission  and  its  purport.  Clayton,  ex-Sec- 
retary of  State,  went  "with  Kossuth  fully."  But  he  represented 
a  minority.  Houston  savagely  denounced  the  program  of  aid 
the  Magyar  wanted.  Senator  J.  M.  Mason  regarded  the  Hun- 
garian as  a  common  impostor.  "Kossuth  errs,"  wrote  Sumner, 
"all  err  who  ask  any  intervention  by  the  government  .  .  . 
the  government  cannot  act  .  .  .  Enthusiast  for  freedom  I  am 
for  every  thing  practical  but  this  is  not  so."  "Cover  the  Magyar 
with  flowers  .  .  .  Serenade  him  with  eloquence  and  let  him  go 
home  alone  if  he  will  not  live  here,"  thought  Rufus  Choate.*6 

Undoubtedly  of  greater  importance  than  that  of  any  other 
man  was  the  utterance  of  the  feeble  yet  influential  Clay.  After 
several  unsuccessful  attempts,  Kossuth  accompanied  by  Cass 
secured  an  interview  with  the  veteran  Kentucky  legislator. 
Earlier,  Clay  had  praised  Fillmore's  reply  at  the  time  of  the 
famous  reception,  and  now  he  re-expressed  in  unequivocal 
terms  his  attitude  on  the  subject  of  intervention.  War,  he 
explained,  would  probably  result  from  our  giving  aid  to  Hungary, 
and  in  case  of  war  America  could  do  nothing  on  land  and  little 
on  water.  Having  abandoned  non-interference  Europe  would 
be  justified  in  turning  on  the  United  States  and  terrible  conse- 
quences might  ensue.  Affected  by  the  recent  coup  d'etat  of 
Louis  Napoleon  in  France,  Clay  despaired  of  liberty  and  inde- 
pendence for  Europe.  Therefore  America's  policy  should  be  to 
keep  "our  lamp  brightly  burning  on  this  western  shore  as  a  light 
to  all  nations"  rather  than  "to  hazard  its  utter  extinction  amid 


26  N.  Y.  Tribune,  3,  5  Jan.  1852;   N.  Y.  Herald,  3  Jan.  1852;    Wash.  Union, 
10  Jan.  1852. 
26  Clayton  to  Bird,  20  Dec.  1851.     Bird  Mss. 
Crane,  S.  P.,  Life  of  Samuel  Houston,  210. 
Mason,  V.,  Life  of  J.  M.  Mason,  94. 
Bigelow,  J.,  Retrospections,  I,  123. 

Choate  to  Sumner,  29  Dec.  1851,  Sumner's  Works,  III,  3. 
Wash.  Union,  23  Dec.  1851 


106  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

the  ruins  of  fallen  and  falling  republics  of  Europe."  Somewhat 
stunned,  Kossuth  turned  the  conversation  into  general  channels 
and  soon  after,  with  great  emotion,  the  celebrated  leaders 
separated.  It  is  difficult  to  overestimate  the  influence  of  this, 
the  last  public  counsel  issuing  from  Clay's  lips.*  Later,  during  a 
speech  at  Louisville,  Kossuth  made  an  unhappy  reference  to 
the  position  of  Clay  with  respect  of  intervention  which  produced 
a  very  unfavorable  reaction  to  the  Hungarian  cause.27 

It  remains  but  to  note  the  dispute  over  payment  of  the  debt 
created  by  Kossuth's  stay  in  Washington.  Seward  advocated  that 
a  sum  not  to  exceed  $5,000  be  appropriated  from  the  Senate  con- 
tingent fund.  An  inspired  debate  ensued  in  which  some  members 
called  for  an  itemized  account  of  the  expenses  and  others  objected 
to  paying  for  the  retainers  that  accompanied  the  Hungarian. 
Fearing  that  Seward  would  gain  prestige  by  the  passage  of  the 
measure,  Cass  proposed  a  joint  resolution  to  meet  the  situation. 
Eventually  the  Seward  bill  passed  (31-6)  with  Cass  in  the  nega- 
tive. His  action  marks  him  as  a  straddler  if  not  a  convert  to  the 
opposition  camp,  said  one  journal.28 


*"One  blast  upon  that  bugle  horn  were  worth  a  thousand  men.  Let 
Mr.  Clay  get  to  the  Senate  and  intervention  will  be  a  dead  horse.  He  will 
wither  it  with  the  fiery  breath  of  his  nostrils.  He  will  by  the  force  of  his  logic 
and  eloquence  cut  it  up  by  the  roots  in  a  thousand  localities  where  it  is  now 
free  and  flourishing."    N.  Y.  Tribune,  4  Feb.  1852. 

27  Colton,  C.  C,  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  III,  221. 

Blair,  F.  P.  to  Van  Buren,  11  Jan.  1852.     Van  Buren  Mss. 

Phila.  No.  Am.,  5  Jan.  1852;   St.  Louis  Republican,  14  Jan.  1852,  4  Feb. 
1852;  Wash.  Intelligencer,  20  Mch.  1852;   15  Am.  Rev.,  375. 
28  32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  717-9,  1692.     N.  Y.  Tribune,  12  Mch.  1852. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  107 


VIII 
The  Grand  Tour 

From  Washington  the  Hungarians  carried  out  their  projected 
program  and  visited  the  various  sections  of  the  country.  The 
opinion  of  the  people,  if  it  may  be  generalized,  appears  like  this: 
the  West  with  its  large  population  of  recent  immigrants  favored 
wholeheartedly  the  ambitions  of  the  revolutionary  exiles;  the 
South,  the  real  conservative  element  in  the  nation,  heeded  not 
the  voice  of  the  tempter,  and  refused  to  be  swayed  by  the  flam- 
boyant receptions  in  the  Northern  metropolis  and  in  the  West; 
New  England,  shot  through  and  through  with  antislavery  con- 
victions, recognized  the  striking  analogy  between  the  situation 
of  the  Hungarians  and  that  of  the  bondmen  in  their  own  country, 
hence  the  exiles  received  here  an  acclaim  which  must  have 
pleased  them  and  which  at  the  same  time  served  to  stress  the 
unmistakable  differences  between  the  North  and  the  South. 

First  the  party  crossed  into  Maryland.  Appended  to  an 
invitation  of  welcome  by  the  legislature  was  a  most  emphatic 
disavowal  of  the  doctrine  of  intervention.  After  a  hurried  visit 
to  the  Naval  Academy,  Kossuth  met  the  two  branches  of  the 
legislature,  and  espying  a  picture  of  Lafayette,  declared  European 
revolutionists  expected  from  America  some  private  assistance 
and  an  assurance  of  fair  play.  The  next  day,  in  accordance 
with  the  invitation  of  the  Pennsylvania  legislature,  he  left  for 
Harrisburg  and  immediately  upon  his  arrival  visited  that  body. 
A  tremendous  throng  surged  through  the  Chamber  and  created 
a  full-blown  riot  with  which  the  military  had  to  deal.  Conse- 
quently no  one  succeeded  in  hearing  the  message  of  the  Governor 
or  the  response  of  the  guest.  At  a  banquet  engineered  by 
Governor  Johnson  and  ex-Senator  Simon  Cameron,  the  speakers 
pronounced  themselves  as  favoring  intervention.  It  was  "  inter- 
vention and  fight"  if  necessary.    The  treasure  chest  showed  a 


108  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

satisfactory  gain.     Thus  the  triumphal  march  of  the  Magyar 
to  the  Mississippi  had  begun.1 

Despite  a  blizzard,  the  party  pushed  on  to  Pittsburg,  receiving 
ovations  all  along  the  route.  The  Hungarian  leader  now  pressed 
more  vigorously  for  the  "the  sinews  of  war"  and  announced  his 
disapproval  of  the  sheer  waste  of  money  in  parades  and  banquets. 
Of  $180,000  already  collected  only  $30,000  had  found  its  way 
permanently  into  the  Hungarian  coffers.*  At  his  suggestion 
associations  were  formed  in  which  each  member  pledged  himself 
to  contribute  twenty-five  cents  monthly  through  a  period  of 
four  months.  He  authorized  agents  to  sell  Hungarian  bonds  at  a 
commission  of  8  per  cent  with  an  additional  4  per  cent  if  the 
agent  sold  in  the  rural  districts.  In  Pittsburg  the  visitor  received 
a  princely  welcome  and  money  came  in  by  the  thousands.  From 
here  he  moved  on  to  Cleveland  where  he  delivered  his  156th 
formal  speech.  The  people  were  assured  that  any  loan  they 
might  make  would  be  secured  by  the  rich  salt  mines  of  Hungary. 
A  cordial  invitation  from  the  Ohio  legislature  led  Kossuth  to 
turn  his  steps  toward  Columbus.  The  members  of  the  Assembly 
looked  upon  him  as  "the  personification  of  the  great  principles 
of  1776."  Nor  did  their  conduct  belie  their  convictions,  for 
each  legislator  presented  five  dollars  to  the  fund.  One  member 
proposed  that  all  the  arms  in  the  state  be  loaned  to  Hungary  to  be 
returned  after  her  independence  had  been  attained.  The  Gover- 
nor, Wood,  who  favored  intervention,  was  elected  President  of  the 
Hungarian  Association  in  Columbus.  The  crowds  that  greeted 
the  refugees  in  Cincinnati  exceeded  in  numbers  those  in  any 
other  Western  city.  The  excitement  coincident  with  the  visit 
had  never  before  been  equalled  in  this  centre  of  German  popu- 
lation. Though  ill,  Kossuth  appeared  and  amidst  the  huzzas  of 
thousands  pleaded  the  cause  of  Hungary  and  her  revolutionary 
fund.  The  auditors  responded  liberally  to  his  appeal.  Before 
his  departure,  Kossuth  got  into  a  serious  misunderstanding  with 


lN.  Y.  Tribune,  13-16,  20  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Herald,  17  Jan.  1852;  Phila. 
Ledger,  15-16  Jan.  1852. 

Laws  of  General  Assembly  of  Penna.,  1852,  627,  636. 

Penna.  Archives,  4th  Series,  Papers  of  Govs.,  VII,  490. 

*  In  spite  of  Kossuth's  use  of  the  word  "permanently"  on  this  occasion, 
he  later  reported  that  only  $1000  remained  in  his  possession. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  109 

the  committee  which  had  promised  him  $25,000  but  turned  over 
only  $7,000.  Too  much  had  been  spent  on  festivities  and  parades, 
he  claimed.  Conservative  journals  could  not  be  oblivious  of  the 
extravagances  of  these  supposedly  phlegmatic  people  in  the 
West.  If  any  considerable  portion  of  the  nation  were  per- 
manently affected  with  this  same  contagious  folly,  thought  the 
Intelligencer,  the  country  might  with  reason  be  considered  on  the 
road  to  ruin.2 

The  progress  continued.  A  side  excursion  to  Louisville 
aroused  the  German  populace  and  netted  a  small  sum  for  the 
treasury,  though  the  Board  of  Aldermen  refused  by  unanimous 
vote  to  welcome  Kossuth  to  the  city.  In  a  Louisville  speech, 
he  decried  the  wide  dissemination  of  the  views  of  Clay  which 
were  antagonistic  to  intervention.  The  implications  of  Kossuth's 
statements  aroused  many  enemies.  In  St.  Louis,  another  centre 
for  the  German  immigrant,  Kossuth  ran  amuck  of  a  group  of 
Jesuits  whom  he  denounced  as  Austrians.  The  St.  Louis  Repub- 
lican, a  Fillmore  sheet,  bitterly  assailed  this  attempt  to  stir  up 
differences  among  the  various  sects.  Senator  Benton,  who  was 
favorably  disposed  toward  Kossuth  personally,  hurled  thunder- 
bolts at  intervention  and  its  defenders,  and  refused  to  appear  on 
the  platform  with  Kossuth  lest  he  antagonize  the  Catholics. 
Despite  this  hostility  the  Germans  cordially  welcomed  the 
Hungarians  and  glowing  accounts  of  money  receipts  filled  the 
papers.  Encouragement  came  from  California  where  the  legis- 
lature passed  resolutions  declaring  its  admiration  for  liberty's 
champion  and  his  illustrious  companions.  Wisconsin  named 
a  town  after  the  hero,  Iowa,  a  county.3 

En  route  to  New  Orleans  the  expedition  halted  at  Memphis 
and  Vicksburg.  No  public  display  or  enthusiasm  greeted  the 
preacher  of  intervention.      In  the  Mississippi  capital  Governor 


*  Phila.  Ledger,  23-31  Jan.  1852,  1-16  Feb.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  20-29 
Jan.  1852,  2-20  Feb.  1852;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  2-13  Feb.  1852;  Wash.  Intelli- 
gencer, 17  Feb.  1852,  17  Ap.  1852;  Cincinnati  Commercial,  27  Feb.  1852; 
Cincinnati  Gazette,  28  Feb.  1852. 

Acts  of  the  General  Assembly  of  Ohio,  L,  23. 

3iV.  Y.  Tribune,  22  Jan.  1852,  20  Mch.  1852;  Wash.  Intelligencer,  26,  30 
Mch.  1852;  N.  Y.  Herald,  30  Mch.  1852;  St.  Louis  Rep.,  14-15  Mch.  1852, 
28  Ap.  1852;  Louisville  Courier,  8  Mch.  1852;  Liberator,  12  Mch.  1852;  15  Am. 
Rev.,  374. 


110  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Foote,  so  recently  a  friend  of  Kossuth  in  the  Senate,  extended  a 
hospitable  welcome.  Before  the  House  of  Representatives, 
Kossuth  delivered  a  long  speech  which  called  forth  neither  great 
applause  nor  material  aid.  The  same  cold  reticence  character- 
ized the  stay  in  New  Orleans.  Kossuth  created  no  extraordinary 
excitement  or  commotion;  "the  pulse  was  not  disturbed  in  the 
slightest,"  chronicled  the  New  Orleans  Bulletin.  In  one  public 
speech,  the  famous  orator  expressed  his  surprise  that  the  doc- 
trines enunciated  by  him  should  meet  with  such  stern  opposition 
in  the  states'-right  South.  At  the  same  time,  he  took  pains  to 
make  clear  that  his  remarks  in  Louisville  concerning  Clay  had 
been  maliciously  misinterpreted.  This  explanation  mitigated 
somewhat  the  opposition  of  Clay's  disciples.  Nevertheless,  an 
inflexible  passive  antipathy  persisted.  New  Orleans  would  not 
be  moved  by  passionate  appeals  or  calls  of  reason.  The  New 
York  Herald  regarded  this  city  as  representative  of  the  general 
feeling  throughout  the  South.4 

During  the  remainder  of  his  tour  in  the  Southern  states 
Kossuth  found  the  people  indifferent  if  not  openly  hostile  to 
his  person  and  his  cause.  A  newswriter,  who  traveled  exten- 
sively in  the  South,  questioned  whether  any  Southern  man 
capable  of  reading  and  writing  favored  intervention  in  any  form. 
Everyone  ridiculed  the  tumultuous  exuberance  with  which 
the  exile  had  been  received  in  the  North.  Widely  divergent 
views  reached  New  York  as  to  the  character  of  the  welcome 
Kossuth  had  received  in  Mobile,  but  Mobile  journals  say  little 
that  would  lead  one  to  believe  that  it  was  enthusiastic  and 
assert  that  the  citizens  in  no  degree  accepted  the  views  of  the 
foreigner.  In  Atlanta,  Augusta,  Charleston,  and  Wilmington 
no  huzzas  or  evidences  of  financial  aid  made  pleasant  the  trip 
northward.  Kossuth's  visit  served  as  a  pretext  for  Southern 
journalists  to  issue  panegyrics  upon  their  section  as  "the  con- 
servative element  in  the  Confederacy."  Undoubtedly  these 
conveyers  and  conservers  of  public  opinion  recorded  the  calm 
reflections  of  the  Southern  people  who  looked  with  disfavor  on  any 


iPhila.  Ledger,  23-31  Mch.  1852,  1-3,  16  Ap.  1852;  Wash.  Intelligencer,  6, 
12  Ap.  1852;  N.  F.  Herald,  31  Mch.  1852,  9  Ap.  1852;  N.  O.  Picayune,  1-5 
Ap.  1852;    Yazoo  City  Whig,  26  Mch.  1852. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  111 

alteration  of  the  traditional  foreign  policy.  The  "status  quo" 
in  many  matters  political  suited  the  interests  of  the  South.*5 

The  legislatures  of  several  Southern  states  voiced  their  con- 
victions in  memorials  to  Congress.  Before  Kossuth's  arrival, 
Tennessee  held  that  no  European  of  the  nineteenth  century  was 
entitled  to  share  more  largely  its  admiration.  In  the  Georgia 
assembly  a  member  offered  a  resolution  to  welcome  the  oppressed 
exiles.  When  the  implications  of  the  Hungarian  mission  and 
message  found  lodgement  in  Southern  minds,  a  different  tone 
prevailed.  Alabama  warned  against  the  danger  of  America 
being  drawn  into  the  vortex  of  European  politics.  The  policy 
of  the  United  States  should  be  to  cultivate  amity  with  all 
nations,  entangling  alliances  with  none,  and  to  practice  literally 
the  doctrine  of  non-intervention.  A  measure  of  like  substance 
passed  the  Georgia  assembly.  "Why  by  interweaving  our 
destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe  entangle  our  peace 
and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European  ambition,  interest  or 
caprice?"  Louisiana  would  receive  Kossuth  merely  as  an 
"advocate  of  freedom."  The  Mississippi  Whig  Convention 
resolved  that  the  wise  maxims  of  Washington  respecting  for- 
eign policy  ought  ever  to  guide  the  Federal  government. 
The  Richmond  City  Council  rescinded  its  resolution  inviting 
the  Hungarian  to  enjoy  the  hospitalities  of  that  cordial  city.6 

By  the  time  the  Hungarian  leader,  disillusioned,  returned 
to  Washington,  sycophantic  adulation  had  been  supplanted  in 
the  minds  of  politicians  by  a  cautious  reserve.  The  nominating 
conventions  approached  rapidly  and  in  an  unmistakable  way  the 
South  had  revealed  its  aversion  to  the  Kossuth  program.  Seward 
alone  repeated  his  previous  cordiality  and  invited  Kossuth  with 
leading  Whigs  to  a  dinner.     When  the  Magyar  party  boarded 


*"the  analyist  .  .  .  may  trace  the  cause  (of  our  opposition  to  inter- 
vention) to  our  peculiar  institution."     Augusta  (Ga.)  Chronicle,  22  Jan.  1852. 

*N.  Y.  Herald,  6,  10,  13  Ap.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  3  Ap.  1852;  Mobile 
Register,  5  Ap.  1852;  Mobile  Tribune,  6  Ap.  1852;  Augusta  Chronicle,  14  Mch. 
1852,  10  Ap.  1852;  Savannah  Republican,  6  Ap.  1852;  Charleston  Courier,  12 
Ap.  1852;   Wash.  Intelligencer,  26  Jan.  1852,  23,  28  Ap.  1852. 

6  Acts  of  the  State  of  Tenn.,  29th  Gen.  Ass.,  1  Sess.,  731. 

Acts  of  the  Gen.  Ass.  of  Georgia  (1851-2),  560. 

Acts  of  the  Gen.  Ass.  of  Alabama,  (1851-2),  532. 

Savannah  Rep.,  29  Nov.  1851;  Liberator,  9  Ap.  1852;  Wash.  Intelligencer, 
31  Jan.  1852,  29  Mch.  1852,  15  May  1852;  Phila.  Ledger,  29  Dec.  1851. 


112  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

the  train  to  leave  Washington,  only  the  Seward  family  and  Mrs. 
Horace  Mann  and  children  appeared  to  bid  it  Godspeed.  The 
Hungarians  passed  through  Philadelphia  on  the  way  to  Trenton 
"unwept,  unhonored,  and  unsung".7 

On  April  20,  northern  New  Jersey  with  its  large  Ger- 
man population  reeled  under  excitement  comparable  to  that 
earlier  experienced  in  New  York.  Ex-Governors  and  an  ex- 
Senator  vied  with  one  another  in  replying  to  the  oratorical 
bouquets  and  appeals  for  aid  which  fell  from  the  lips  of  Kossuth. 
From  New  Jersey  the  course  wound  through  the  Connecticut 
valley  to  Springfield.  Kossuth's  speeches  indicate  that  he 
recognised  a  distinct  difference  of  opinion  from  that  prevalent 
in  the  South.  New  England's  climate  might  be  cold,  but  the 
hearts  of  her  people  were  warm.  In  no  state  in  the  Union  did 
the  exile  have  a  more  hearty  reception  than  in  Massachusetts, 
the  seat  of  the  virile  abolitionist  movement.  Boston,  the  mill 
towns,  the  villages  with  historic  associations,  all  endeavored 
to  outdo  previous  welcomes.  As  Governor  Boutwell  said,  "the 
invitation  to  Kossuth  would  be  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the 
sympathy  of  Massachusetts  for  the  cause  of  liberty  in  Europe." 
Faneuil  Hall  thrice  reverberated  with  the  applause  of  crowds 
of  interested  sympathizers.  Longfellow  entertained  the  guest  at 
dinner.  Emerson  considered  him  "a  fair  offset  to  the  Andes  of 
conventionalism."  Henry  Wilson,  President  of  the  Senate, 
assured  him  that  though  the  high  hopes  of  1848  were  "quenched 
in  the  blood  of  subjugated  people,  all  was  not  lost."  Nor  did  the 
citizens  overlook  the  efficacy  of  loaning  their  money  to  Hungary. 
The  Boston  Transcript  reported  that  $27,000  had  been  speedily 
raised  and  anticipated  $50,000  would  be  secured  altogether.*8 

After   a   thorough   canvass   of   Massachusetts,   the   Kossuth 


7  N.  Y.  Herald,  15,  27  Ap.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  19  Ap.  1852;  Wash.  Union, 
14  Ap.  1852. 

Snow,  W.  W.  to  Marcy,  17  Ap.  1852.     Marcy  Mss. 
Seward,  F.  W.,  Reminiscences  etc.,  102. 

*  The  Liberator  later  announced  the  total  New  England  receipts  as  $15,099. 
Liberator,  28  May  1852. 

8  N.  Y.  Herald,  20-24,  27-30  Ap.  1852,  1-8  Je.  1852;  Phila.  Ledger,  23  Ap. 
1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  21,  27  Ap.  1852;  Liberator,  30  Ap.  1852;  Boston  Atlas, 
27  Ap.  1852,  18  May  1852. 

Sumner  to  Wilson,  H.,  29  Ap.  1852,  Pierce,  Life  of  Chas.  Sumner,  II,  271. 

Howe,  S.  G.,  Journal,  370-78. 

Emerson,  S.  E.  and  Forbes,  W.  D.,  Jols.  of  R.  W.  Emerson,  VIII,  277. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  113 

party  re-entered  New  York  at  Albany.  The  scenes  in 
New  York  almost  equalled  those  in  Massachusetts.  Governor 
Hunt  and  ex-Governor  Marcy  felt  honored  to  ride  with  Kos- 
suth. Straight  across  the  state  to  Buffalo,  then  back  to  New 
York  City  via  Rome  and  Utica,  Schenectady  and  Troy,  journeyed 
the  party.  Everywhere  enthusiasm,  everywhere  material  aid, 
but,  said  an  antagonist,  when  he  got  back  to  New  York  City, 
only  one  person  welcomed  him.  What  had  become  of  the 
thousands  who  had  cheered  him  half  a  year  earlier?8 

In  striking  contrast  to  measures  adopted  in  the  Southern  legis- 
latures are  the  acts  of  several  of  the  Northern  states.  New 
Jersey  deplored  the  Hungarian  catastrophe  and  trusted  Kos- 
suth might  yet  be  successful.  The  armed  intervention  of  one 
nation  to  frustrate  the  attempt  to  alter  the  form  of  government 
is  an  infraction  of  international  law,  it  said.  Delaware  believed 
that  a  law  of  nations  assured  every  nation  the  right  to  manage 
internal  affairs  as  it  chose;  therefore,  it  was  convinced  that 
the  United  States  ought  not  to  see  the  law  of  non-intervention 
violated  again  without  deep  concern.  Pennsylvania  gladly 
welcomed  the  unsuccessful  leader  into  its  legislative  assembly. 
In  Kossuth  the  Rhode  Islanders  recognized  "the  undaunted 
champion  ...  of  national  freedom  .  .  .  political  equality 
.  .  .  and  .  .  .  civil  and  religious  liberty,"  and  as  such  they 
invited  him  to  receive  the  hospitality  of  the  state.  The  inaugural 
address  of  Governor  Boutwell  in  Massachusetts  rang  with 
pleas  that  the  United  States  assert  a  right  to  interfere  everywhere 
in  favor  of  republican  or  constitutional  governments.  Approv- 
ing the  position  thus  taken,  the  legislature  declared  it  the 
duty  of  constitutionally  governed  nations  to  cultivate  inti- 
mate relations  so  that  if  an  emergency  should  arise  they 
might  easily  combine  against  the  despots.  Maine  proposed 
that  the  United  States  in  the  future  should  use  her  influence  to 
prevent  a  repetition  of  interference  similar  to  that  carried  out 
by  Russia  in  Hungary.  Vermont  merely  welcomed  the  exile  to  a 
home  in  the  land  of  the  free.9 


9  Laws  of  Rhode  Island,  1852,  55. 

Acts  of  the  Gen.  Ass.  of  Vermont,  1851,  71. 

Acts  and  Resolves  of  the  Gen.  Court  of  Mass.,  1852,  306,  318. 

32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  House  mis.  docs.,  8,  34. 


114  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Soon  after  his  return  to  New  York  City,  Kossuth  set  his 
house  in  order  for  the  departure  to  Europe.  It  was  generally 
believed  that  ultimately  he  would  come  back  and  reside  in  the 
West.  To  Seward,  Cass,  and  Shields,  the  Senate  reception  com- 
mittee, he  sent  an  account  of  his  stewardship  of  the  money 
collected.  Of  $90,000  raised,  all  had  been  spent  except  $1,000 
then  in  the  chief's  possession,  although  the  newspapers  were 
under  the  impression  that  Kossuth  had  nearly  $100,000  in  the 
bank.  On  June  21,  he  delivered  an  address  in  the  Tabernacle 
to  an  audience  "largely  women  and  antislavery  people."  He 
argued  along  much  the  same  line  as  previously,  vigorously  plead- 
ing the  doctrine  of  intervention.  To  Horace  Mann  it  seemed  the 
greatest  speech  of  all.  Two  days  later  came  the  farewell  speech 
to  the  Germans.  Since  neither  of  the  national  party  conven- 
tions had  adopted  a  platform  which  satisfied  him,  Kossuth  sug- 
gested that  the  German  citizens  might  unite  with  a  third  party. 
Thus  the  Presidential  election  might  be  thrown  into  Congress. 
The  speech  produced  quite  a  sensation  in  political  circles.10 

Under  the  assumed  name  of  Alexander  Smith,  Kossuth  slipped 
off  to  Europe  on  July  14, 1852.  The  newspapers  took  the  oppor- 
tunity to  express  their  consummate  judgment  on  the  man  and 
his  work.  "We  know  not  when  a  truer,  a  nobler  soul  has  crossed 
the  Atlantic/'  chanted  the  Tribune.  "Had  a  million  dollars  gone 
with  him,  the  clock  of  Europe  might  have  been  speeded  on  by 
half  a  century."  Another  paper  believed  that  in  many  ways  the 
sojourn  had  been  fruitful  to  Americans.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Herald,  after  expatiating  on  the  marked  difference  between 
the  reception  and  the  departure,  commented  that  the  visit 
would  be  recorded  as  a  monument  to  arrogance,  vainglory,  and 
absurdity,  and  should  serve  in  the  future  to  deter  any  who  might 
with  sacrilegious  hand  venture  to  alter  the  "deep-seated  reverence 
in  the  the  American  heart  for  Washington  and  the  fathers."11 


10  Seward  to  ?,  12  Je.  1852,  Seward  at  Washington,  I,  185. 
Mann  to  ?,  24  Je.  1852,  Mann,  Life  of  Horace  Mann,  I,  371. 
N.  Y.  Tribune,  26  Je.  1852. 

11  N.  Y.  Tribune,  15  Jl.  1852;    Phila.  Ledger,  16  Jl.  1852;    N.  Y.  Herald, 
15,  22  Jl.  1852. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  115 

IX 

European  Liberty  and  the  Campaign  of  1852 

While  Kossuth  toured  the  country  in  an  endeavor  to  awaken 
an  aggressive  public  opinion  favorable  to  his  cause — an  opinion 
which  might  be  transmuted  into  an  avalanche  of  votes — the 
national  political  parties  enjoyed  their  quadrennial  conventions. 
That  politicians  were  aware  of  the  potentialities  in  the  Kossuth 
movement  has  already  been  noted.  The  foreign  vote,  particu- 
larly that  of  the  Germans,  had  grown  to  proportions  to  conjure 
with,  and  aspirants  to  the  White  House  were  skilled  in  the  fine 
arts  of  legerdemain.  Genuine  republican  feeling  would  be 
utilized  as  a  lever  in  president-making.  What  attitude  then  did 
each  candidate  assume?  How  did  the  parties  react  to  Kossuth's 
pleas  for  assistance? 

Leading  Whig  sectaries  attempted  to  show  that  the  Demo- 
cratic opposition  intended  to  alter  the  established  foreign  policy 
by  supporting  intervention  in  the  mid-European  whirlpool. 
For  a  long  time  even  Daniel  Webster  feared  that  a  faction  in  the 
Democracy  might  bring  that  party  to  espouse  the  cause  of  inter- 
ference. But  as  usual,  the  Democrats,  divided  on  the  question 
of  European  policy,  pursued  the  familiar  spirit  of  compromise.* 

In  the  South  the  ultra-cordial  reception  of  the  Hungarians 
in  the  Northern  cities  had  been  interpreted  as  a  covert  political 
gesture  engineered  by  radical  Democrats  or,  greater  anathema, 
by  the  despicable  Free-Soilers.  Presidential  candidates  should 
have  been  deeply  concerned  over  the  serried  hostility  in  the  slave 
states  which  the  Kossuth  movement  had  aroused.  The  "last 
of  the  heroes,"  Lewis  Cass,  Democracy's  defeated  standard- 
bearer  of  1848,  and  in  1852  in  a  receptive  mood  for  another 
nomination,  lost  prestige  in  the  South  because  of  his  activities  in 


*In  connection  with  this  chapter  mention  should  be  made  of  the  splendid 
monograph  of  Nichols,  R.  F.,  The  Democratic  Machine,  1850-54,  in  Col.  Univ. 
Series,  CXI,  I. 


116  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

connection  with  the  Kossuth  visit.*  On  several  occasions,  he 
enunciated  views  that  favored  the  abstract  dogma  of  inter- 
vention, though  he  left  the  topic  of  active  intervention  to  be 
decided  when  necessary.  In  addition  to  alienating  influential 
Southerners,  Cass'  attitude  lost  him  the  adherents  of  the  Catholic 
church  which,  by  and  large,  opposed  Kossuthism.  Henry 
Wilson  prophesied  that  Cass'  policy  might  win  Massachusetts 
for  him  but  it  would  cost  him  the  entire  South.  This  conviction 
proved  correct  for  in  the  nominating  convention  the  Southern 
delegates  voted  almost  solidly  against  Cass.  Too  late  the  vener- 
able general  realized  the  error  of  his  way.1 

Buchanan,  a  logical  candidate  for  the  Democratic  nomination, 
and  personally  anxious  to  have  it,  pursued  a  policy  with  regard  to 
the  Kossuth  visit  which  he  believed  would  gain  the  support  of  the 
South.  Obedient  to  the  advice  of  a  shrewd  friend,  throughout 
the  period  of  the  Hungarian  excitement  he  kept  as  quiet  as 
possible.  His  grave,  dignified  response  at  the  Kossuth  dinner 
in  Philadelphia  won  for  him  the  approval  of  Henry  A.  Wise, 
a  recent  convert  to  the  Democracy,  who  assured  Buchanan  that 
two-thirds  of  the  people  of  his  state,  Virginia,  held  his  views. 
Buchanan's  henchmen  unsuccessfully  fought  the  invitation  to  a 
banquet  extended  the  Magyar  by  the  Washington  Jackson 
Association.  In  the  event  of  Buchanan's  nomination  and  elec- 
tion the  country  might  be  assured  that  the  traditional,  con- 
servative policy  of  non-intervention  would  be  followed.  William 
L.  Marcy,  who  had  so  faithfully  served  his  party  in  minor  r61es, 


*  In  1848,  within  party  ranks,  some  fear  existed  lest  Cass,  if  elected,  might 
embroil  the  United  States  in  the  European  revolutions.  Seddon,  J.  A.  to 
Hunter,  16  Je.  1848,  Correspondence  of  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  A.  H.  A.,  Rept., 
1916,  II,  91. 

»  Richmond  Whig,  2,  8  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Tribune,  11  Feb.  1852;  N.  F. 
Herald,  12  Feb.  1852. 

Bird  to  Clayton,  12  Jan.  1852.     Clayton  Mss. 

Hubard  to  Hunter,  8  May  1852,  Cones.  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  A.  H.  A.  Rept., 
1916,  II,  140. 

Buchanan  to  Cave  Johnson,  30  Mch.  1852.     Buchanan  Mss. 

Webster  to  Lawrence,  29  Dec.  1851,  Webster's  Works,  National  Ed.,  IV,  633. 

Munroe  to  Wilson,  H.,  10  Jan.  1852.     Wilson  Mss. 

Belmont  to  Buchanan,  28  Jan.  1852.     Buchanan  Mss. 

Cass  to  Donelson,  19  Jl.  1852.     Donelson  Mss. 

Thomas,  J.  A.  to  Marcy,  22  Dec.  1851.     Marcy  Mss. 

Wilson,  H.  to  Sumner,  5  Jan.  1852.     Sumner  Mss. 

Clearland,  C.  F.  to  Welles,  13  Jan.  1852.     Welles  Mss. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  117 

wanted  to  be  elevated  to  the  Presidency.  As  with  Buchanan,  a 
sagacious  friend  warned  Marcy  of  the  forces  that  were  hostile  to 
Kossuth  and  intervention  and  urged  him  to  take  "  no  more  ground 
on  this  question  than  is  absolutely  necessary."  Unwarily, 
Marcy  headed  a  call  for  a  sympathy  meeting  for  the  Hungarians. 
Speaking  on  that  occasion  he  advocated  European  liberty  but 
omitted  to  outline  the  policy  he  favored  to  achieve  the  end. 
The  speech  hinted  at  non-intervention  in  states'-rights — a  phi- 
losophy which  should  have  been  well  received  in  the  South. 
Friends  of  Marcy  were  divided  as  to  the  effect  of  the  address. 
Certainly  he  lost  some  support  by  it.a 

Presidental  aspirants  in  the  more  radical  element  of  the 
Democracy  were  Robert  J.  Walker  and  Stephen  A.  Douglas. 
Long  before  the  conventions,  in  his  speeches  delivered  in  Kos- 
suth's presence  in  England,  the  former  had  announced  himself 
heartily  in  favor  of  European  liberty  to  be  acquired  if  necessary 
through  a  combined  military  expedition  of  the  United  States  and 
England.  Could  the  convention  have  been  held  in  December, 
1851,  rather  than  June,  1852,  he  would  have  made  a  strong  bid 
for  first  honors.  As  the  Kossuth  excitement  waned,  so  did 
Walker's  chances  become  dim.  By  common  consent,  Douglas 
had  been  placed  at  the  head  of  "Young  America,"  a  faction 
which  proposed  to  carry  on  a  more  aggressive  foreign  policy, 
notably  with  regard  to  the  strong  liberal  movements  so  ably 
championed  by  the  great  Magyar.  Fear  of  the  Irish  vote  led 
Douglas  to  cast  aspersions  on  any  alliance  with  Great  Britain 
to  further  the  liberation  of  Europe.  The  policy  of  his  friend, 
George  N.  Sanders,  in  linking  his  name  with  intervention  through 
the  columns  of  the  Democratic  Review  did  him  irreparable  harm. 
Assuredly  an  aggressive  policy  might  be  anticipated  should  this 
fiery  young  petrel  move  into  the  White  House.     As  on  most 


a  Byrdsall,  T.  to  Buchanan,  18  Dec.  1851.     Buchanan  Mss. 

Wise  to  Buchanan,  25  Jan.  1852.     Ibid. 

Vandyke  to  Buchanan,  15  Mch.  1852.     Ibid. 

Blair  to  Van  Buren,  1,  2  Jan.  1852.     Van  Buren  Mss. 

Thomas,  F.  A.  to  Marcy,  22,  29  Dec.  1851.     Marcy  Mss. 

Marcy  to  Banquet  Committee,  6  Dec.  1851.     Ibid. 

Snow,  W.  W.  to  Marcy,  27  Dec.  1851.     Ibid. 

Campbell,  A.  to  Marcy,  30  Dec.  1851,  1  May  1852.     Ibid. 


118  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

other  vexing  questions  of  the  hour,  the  ultimate  nominee  of  the 
Democracy,  General  Franklin  Pierce,  had  registered  no  opinion.3 

Amidst  the  swirl  of  nomination  the  Democratic  national 
convention  took  little  interest  in  the  party  platform.  Southern 
influence  prevented  the  adoption  of  any  vigorous  statement  on 
European  liberty.  One  plank  read:  "Resolved,  that  in 
view  of  the  condition  of  popular  institutions  in  the  Old 
World,  a  high  and  sacred  duty  is  devolved  upon  the  Demo- 
cracy of  this  country ; "  that  was  all.  Greeley  sharply  criti- 
cised the  Democratic  stand  on  what  he  deemed  a  leading 
issue  of  the  day.  Not  a  word  indicated  the  presence  of  the 
recognized  champion  of  European  liberty;  nor  was  there  a 
remonstrance  against  Russian  interference;  nothing  but  a  little 
watery  talk,  Nevertheless,  a  potent  Catholic  editor,  Brownson, 
lived  in  fear  that  the  Democrats  under  Pierce  would  pursue  the 
policy  urged  by  Kossuth.4 

Among  the  Whigs  only  three  men  sought  the  nomination  in 
1852.  Of  these,  Fillmore  had  in  his  annual  message  and  in  his 
response  on  the  occasion  of  the  presentation  of  Kossuth  indicated 
that  he  opposed  any  change  in  our  foreign  policy.  His  successful 
opponent  in  the  convention,  a  hero  of  the  Mexican  War,  General 
W.  S.  Scott,  despite  the  fact  that  his  chief  protagonist,  Seward, 
favored  some  modification  of  Washington's  foreign  policy, 
opposed  the  Kossuth  pleas.  This  position  strengthened  him 
among  the  Southern  Whigs.  An  eager  searcher  could  find  no 
"piratical  propensities"  in  Scott's  mental  constitution.  Daniel 
Webster,  never  a  strong  contender  for  the  nomination,  likewise 
opposed  intervention.5 


3  Belmont  to  Buchanan,  6  Dec.  1851.     Buchanan  Mss. 
Byrdsall  to  Buchanan,  18  Dec.  1851.     Ibid. 
Wise  to  Buchanan,  25  Jan.  1852.     Ibid. 

Pickett,  J.  C.  to  Breckinridge,  5  Dec.  1851.     Breckinridge  Mss. 
Willis,  H.  P.,  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  172. 
Johnson,  A.,  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  199. 
N.  Y.  Tribune,  22  Jan.  1852. 

'N.  Y.  Herald,  9  Jan.  1852,  2  Feb.  1852;    N.  Y.  Tribune,  8,  25  Je.  1852; 
Wash.  Intelligencer,  18Nov.  1851,31  Jan.  1852;  9  Brownson' s  Quarterly  Rev.,  516. 
6  N.  Y.  Herald,  15,  22,  24  Jan.  1852;   Wash.  Union,  9  Jan.  1852. 
Bird  to  Clayton,  12  Jan.  1852.  Clayton  Mss. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  119 

The  Whig  convention  adopted  a  resolution  in  its  platform 
which  expressed  warmest  sympathy  for  struggling  freedom 
everywhere  but  reaffirmed  its  intention  to  stand  fast  "to  the 
doctrines  of  the  Father  of  His  Country."  The  United  States 
should  demonstrate  by  example  and  not  by  force  the  advantages 
of  self-government  and  free  institutions.  To  the  Tribune,  this 
plank  was  a  sample  of  the  chronic  Whig  stupidity  which  caused 
the  great  majority  of  the  foreign-born  citizens  to  unite  with  the 
Democrats.  New  York,  Ohio,  and  Wisconsin  would  all  be  lost 
on  account  of  this  meretricious  blunder.  Since  neither  the 
Democratic  nor  the  Whig  platform  contained  Greeley's  conviction 
this  influential  editor  would  not  support  either  party.  Brownson 
urged  Catholics  to  support  the  Whig  ticket  since  it  definitely 
declared  against  action  in  Europe,  whereas  the  Democrats 
remained  non-committal.6 

As  neither  of  the  major  parties  approved  the  Kossuth  doc- 
trines, the  Herald  reiterated  its  belief  that  a  third  party  would 
appear  and  adopt  them.  Kossuth  told  a  committee  that  the 
Germans  were  strong  enough  to  secure  the  election  of  any  party 
which  would  give  proper  attention  to  the  European  cause. 
Certainly,  commented  the  Herald,  he  must  mean  the  abolitionists 
led  by  Senator  John  P.  Hale.  When  the  Free-soil  Party  met  in 
August,  it  selected  Hale  and  Julian  of  Indiana  to  carry  the  banner 
in  November.  Throughout  the  convention  there  was  much 
evidence  of  opinion  favorable  to  definite  action  to  liberate  Europe. 
Article  16  of  the  platform  declared:  "every  nation  has  a 
clear  right  to  alter  or  change  its  government  and  foreign  inter- 
ference with  that  right  is  a  dangerous  violation  of  the  laws 
of  nations.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  American  government  to 
protest  against  and,  by  all  proper  means  to  prevent,  the  inter- 
vention of  Kings  and  Emperors  against  nations  seeking  to 
establish  for  themselves  republican  or  constitutional  govern- 
ments."7 


6  N.  Y.  Tribune,  22,  25  Je.  1852;  9  Brownson' s  Quarterly  Rev.,  515-16. 
Stanwood,  E.  A.,  History  of  Pres.  etc.,  251. 

7  N.  Y.  Herald,  31  Jan.  1852, 14,  24  Je.  1852. 
Pierce,  E.  L.,  Life  of  Charles  Sumner,  III,  269. 
Stanwood,  E.  A.,  History  of  Pres.  etc.,  255. 


120  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Immediately  upon  learning  of  the  policy  of  the  two  major 
parties,  Kossuth  delivered  his  farewell  address  to  a  throng  of 
Germans  in  New  York  City.  He  felt  that  neither  political  party 
had  responded  to  the  spirit  of  the  times.  In  the  Democratic 
position  there  might  yet  be  hope ;  if  nothing  definite  developed 
he  advised  the  Germans  to  unite  with  an  independent  third 
party.  Subsequently  a  series  of  resolutions  was  passed  by  the 
meeting  in  which  those  present  announced  that  they  would 
attach  themselves  to  the  Democratic  party  with  the  expectation 
that  the  candidate  would  adopt  the  policy  of  intervention. 
Newspapers  of  both  parties  acknowledged  that  these  proceed- 
ings would  be  a  serious  blow  to  the  Scott  nomination.  Politicians 
showed  their  alarm  since  the  Germans  held  500,000  votes  which 
might  determine  the  election.  A  few  days  after  the  speech, 
Kossuth  sent  out  a  secret  circular,  presumably  to  individuals 
of  political  influence,  containing  an  account  of  the  meeting  and 
emphasizing  the  fact  that  the  German  citizens  of  America  held 
the  deciding  votes  in  the  election.  Such  documents  made 
splendid  campaign  material  for  the  reviving  anti-foreign  crusade 
which  reached  its  climax  four  years  later  in  the  American  Party 
— a  national  movement  in  whose  development  the  Kossuth 
episode  played  no  small  role.8 

During  the  campaign,  Pierce's  supporters  manoeuvered  to 
win  the  favor  of  Kossuth  so  that  they  might  feel  confident  of 
getting  the  German  vote.  Edmund  Burke,  a  Pierce  manager, 
urged  his  chief  to  invite  the  Hungarian  to  New  Hampshire  but 
cautioned  that  he  should  receive  nothing  but  courtesies  and 
civilities.  To  Burke  one  of  "  the  grand  ideas  "  bound  to  be  power- 
ful in  the  campaign  was  sympathy  with  the  liberals  in  Europe. 
Entirely  cognizant  of  the  strength  of  this  grand  idea,  Pierce, 
in  a  letter  to  Philadelphians  in  reply  to  a  Fourth  of  July  invita- 
tion, trusted  that  America  would  remember  that  "in  the  weak- 
ness of  our  infancy  .  .  .  not  only  words  of  cheering  were  sent 
across  the  ocean  to  greet  us,  but  upon  its  bosom  were  borne  to 


*N.  Y.  Herald,  24,  25  Je.  1852,  12  Jl.  1852;    N.  Y.  Tribune,  26  Je.  1852; 
Wash.  Intelligencer,  28  Je.  1852. 
Biography  M.  Fillmore,  (1856),  205-212. 
Poore,  B.  P.,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  406. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  121 

our  shores,  hearts  to  sympathize  and  arms  to  strike."  The 
covert  implications  contained  therein  Kossuth  discerned,  but 
he  expected  a  more  explicit  avowal  with  regard  to  foreign  policy. 
The  historian,  Stillman,*  asserts  that  Pierce  was  prepared  to 
go  even  further  to  win  the  Hungarian's  support.  Kossuth  told 
Stillman  that  a  committee  of  Democrats  had  presented  itself, 
and,  with  the  approval  of  Pierce,  had  offered  him  two  men-of- 
war  equipped  for  action  and  $500,000  if  Kossuth  would  sup- 
port their  nominee.  Kossuth  did  not  indicate  whether  or  not  he 
accepted  the  offer.9 

Whiggery  remained  loyal  to  its  platform  pronouncement. 
Scott's  followers  circulated  the  resolutions  adopted  at  the 
German  farewell  meeting,  hoping  thereby  to  j£ain  votes  in  the 
South.  In  a  campaign  document  one  finds  this  pungent  inter- 
rogation: "Are  the  people  of  the  South  prepared  to  take  sides 
with  the  Democratic  Party  in  fostering  and  maintaining  a  policy, 
the  result  of  which  will  be  to  offset  the  material  aid  furnished 
by  American  sympathizers  with  material  aid  to  foment  insur- 
rections in  our  Southern  States  by  European  Abolitionists?"10 

With  the  departure  of  Kossuth  the  influence  of  the  European 
liberty  cause  in  the  campaign  rapidly  subsided.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  prove  that  the  issue  had  any  influence  in  the  final 
outcome  of  the  canvass. 


*  William  J.  Stillman  was  an  author  of  some  distinction.  During  Kossuth's 
visit  Stillman  became  a  confidential  friend  and  was  commissioned  to  go  to 
Hungary  to  fetch  the  crown  jewels  which  had  been  hidden  by  Kossuth  during 
the  revolution.     26  Century  Magazine,  271-76. 

9  Burke  to  Pierce,  6,  14  Je.  1852.     Pierce  Mss. 
Hebbe  to  Burke,  13  Jl.  1852.     Pierce  Mss. 
N.  Y.  Herald,  8  Jl.  1852. 

Stillman,  W.  J.,  Biography  of  a  Journalist,  I,  142. 

10  Memoir  of  General  Scott,  Doc.  2,  The  Presidential  Canvass  or  Why  Southern 
Whigs  Should  Support  the  Whig  Convention. 


122  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 


Conclusion 

From  this  study  of  the  contemporary  American  opinion  of  the 
mid-century  revolutions  in  Central  Europe,  one  might  proceed 
to  analyze  the  American  mind  of  1850  as  mirrored  in  this  opinion. 
Such  a  task,  however  valuable,  scarcely  lies  within  the  province 
of  a  historical  dissertation.  Propriety  and  scholarship,  on  the 
other  hand,  demand  that  some  further  interpretation  be  laid 
upon  the  facts  herein  presented.  Why  did  Americans  respond 
so  cordially  to  the  appeal  of  revolutionary  Europe?  How  may 
one  account  for  the  activities  of  the  Federal  government  toward 
the  new  states  whose  appearance,  in  consequence  of  the  upheaval, 
seemed  imminent?  Why  did  the  Kossuth  program  fail  to  win 
unqualified  and  lasting  support  in  the  foremost  democracy  of 
the  time?  What  effect  did  the  revolutionary  movement  and  the 
visit  of  this  "Byzantine  logothete"  have  on  American  develop- 
ment? 

Several  factors  serve  to  explain  the  intense  sympathy  the 
American  people  had  for  the  masses  of  Europe  in  their  struggle  to 
erect  new  political  organisms.  Americans  vividly  remembered 
that  only  three-quarters  of  a  century  earlier  their  forebears  had 
participated  in  a  momentous  conflict  against  authority,  and  in 
this  central  European  revolt  they  discerned  a  movement  of 
similar  intent.  Furthermore,  many  of  the  people  had  imbibed 
that  delicious  nectar  described  as  Jacksonian  Democracy. 
Exuberant  Jacksonianism  was  a  philosophy  that  suggested  aid 
for  any  development  that  contained  even  a  vestige  of  democracy. 
Again,  the  increasing  German  element  in  the  population  and 
recent  immigrants  of  other  nationalities  vigorously  expressed 
their  devotion  to  the  aspirations  of  their  brothers  in  Europe. 
Politicians  from  German-inhabited  districts  were  not  oblivious 
of  the  opinion  of  this  faction.  Then  too,  a  robust  nationalism, 
stimulated  by  the  recent  successes  in  Mexico,  temporarily 
found  an  outlet  in  hostile  expressions  against  European  despot- 
ism. Through  the  medium  of  the  press  and  public  gatherings 
the  people   expressed   unmistakably   their  common   sympathy 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  123 

with  the  revolting  European  masses,  and  the  newspapers  served 
not  only  as  weathervanes  to  indicate  the  prevailing  opinion  of 
their  readers,  but  as  agencies  to  advance  arguments  in  favor  of 
the  revolutionary  cause.  At  the  outset,  the  means  whereby 
the  Europeans  should  attain  the  desired  goal  seem  not  to  have 
entered  into  the  calculations  of  the  American  people.  Enthu- 
siasm, boisterous  or  restrained,  might  strengthen  the  morale 
of  European  political  non-conformists  but  material  aid  alone 
would  enable  them  to  wrest  the  sceptre  from  the  hands  of 
monarchy. 

Public  opinion  moves  governments  to  action  and  nowhere  at 
the  mid-century  may  this  overweening  phenomenon  be  observed 
better  than  in  the  United  States.  Actuated  by  the  tremendous 
sympathy  which  struggling  Europe  engendered  in  the  minds  of 
the  American  people,  the  authorities  in  Washington  shaped 
their  policy.  To  the  quixotic  government  instituted  in  Ger- 
many, was  despatched  the  Minister  in  Berlin  and  eventually  a 
complete  mission  at  Frankfort  was  created.  The  government 
sent  to  Germlany  a  distinguished  naval  captain  who  might  have 
assisted  in  establishing  a  strong  German  fleet.  The  Hungarian 
revolutionists  would  have  found  an  American  ready  to  recognize 
them  had  their  military  forces  been  powerful  enough  to  sever 
their  country  from  the  union  with  Austria.  These  government 
activities  indicate  beyond  cavil  the  influence  that  the  opinion  of 
the  populace  wielded. 

The  fullest  expressions  of  opinion  on  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment are  connected  with  the  visit  of  Louis  Kossuth,  "the  general 
representative  of  liberty  in  Europe."  In  this  man  Americans 
were  pleased  to  find  the  virtues  they  associated  with  the  upheaval. 
His  flight  and  subsequent  confinement  in  Turkey  raised  him  in 
the  eyes  of  the  people  to  the  position  of  a  martyr.  Due  to  their 
agitation  the  government  sent  a  vessel  to  Turkey  to  bring  the 
Hungarian  to  America  with  the  expectation  that  he  would 
settle  here.  A  tumultuous  public  reception,  unparalleled  in  the 
annals  of  the  country,  greeted  Kossuth  in  the  North  and  West 
generally.  In  marked  contrast  to  the  welcome  extended  by 
these  masses  was  the  attitude  assumed  by  the  Federal  govern- 


124  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

ment,  by  many  influential  citizens  in  the  North,  and  by  virtually 
the  entire  South. 

A  recital  of  the  reasons  for  the  antagonism  towards  Kossuth 
will,  save  in  so  far  as  the  opposition  rose  from  idiosyncracies  in 
his  own  personality,  explain  why  the  United  States  would  take 
no  active  part  in  any  European  revolutionary  movement  even 
though  a  host  of  people  favored  some  definite  aid. 

First,  foremost,  and  familiar  to  those  of  this  latter  day, 
stood  the  obstacle  known  as  the  Washington  foreign  policy; 
notably,  that  portion  which  enjoined  the  country  to  remain 
aloof  from  European  entanglements.  That  program  suggested 
absolute  non-interference  in  European  struggles;  it  implied  that 
America  should  take  no  action  to  prevent  Russian  aid  to  Austria 
if  the  latter  were  brought  into  civil  conflict  with  her  vassal,  Hun- 
gary. The  bulk  of  the  Whig  leaders  remained  firm  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  traditional  dogma.  Clay  and  Fillmore  blasted  any 
hope  of  aid  Kossuth  may  have  nurtured;  for  "we  would  not  leave 
our  own  land  to  stand  in  defence  of  another."  Washington's 
Farewell  Address  would  be  used  as  a  textbook  of  sound  political 
truth.  Up  and  down  the  land  many  Whig  journals  reaffirmed 
their  adherence  to  the  non-interference  idea  and  their  columns 
were  loaded  with  editorials  bearing  such  captions  as  "European 
Designs  Against  the  United  States ' '  and  ' '  The  Folly  of  the  Day ' '.* 

A  number  of  Democratic  papers,  including  the  New  York 
Herald  and  the  important  Washington  Union,  held  it  to  be  the 
American  duty  "to  sacrifice  nothing  to  the  dictates  of  sympathy 
for  a  foreign  cause  which  may  be  incompatible  with  the  safety 
and  prosperity"  of  the  republic.  Southern  sheets,  irrespective 
of  party  affiliation,  rejoiced  that  "the  new-fangled  doctrine" 
had  little  vogue  in  their  section.  Our  mission,  many  thought, 
was  to  teach  republican  principles  by  example  and  not  to  propa- 
gate them  in  Mohammedan  fashion.2 

Throughout  the  period  of  the  Kossuth  excitement,  other  leaders 


1  Wash.  Intelligencer,  13,  16,  19  Dec.  1851,  9,  21  Feb.  1852;  St.  Louis  Repub- 
lican, 12  Dec.  1851,  10  Jan.  1852;  Phila.  No.  Am.,  13  Dec.  1851;  Savannah 
Republican,  18,  31  Dec.  1851;  Augusta  Chronicle,  22  Jan.  1852. 

a  Rich.  Enquirer,  12  Dec.  1851;  Wash.  Union,  17,  22  Dec.  1851;  Phila. 
Ledger,  15  Dec.  1851. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  125 

of  opinion,  with  a  few  exceptions,  advocated  that  the  policy  of 
non-interference  in  European  affairs  should  be  continued.  From 
mid- January  until  early  in  May,  1852,  there  continued  inter- 
mittently in  the  Senate  a  discussion  on  the  reaffirmation  of 
the  "ancient"  principle.  Only  Soule,  of  Louisiana,  and  Seward 
favored  a  change.  Military  men  predicted  that  a  change  would 
make  "the  army  and  the  navy  the  only  worthwhile  trades." 
The  adoption  of  an  intervention  policy  would  be  much  less  likely 
to  result  in  converting  the  European  monarchies  into  republics 
than  in  eventually  changing  the  happy  American  republic 
into  a  military  despotism,  thought  Edward  Everett.  Various 
Southern  statesmen  made  Washington's  Birthday  in  1852  an 
occasion  for  re-emphasizing  the  diplomatic  principles  of  the 
country's  father.  Able  speeches  by  men  of  the  stamp  of  Alex- 
ander Stephens,  Robert  Toombs,  and  John  J.  Crittenden  had  a 
great  effect.  Reason,  not  passion,  became  the  slogan  of  many 
thoughtful  leaders.  Such  universal  sentiment  among  men 
respected  for  their  intelligence  and  ability,  plus  the  newspaper 
opposition,  gradually  overcame  the  early  urban  exuberance. 
As  in  1919-1920,  aid  to  Europe  retreated  as  the  apothegms  of 
Washington  were  advanced.3 

In  his  last  annual  message,  Fillmore  rightly  summed  up  the 
consensus  of  opinion  with  respect  of  intervention: 

"It  has  been  the  uniform  policy  of  this  government  from  its  foundation 
to  the  present  day  to  abstain  from  all  interference  in  the  domestic  affairs  of 
other  nations.  The  consequence  has  been  that  while  the  nations  of  Europe 
have  been  engaged  in  desolating  wars  our  country  has  pursued  its  peaceful 
course  to  unexampled  prosperity  and  happiness.   .    .    . 


1  Mann  to  Clayton,  9  Sept.  1849,  Mss.,  Dept.  of  State,  Repts.,  Spec.  Agents 
to  German  States  and  Hungary. 

Bayard  to  Webster,  28  Ap.  1852,  Ibid.,  Repts.,  Belgium,  IV. 

Wool,  J.  E.  to  a  friend,  31  Dec.  1851.    Wash.  Intelligencer,  20  Feb.  1852. 

Everett,  E.  to  Ashmun,  G.,  25  Nov.  1851,  1  Dec.  1851.    Everett  Mss. 

Benton,  T.  H.  to  Van  Buren,  11  Jan.  1852.     Van  Buren  Mss. 

Ripley,  R.  S.  to  Breckinridge,  20  Dec.  1851.     Breckinridge  Mss. 

Richardson,  Messages  etc.  of  the  Presidents,  V,  179. 

Liberator,  23  Jan.  1852. 

Coleman,  C,  Life  of  J.  J.  Crittenden,  II,  27. 

Johnston  and  Browne,  A.  H.  Stephens,  266. 

Sargent,  N.  S.,  Public  Men  and  Events,  II,  384. 


126  Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe 

"But  it  is  now  said  by  some  that  this  policy  must  be  changed.  Europe  is 
no  longer  separated  from  us  by  a  voyage  of  months,  but  steam  navigation 
has  brought  her  within  a  few  days'  sail  of  our  shores  .  .  .  it  is  said  that  we 
ought  to  interfere  between  contending  sovereigns  and  their  subjects  for  the 
purpose  of  overthrowing  the  monarchies  of  Europe  and  establishing  in  their 
place  republican  institutions  .  .  .  We  cannot  witness  the  struggle  between 
the  oppressed  and  his  oppressor  anywhere  without  the  deepest  sympathy 
for  the  former  and  the  most  anxious  desire  for  his  triumph.  Nevertheless 
is  it  prudent  or  is  it  wise  to  involve  ourselves  in  these  foreign  wars?  .  .  . 
Our  policy  is  wisely  to  govern  ourselves  and  thereby  to  set  an  example  of  national 
justice,  prosperity,  and  true  glory  as  shall  teach  to  all  nations  the  blessings  of 
self  government  and  the  unparalleled  enterprise  and  success  of  a  free  people."3 

Granting  that  the  non-intervention  policy  was  the  paramount 
influence  which  caused  America  to  refuse  aid  to  European 
liberalism,  the  second  factor  in  the  decision  was  that  issue  which 
obfuscated  all  American  affairs  in  the  middle  of  the  century — 
the  slavery  question.  In  the  South  the  class  interested  in  the 
continuance  of  the  slave  system  largely  molded  the  public 
opinion  and  this  class  opposed  Kossuth's  program.  If  the 
United  States  should  aid  Hungary  to  secure  its  release  from 
Austrian  servitude,  did  not  the  genesis  of  logic  suggest  that 
similar  action  might  come  from  abroad  and  cause  America 
to  free  those  held  in  bondage?  "  People  who  live  in  glass  houses," 
wrote  a  Southern  correspondent  to  the  Washington  Intelligencer ', 
"should  not  throw  stones."  Non-intervention,  demanded  by 
the  South  so  far  as  its  own  interests  were  concerned,  very  easily 
carried  over  into  the  field  of  international  affairs.  Thus  the 
peculiar  institution  determined  the  South  in  its  hostility  toward 
active  aid  for  the  European  revolutionists.4 


4  Rich.  Whig,  2  Feb.  1852. 

Seward  to  his  home,  2  Dec.  1851,  Seward,  F.  W.,  Seward  at  Wash.,  II,  175. 

26  Century  Mag.,  270. 

32  Cong.,  1  Sess.,  Cong.  Globe,  App.,  1074.     Speech  of  Horace  Mann. 

Liberator,  30  Ap.  1852;  Savannah  Republican,  25  Mch.  1852;  Wash.  Intel- 
ligencer, 26  Jan.  1852;  Augusta  Chronicle,  10  Dec.  1851;  N.  Y.  Tribune, 
28  Oct.  1851. 

Godwin,  P.,  Commemorative  Addresses,  136. 

Mann,  H.  to  May,  S.  J.,  3  Jan.  1852,  Mann,  Life  of  Horace  Mann,  I,  356. 

Buchanan  to  Davis,  J.,  16  Mch.  1850.     Buchanan  Mss. 


Mid- Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  127 

The  slavery  issue,  moreover,  created  many  enemies  for  Kossuth 
in  the  North  when  he  refused  to  announce  himself  in  favor  of 
abolition.  Bitter  attacks  by  Garrison,  Wendell  Phillips,  and  others 
were  launched  against  Kossuthism.  To  them  freedom  carried 
the  same  implication  the  world  over.  As  a  typical  verse  from 
the  Liberator  indicates,  the  Abolitionists  expected  that  definite 
assistance  would  be  given  their  cause  by  the  Magyar: 

"Strike  then  for  us,  with  thought  and  prayer, 
God  give  thee  power  most  noble  heart, 
Nor  waste  thy  words  on  empty  air 

But,  flying  slave,  take  the  slaves  part." 

Undoubtedly  this  voice  of  freedom  from  Europe  did  rivet  the 
idea  of  freedom  more  firmly  in  the  minds  of  the  people  in  the 
North,  but  Garrison  wanted  a  concrete  expression  against  negro 
slavery,  and  Kossuth  balked.  The  Hungarian's  position  as 
America's  greatest  excitement  changed  with  the  appearance  of 
Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  commented  the  indomitable  editor  of  the 
Liberator  *5 

Other  reasons  existed  for  the  positive  refusal  of  the  United 
States  to  participate  in  the  quarrels  for  European  liberty. 
When  Louis  Napoleon,  by  the  coup  d'etat  in  1851,  made  himself 
virtually  the  master  of  the  French,  American  faith  in  the  demo- 
cratic and  republican  ideal  for  Europe  was  sadly  shaken.  If 
France  could  not  maintain  a  liberal  government,  America  had  little 
hope  for  any  other  continental  state.  Then  too,  leaders  of 
the  Roman  Catholic  church  indicated  their  antipathy  to  the 
revolutionary  movements.     Catholicism,  invariably  conservative, 


*  An  additional  source  of  trouble  arose  when  Gyurman,  a  companion  of 
Kossuth,  associated  himself  with  an  outspoken  antislavery  sheet  which 
proposed  to  use  its  influence  to  abrogate  the  compromise  of  1850.  Though 
he  declared  his  adhesion  to  the  paper  had  received  his  chief's  approval,  the 
latter  promptly  denied  any  connection  with  the  paper  or  the  policy  of  his 
comrade.  Throughout  the  South  the  Gyurman  action  augmented  the 
hostility  against  the  revolutionary  projects.  Savannah  Republican,  16  Jan. 
1852;  Augusta  Chronicle,  14  Jan.  1852;  N.  Y.  Herald,  6  Jan.  1852. 

6  Whittier,  J.  to  Sumner,  Dec.  1851,  Pickard,  S.  T.,  Life  and  Letters  of 
J.  G.  Whittier,  I,  363. 

Liberator,  19  Dec.  1851,  2,  9  Jan.  1852. 

Life  of  W.  L.  Garrison  by  his  children,  HI,  360. 


128  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

could  not  forget  the  effect  that  the  French  Revolution  had  had 
upon  its  welfare  and  its  fortunes.  Revolutions  and  revolutionists 
were  anathema  to  her  and  the  priests  lost  few  opportunities  to 
stigmatize  the  Hungarian  movement  and  its  leader.6 

In  conclusion,  the  mid-century  revolutions  and  their  aftermath 
had  several  important  effects  on  American  development.  Non- 
intervention in  European  affairs  became  more  firmly  rooted  in 
American  diplomatic  parlance  and  policy;  the  ferment  created 
by  Kossuth's  pleas  for  a  departure  from  the  established  practice 
led  to  a  reaffirmation  of  allegiance  to  Washington's  ideals,  and, 
simultaneously,  to  a  revulsion  of  feeling  towards  those,  particu- 
larly foreigners,  who  advocated  a  change.  That  feeling  crystal- 
lized and  played  a  part  in  the  formation  of  the  anti-foreign 
social  and  political  phenomenon  termed  "Know-Nothingism". 
If  the  Clay  compromise  measures  temporarily  allayed  the  anti- 
slavery  agitation,  that  movement  received  a  fresh  impetus  from 
the  visit  of  Kossuth,  a  preacher  of  freedom — the  impersonation 
of  1848.  American  thought  reverted  to  the  slavery  question 
with  a  fervor  and  intensity  never  before  witnessed.  But  amidst 
all  the  bluster  and  debate,  pro  and  con,  Americans  delighted 
in  the  European  movements  for  liberty  and  democracy  and 
were  eager  to  welcome  new  states  into  the  sisterhood  of  demo- 
cratic governments.  From  that  position  America  in  the  nine- 
teenth century  never  wavered. 


•  N.  Y.  Tribune,  13  JI.  1852;  N.  Y.  Herald,  26  Dec.  1851. 

Webster  to  Rives,  12  Jan.  1852,  Webster's  Works,  National  Edition,  II,  451. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  129 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I.    Contemporary  Source  Materials. 
A.    Letters: 

1.     Manuscript  Collections 
a.    Official 

Department  of  State: 

(1)  Instructions  to  Austria,  I. 

"  Prussia,  XIV. 
44  Turkey,  I. 
44        44  Special  Missions,  I. 

(2)  Notes  to  German  States,  VI. 

(3)  Reports  from  Austria,  II,  III. 

44    Belgium,  III,  IV. 
44    France,  XXXI-XXXIII. 
44     •     44    Great  Britain,  LVIII-LXI. 
44    Holland,  XIV. 
44    Prussia,  IV-VII. 
44    Russia,  XV. 
44    Turkey,  XI-XIII. 
44    Special  Agents  to  German  States    and 
Hungary. 

(4)  Reports  from  Consuls: 

44    Dresden,  I. 

44     Frankfort,  I. 
44  4<    Hesse-Cassel,  I. 

44    Leipzig,  I. 
44  44     Mannheim,  I. 

44    Marseilles,  V. 
44  44    Southampton,  I. 

44    Stuttgart,  I. 

44    Vienna,  I. 

(5)  Miscellaneous  Letters,  1848-52. 
Department  of  Navy: 

Captain's  Letters,  Jan -June,  1849,  Jl.-Dec,  1851. 
Cruise  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  1848-50. 
Executive  Letters,  1849. 
Mediterranean  Squadron,  1849-52. 
Officers,  Ships  of  War,  XLII,  XLIV,  XLVI. 
Record  of  Confidential  Letters,  I,  II. 


130 


Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 


b. 


Private 

Bird,  T.  M.              Papers  Library  of  University 

of  Pennsylvania. 

Breckenridge,  J.  C.        ' 

'      L.  C. 

Buchanan,  James          ' 

1      Hist.  Soc.  of  Penna. 

Chase,  S.  P.                   ' 

'      L.  C. 

Clay,  C.  M. 

1      L.  C. 

Clay,  Henry                    ' 

'      L.  C. 

Clayton,  J.  M. 

'      L.  C. 

Corwin,  Thos.                 ' 

4      L.  C. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.             ' 

'      L.  C. 

Donelson,  A.  J.              ' 

•      L.  C. 

Everett,  E.                     ' 

4      L.  C. 

Hammond,  J.  H.           * 

4      L.  C. 

Lieber,  F.                       ' 

4      L.  C. 

McClellan,  G.  B. 

'      L.  C. 

Mann,  A.  D.                   * 

'      L.  C. 

Marcy,  W.  L.                 * 

4      L.  C. 

Mason,  J.  M.                 ' 

4      L.  C. 

Morse,  S.  F.  B.              ' 

4      L.  C. 

Pierce,  F.                        ' 

4      L.  C. 

Sumner,  C.                     ' 

4      Library  of  Harvard 

University. 

Tyler,  J. 

4      L.  C. 

Van  Buren,  M.              ' 

4      L.  C. 

Walker,  R.  J. 

4      L.  C. 

Webster,  D.                   ' 

4      L.  C. 

Welles,  G. 

4      L.  C. 

Wilson,  H. 

4      Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 

Winthrop,  R.  C. 

4      Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  and  L.C 

Wise,  H.  A. 

4      L.C. 

2.     Printed  Collections: 
Bancroft,  E.  D.,  Letters  from  England,  1846-49,  New  York,  1904. 
Moore,  J.  B.,  Works  of  James  Buchanan,  12  vols.,  Phila.,  1908-11. 
Jameson,  J.  F.,  Correspondence  of  John  C.  Calhoun,  Amer.  Hist.  Ass.,  Rept., 

1899,  II. 
Cralle,  R.  10,  Works  of  J.  C.  Calhoun,  6  vols.,  New  York,  1853-55. 
Rowland,  D.,  Jefferson  Davis,  Constitutionalist,  etc.,  10  vols.,  New  York,  1923. 
Dickinson,  J.  R.,  Speeches  etc.,  D.  S.  Dickinson,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1867. 
Sioussat,  St.  G.  L.,  Letters  of  A.  J.  Donelson,  Tenn.  Hist.  Mag.,  vols.,  Ill,  VII. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  131 

Severance,  F.  H.,  Millard  Fillmore  Papers,  2  vols.,  Buff.  Hist.  Soc.,  X,  XI, 

Buffalo,  1907. 
Ambler,  C.  H.,  Correspondence  of  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  Amer.  Hist.  Ass.,  Rept., 

1916,  II. 
Nicolay,  J.  G.,  and  Hay,  J.,  Works  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  10  vols.,  New  York, 

1890-1914. 
Baker,  G.  E.,  Works  of  W.  H.  Seward,  5  vols.,  Boston,  1884. 
Pierce,  E.  L.,  Works  of  Charles  Sumner,  4  vols.,  Boston,  1894. 
Tyler,  W.  G.,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  2  vols.,  Richmond,  1885. 
Webster,  D.,  Writings,  etc.,  of  Daniel   Webster,   National  Edition,    12   vols., 

Boston,   1903. 
Van  Tyne,  C.  H.,  Letters  of  Daniel  Webster,  New  York,  1902. 
Webster,  F.,  Private  Correspondence  of  D.  Webster,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1856. 

B.    Newspapers,  1848-52:  Only  principal  ones  enumerated. 
1.    North 

Massachusetts:  Boston  Atlas 
The  Liberator 
New  Jersey:  Newark  Daily  Advertiser 
New  York:    Evening  Post 
Herald 
Tribune 
Pennsylvania:  Phila.  North  American  and  United  States  Gazette 
Phila.  Public  Ledger 
Phila.  Sunday  Despatch 

2.    South 

Alabama:  Mobile  Daily  Advertiser 
District  of  Columbia:   Wash.  Daily  Intelligencer 
Wash.  Daily  Union 
Wash.  Republic 
Georgia:  Augusta  Chronicle  and  Sentinel 

Savannah  Daily  Republican 
Louisiana:  New  Orleans  Bee  (broken  files) 
New  Orleans  Bulletin 
New  Orleans  Daily  Picayune 
So.  Carolina:  Charleston  Daily  Courier 

Charleston  Mercury 
Virginia:  Richmond  Enquirer 
Richmond  Whig 


132  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

3.    West 

Missouri:  St.  Louis  Republican 
Ohio:  Cincinnati  Daily  Enquirer 
Cincinnati  Gazette 

C.    Pamphlets: 
Bellew,  F.,  Kossuth  Coppered  or  the  Banquet  at  the   Capital  of  Laputa,  New 

York,  1852. 
Boardman,  H.  A.,  Kossuth  or  Washington?,  Phila.,  1852. 
Carter,  R.,  The  Hungarian  Controversy,  an  exposure  of  Slanders,  Boston,  1852. 
Crandall,  W.  L.,  Letter  on  Kossuth  and  His  Mission,  Syracuse,  1852. 
Gaylord,  N.  M.,  Kossuth  and  the  American  Jesuits,  Lowell,  1852. 
McCalla,  W.  L.,  A  Defense  of  Kossuth,  Phila.,  1852. 
Proceedings  at  the  Banquet  of  the  Jackson  Democratic  Association,  Washington, 

1852. 
Skinner,  P.  H.,  The  Welcome  to  Kossuth,  e  c,  Phila.,  1852. 
Thomas,?,  E  Pluribus  Unum,  Phila.,  1852. 
Wallcutt,  R.  F.,  Letter  to  Kossuth  Concerning  Freedom  and  Slavery,  Boston, 

1852. 

D.    Magazine  Articles: 
13  American  Review:  251.    America  and  Europe. 
15  "  "        73.     The  Policy  of  Non-intervention. 

8  Brownson's  Quarterly  Review:  198.     Webster's  Answer  to  Hiilsemann. 

9  "  "  "    493.    Politics  and  Political  Parties. 

2     Massachusetts  Quarterly  Review:     137.     The  German  Revolution  in  1848. 

17    Southern  Literary  Messenger:  505.    Hungary. 

25     The  Friend:  135.     Article  denouncing  the  clergy  for  their  fulsome  praise 

of  Kossuth. 
30     United  States  Magazine  and  Democratic  Review:  52,  554. 
Virginia  Historical  Register  and  Literary  Advertiser:  1848-52. 
Articles  on  Revolutions  and  Kossuth. 

E.    Governmental  Records: 
1.     National: 
Richardson,  J.  D.,  Messages  etc.,  of  the  Presidents,   10  vols.,  Washington, 

1896-99. 
Congressional  Globe,  1848-52. 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives,  Journals,  1848-52. 

11      "  "  Executive  documents,  1848-52. 

11        "        "      "  "  Miscellaneous  documents,  1848-52. 

65  Cong.,  2  Sess.,  Sen.  exec,  doc,  282. 

Mann  correspondence  in  re  Hungary. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  133 

2.    State: 
Acts  of  General  Assembly,  Alabama,  1851-2.  Montgomery,  1852. 

Georgia,  1851-2.  Milledgeville,  1852. 
Acts  etc.,  3rd  General  Assembly  of  Iowa.  Iowa  City,  1852. 
Acts  and  Resolves,  31st  Legislature  of  Maine.  Augusta,  1852. 
Acts  and  Resolves  of  General  Court  of  Massachusetts,  1852.  Boston,  1852. 
Acts,  76th  Legislature  of  New  Jersey.  Somerville,  1852. 
Laws  of  State  of  New  York,  73rd  Session.  Albany,  1850. 
Acts  of  48th  and  50th  General  Assembly,  Ohio.    Columbus,  1850,  1852. 
Laws  of  General  Assembly  of  Pennsylvania,  1852.    Harrisburg,  1852. 
Laws  of  Rhode  Island,  1852.    Providence,  1852. 

Acts  of  State  of  Tennessee,  29th  General  Assembly,  1  Sess.  Nashville,  1852. 
Acts  and  Resolves  of  General  Assembly  of  Vermont.  Montpelier,  1851. 

II.    Non- Contemporary  Source  Materials. 

A.     Biographies  and  Reminiscences: 
Brace,  E.,  Life  of  Charles  Loving  Brace,  New  York,  1894. 
Smith,  W.  L.  G.,  Life  and  Times  of  Lewis  Cass,  New  York,  1856. 
Schurz,  C,  Henry  Clay,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1887. 
Comegys,  J.  P.,  Memoir  of  J.  M.  Clayton,  Wilmington,  1882. 
Coleman,  C,  Life  of  J.  J.  Crittenden,  2  vols.,  Phila.,  1871. 
Johnson,  A.,  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  New  York,  1908. 
Willis,  H.  P.,  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  Phila.,  1910. 
Griffis,  W.  E.,  Millard  Fillmore,  Ithaca,  1915. 
Biography  of  Millard  Fillmore,  Buffalo,  1856. 

Garrison's  Children,  William  Lloyd  Garrison,  4  vols.,  New  York,  1894. 
Dubois,  P.  T.  and  Mathews,  G.  S.,  Galusha  Grow,  Boston,  1917. 
Crane,  W.  C,  Samuel  Houston,  Phila.,  1884. 
Hill,  H.  A.,  Memoir  of  Abbott  Lawrence,  Boston,  1883. 
Perry,  T.  S.,  Life  and  Letters  of  Francis  Lieber,  Boston,  1882. 
Mann,  M.  T.,  Life  of  Horace  Mann,  3  vols.,  Boston,  1865. 
Mason,  V.,  Life  of  J.  M.  Mason,  Roanoke,  1903. 
Meade,  R.  P.,  Life  of  Hiram  Paulding,  New  York,  1910. 
Memoir  of  General  Scott,  Washington,  1852. 
Lathrop,  T.  K.,  William  H.  Seward,  Boston,  1896. 

Johnston,  R.  M.  and  Browne,  W.  H.,  Life  of  A.  H.  Stephens,  Phila.,  1878. 
Howard,  O.  O.,  General  Zachary  Taylor,  New  York,  1892. 
Curtis,  G.  T.,  Life  of  Daniel  Webster,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1870. 
Barnes,  T.  W.,  Memoir  of  Thurlow  Weed,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1884. 
Pickard,  S.  T.,  Life  and  Letters  of  J.  G.  Whittier,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1894. 


134  Contemporary  American  Opinion  of  the 

Bigelow,  J.,  Retrospections  of  an  Active  Life,  5  vols.,  New  York,  1909. 

Boutwell,  G.  S.,  Reminiscences  of  Sixty  Years,  New  York,  1902. 

Fay,  T.  S.,  The  Revolution  of  1848  in  Berlin,  16  Galaxy,  244,  363. 

Hamilton,  J.  A.,  Reminiscences,  New  York,  1869. 

Richards,  L.  E.,  Letters  and  Journals  of  Samuel  G.  Howe,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1909. 

McCIure,  A.  K.,  Recollections  of  a  Half  Century,  Salem,  1902. 

Quaife,  M.  M.,  Diary  of  James  K.  Polk,  4  vols.,  Chicago,  1910. 

Poore,  B.  P.,  Perley's  Reminiscences,  2  vols.,  Phila.,  1886. 

Sargent,  N.,  Public  Men  and  Events,  2  vols.,  Phila.,  1875. 

Seward,  F.  W.,  Reminiscences  of  a  War  Time  Statesman  and  Diplomat,  New 

York,  1916. 
Seward,  F.  W.,  Seward  at  Washington,  3  vols.,  New  York,  1891. 
Stillman,  W.  J.,  Autobiography  of  a  Journalist,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1901. 
Ticknor,  G.,  Life,  Letters  and  Journals,  2  vols.,  London,  1876. 
Tribune  Almanac,  1848-52,  New  York,  1849-53. 
Harvey,  P.,  Reminiscences  of  Daniel  Webster,  Boston,  1909. 


B.    Special  and  General  Works. 

1.     Monographs  and  Special  Articles: 
Boutwell,  G.  S.,  Kossuth  in  New  England,  10  New  England  Mag.,  525. 
Curti,  M.  E.,  Austria  and  the  United  States,  1848-1852,  Smith  College  Studies 

in  History,  XI,  No.  3. 
Godwin,  P.,  Commemorative  Addresses,  New  York,  1895. 
Goodrich,  C.  F.,  America's  Part  in  the  Founding  of  the  German  Navy,  50  U.  S. 

Naval  Inst.  Proceedings,  252. 
Greene,  E.  B.,  Interaction  of  European  and  American  Politics,  1823-61,  9 

Hist.  Teachers'  Mag.,  142-3. 
Greenwood,  G.,  Washington  Before  the  War,  55  Independent,  1731. 
McGrane,  R.  C,  American  Position   on  the  German  Revolution  in  1848,  11 

Hist.  Outlook,  333. 
Moore,  J.  B.,  Kossuth,  the  Revolutionist,  10  Pol.  Sci.  Quar.,  95,  257. 
Nichols,  R.  F.,  The  Democratic  Machine,  1850-54.  Col.  Univ.  Series,  CXI,  I, 

New  York,  1923. 
Pivany,  E.,  Webster  and  Kossuth,  Phila.,  1909. 
Sproxton,  C,  Palmer ston  and  the  Hungarian  Revolution,  Cambridge  (Eng.), 

1919. 
Stillman,  W.  J.,  On  a  Mission  for  Kossuth,  26  Century  Mag.,  270. 
Wilson,  L.  M.,  Some  Hungarian  Patriots  in  Iowa,  11  Iowa  Jol.  of  History  and 

Politics,  479. 


Mid-Century  Revolutions  in  Central  Europe  135 

2.    General  Works: 
Annual  Register,  1848-52,  London,  1849-53. 
Blum,  H.,  Die  Deutsche  Revolution,  Florence  and  Leipzig,  1898. 
Cole,  A.  C,  The  Whig  Party  in  the  South,  Washington,  1913. 
DePuy,  H.  W.,  Kossuth  and  His  Generals,  Buffalo,  1852. 
Gorgei,  A.,  My  Life  and  Acts  in  Hungary  in  1848-49,  2  vols.,  London,  1852. 
Headley,  P.  C.,  Life  of  Louis  Kossuth,  Auburn  (N.  Y.),  1852. 
Leger,  P.  M.,  History  of  Austria-Hungary  to  1889,  London,  1889. 
Legge,  J.  G.,  Rhyme  and  Revolution  in  Germany,  London,  1919. 
McMaster,  J.  B.,  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  8  vols.,  New  York, 

1883-1913. 
Marx,  K.,  Revolution  and  Counter-Revolution,  Chicago,  1914. 

A  series  of  letters  to  the  New  York  Tribune, 
Maurice,  C.  E.,  Revolution  of  1848-49  in  Italy,  Austria  Hungary,  and  Germany, 

London,  1887. 
Moore,  J.  B.,  Digest  of  International  Law ,  etc.,  8  vols.,  Washington,  1906. 
Pike,  J.  S.,  First  Blows  of  the  Civil  War,  New  York,  1879. 
Pulsky,  F.,  Meine  Zeit  und  Mein  Leben,  3  vols.,  London,  1853. 
Pulsky,  T.,  Memoirs  of  a  Hungarian  Lady,  Phila.,  1850. 
Rhodes,  J.  F.,  History  of  the  United   States  since  the   Compromise  of  1850, 

7  vols.,  New  York,  1893. 
Smith,  T.  K.,  Parties  and  Slavery,  1850-59,  New  York,  1906. 
Stan  wood,  E.  A.,  History  of  the  Presidency,  Boston,  1898. 
Stiles,  W.  H.,  Austria  in  1848-49,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1852. 


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